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OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

I.—A CRITICISM OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.[1]

II.

IT would, I suppose, be generally held by those who regard the "Return to Kant" as the next step which English philosophy ought to take, that the 'Transcendental Analytic,' in which a metaphysical basis is constructed for physical science, is, of all Kant's work, the most immediately important for English students. To Kant himself, indeed, the negative and destructive side of the argument in the first *Kritik*, which is mainly developed in the 'Transcendental Dialectic,' was, I think, more fundamentally important than its positive side: he was more concerned to demolish dogmatic metaphysics than to establish physical science, of which the principles and procedures appeared to him to be adequately guaranteed by experience, without any transcendental deduction. But the destruction of Rational Psychology, Cosmology and Theology has but a remote interest for English students of philosophy. This kind of dogmatism has never been dominant among us since the time of Locke: some kind of rational theology, indeed, has been kept in existence by the argumentative needs of positive theology, but it can hardly be said that any system or method of rational theology—at least in the Kantian sense—is a force to be seriously reckoned

[1] Concluded from MIND XXIX.

with at present, in the region of independent philosophical speculation. At any rate all the schools of philosophy that were dominant in England when Kantism began to be preached—Empiricism Idealistic and Materialistic, and the philosophy of Common-sense as represented by Hamilton—agreed in accepting what we may speak of broadly as the negative results of the *Kritik;* and even granting that they got at these results too hastily and by too short cuts, still, it would hardly be of fundamental importance to return to Kant in order to reach the goal of philosophic nescience by a more regular road.

Again, it may reasonably be held that Kant himself attached paramount importance to what may be called the ontologically constructive part of his system, the establishment of the belief in "God, Freedom and Immortality" on the basis of practical faith. Indeed, for Kant as a man, we may almost say that the rest of his work was only valuable as leading up to these conclusions: and it is characteristic of Kant that he never seems to lose the man in the philosopher. But no serious attempt has yet been made, by those who are commending Kant to our notice, to lead the English mind to his moral theology: and since, as I explained in my former article, my concern now is not with Kant historically regarded but with Kantism offered as a method of dealing with our present philosophical problems, it would be idle to criticise the Kantian moral theology until some competent expositor seriously asks us to believe it.

It is, therefore, the theory of knowledge given mainly in the 'Analytic' which is to ground us in Kant; and it is accordingly against this theory that one who declines to be thus grounded is called upon to direct his main criticisms. It is true that the 'Analytic' presupposes the exposition of the forms of sensibility given in the 'Æsthetic'; but the only conclusion that it is needful—or even desirable—to carry from the latter to the former is just that Time and Space are necessary forms of sensibility. This is all, I conceive, that Kant holds to be requisite in order to explain how the synthetical *a priori* propositions of geometry or arithmetic are possible. The understanding, of course, has to grasp the particulars of *a priori* intuition in order to construct a mathematical proposition; but Kant does not consider that an explanation of this process is required for the establishment of the possibility of pure mathematics.

The question, then, which the elaborate analysis of the 'Analytic' is required to answer relates primarily to the legitimacy of the synthetical *a priori* propositions of rational

physics (including applied mathematics):—I say "legitimacy" because in the present article I shall not take Kant's argument as *assuming* the universal validity of such propositions, but as designed to establish their validity in respect of all objects of sensible experience.[1] This question is only directly dealt with in the part of the treatise which deals with the systematic presentation of the Principles of the Pure Understanding: to which accordingly, from this point of view, the preceding discussions must be considered merely as introductory. But in fact the problem which Kant is called upon to solve has become more comprehensive by the attainment of the conclusions of the 'Æsthetic'. If Time and Space are merely forms of our sensibility, our empirical cognitions of particular objects seem to require explanation as much as our universal cognitions relative to such objects. If things do not really exist in time and space independently of our consciousness, why do we ordinarily think of them as so existing, and why is this thought apparently confirmed by the whole of our experience, including the communicated experience of other human beings? What is the real significance of this mass of apparently certain and consistent cognitions, by an indefinite number of human beings, of one aggregate of material things, extended and moving in one space and perduring through one time?

This, I say, is the problem with which, I conceive, Kantism is called upon to deal; but it is importantly different from the problem with which Kant actually does deal, though I cannot perceive that he ever shows an adequate consciousness of the difference, while his English expositors appear to ignore it altogether. For instance, Mr. Watson tells us repeatedly that Kant offers an explanation of "the special facts of ordinary experience" (as well as "the laws embodied in each of the special sciences"); that "he sought for a hypothesis adequate to account for the facts in their completeness".[2] But Kant, so far as I am aware, nowhere

[1] See my former article, MIND XXIX., pp. 76-83. Since that article was written I have read with much interest Dr. Vaihinger's full and careful discussion of Kant's starting-point and procedure in his *Commentar zu Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, I., 2. I am glad to find myself in substantial agreement with the conclusions of this learned and acute commentator, at least on the most important questions raised by him.

[2] *Cf. Kant and his English Critics*, chap. 1. I must observe that Mr. Watson is peculiarly unfortunate in his language; since Kant has expressly repudiated, in the strongest possible terms, the notion that his reasoning involves a "hypothesis". *Cf.* Pref. to 1st ed., p. 9, "Ich habe mir selbst das Urtheil gesprochen dass in dieser Art von Betrachtungen . . . alles was einer Hypothese nur ähnlich sieht, verbotene Waare sei".

professes to explain—and certainly nowhere does explain—the apparent objectivity of our empirical cognitions so far as the *particular* characteristics of their objects are concerned; he is entirely occupied with their universal and necessary characteristics—which alone, in his view, are capable of being known *a priori*. He does not profess to give an account of what experience *is*, but what it *must* be; of the "rules of pure thinking of an object," "conceptions which may relate themselves to objects *a priori*," "principles without which no object can be thought".[1] How, indeed, could it be otherwise, if, as he has before told us, "no concepts which contain anything empirical are to be admitted" into Transcendental Philosophy?[2]

Let us take, then, the problem as Kant defines it, and endeavour to get a clear view of it, before we examine his method of solving it. In the first place, what precisely does Kant mean by the "Object," of which he proposes to determine the necessary conditions? What distinctions does he draw at the outset between objects and other nameables?

In the first place it seems evident that he does not, for the most part,[3] mean to include under this term all that, in a wider sense, we are accustomed to call "objects of thought" or "of knowledge". For instance, Logic, as Kant expressly tells us, is not concerned with objects: the forms of thought with which Logic deals are not "objects," for the general purposes of the 'Transcendental Analytic,' though of course capable of being scientifically known, and therefore of being compared and classified, and made the subjects of judgments universal and particular, affirmative and negative, categorical and disjunctive, &c. The "object" of Kant's transcendental analysis must have elements supplied by some sense. At the same time we cannot say that any feeling, or even any combination of feelings thought under one notion, can be an object in the narrower Kantian signification of the term. The latter might perhaps be inferred from the definition that Kant gives in one passage (§ 17, p. 118). "Object is that in the conception of which the manifold of a given intuition is united." But he has already explained ('Æsthetic,' § 3, p. 63) that the sensations of colours, sounds and heat, "because they are merely

[1] 'Transcend. Logik, Einleitung,' pp. 84, 5, 9. My references throughout are to Hartenstein's edition (1867).

[2] 'Einleitung,' p. 51.

[3] I insert this qualifying phrase, because there certainly seem to be some passages in which "Object" must be understood in this wider sense.

sensations and not intuitions, do not help us by themselves to know any object"; so that we cannot suppose that any synthesis of the manifold of such sensations would by itself constitute an object for Kant's purposes—not *(e.g.)* the synthesis of different sounds recalled under the notion of "the tune I heard last night". How then are we to distinguish the kind of sensible manifold of which the combination constitutes an object for Kant? So far as material objects are concerned,[1] we must, I conceive, identify it with what, in ordinary thought, is distinguished as an object of *perception* from mere sensation, by the implicit belief that it exists independently of our consciousness. Such an implicit belief, though Kant nowhere affirms it to be involved in the conception of an empirical object which he analyses, certainly seems to me to be more or less definitely suggested by much of the language that he uses about it. Take, for instance, the following (§ 14, p. 112): "All experience contains, besides the intuition of the senses, by which something is given, also a conception of an object which in the intuition is given, or appears". It seems clear that the object which is thought as appearing in the intuition is at the same time thought to exist independently of it: and the same may be said of the phrases elsewhere used, where an object is said to be thought "through" or "in relation to" a "Vorstellung".

In this way we seem led to the singular result that the combined manifold of sensible elements, which in Kant's view constitutes an object, can only be distinguished from other combined manifolds of feeling by a characteristic which Kant's theory declares to be illusory; the characteristic namely of being thought to have an existence independent of the perception in which it is presented. What I call outward objects are nothing but mere "modifications of my sensibility," merely "in me," "determinations of my identical self"; and yet in thinking of them as objects I inevitably think of them as existing independently of the modifications of my sensibility by which they are perceived. I do not see how this conclusion can be avoided; and yet I cannot perceive that Kant is ever clearly aware that the notion of an empirical object which he is occupied in determining *a priori* is a notion which contains this illusory element. On the contrary, in important parts of

[1] As the constructive importance of the 'Analytic' is explained by Kant himself to lie in its relation to the principles of physics, I may venture here to avoid the peculiar difficulties that I find in making Kant's view of "Selbst-anschauung" clear and consistent.

his argument he appears to me to forget that it is an illusion, in spite of the explicit language in which he has elsewhere characterised it as such. For we find among the characteristics of empirical objects laid down as *a priori* cognisable, that they must contain a (phenomenal) substance that is thought of as remaining unchanged amid all phenomenal change: but it seems impossible to think this and at the same time to think of all phenomena as merely modifications of my sensibility. Yet Kant nowhere seems conscious of this *primâ facie* contradiction, or makes any effort to explain it. It seems to him absurd that "the thing-in-itself" should "wander into my consciousness": yet, so far as I can see, neither he nor his English expositors find any difficulty in conceiving the phenomenal thing to wander out of it. Both he and they seem to hold that I can know objects to be merely modifications of my sensibility, combined in certain ways by my understanding; while at the same time I also conceive them as different from the modifications of my sensibility and as perduring when the latter cease. Indeed, this unconscious contradiction seems to run through Kant's use of his cardinal term "Vorstellung": the "Vorstellung" is now identified with its object, and now again contrasted with it, without any attempt at reconciling the two incompatible views. At one time we are told that "outward things are nothing but mere *Vorstellungen*,"[1] while again it is declared that, "the determination of my existence in time is only possible through the existence of real things which I perceive outside me and not through the mere *Vorstellung* of a thing outside me".[2] Will it be said that these really existent phenomenal things, though independent of *my* consciousness, are implicitly thought by me to be in relation to "consciousness in general," and that it is this relation which gives them their permanence, when they cease to be modifications of my sensibility? This—which resembles the Berkeleyan mode of reconciling Idealism and Common-sense—is an explanation certainly suggested by some passages in our recent English expositors of Kant. Thus (*e.g.*) Mr. Caird says,[3] that by the recognition of the data of sense as objective "the data of sense are taken out of their mere singularity as feelings, and made elements in a universal consciousness, in 'consciousness in general'; or, to put

[1] 'Æsthetic,' § 3, p. 64.

[2] In the 'Refutation of Idealism,' p. 198.

[3] *Philosophy of Kant*, c. viii., p. 341.

the same thing in another way, they are related to a consciousness, which the individual has, not as a mere individual, but as a universal subject of knowledge". But whatever happens to the data of sense in Kant's psychological laboratory, it is at any rate certain that they do not cease to be modifications of sensibility. Hence in order to explain how phenomenal things can be conceived to exist independently of my—or any other man's—sensibility, we should have to suppose not merely a rational consciousness which all men share, but a universal quasi-human sensibility, modified similarly to the human; and I need hardly describe the emphasis with which any such chimera would be repudiated by Kant.

I can only explain Kant's indifference to the difficulty above pointed out by referring it to the confusion—or at least fusion—that continually takes place in his mind between the phenomenal objects which are "insgesammt in mir," and the things-in-themselves of which the former are phenomenal. Here I am glad to find myself in close agreement with Mr. Caird, who says (c. v., p. 278) that Kant "treats the object which the understanding determines through synthesis of the manifold given in sense as *identical with, or at any rate phenomenal of,* the object that affects sense". To express my view exactly, I should vary Mr. Caird's phrase very slightly, and say that Kant always regards the one object as phenomenal of the other, but often identifies the two so completely that he speaks of both indifferently by the same name in the same passage, even in the very transcendental discussions in which the distinction between the two is of fundamental importance. Thus he tells us (§ 14, p. 111) that "two ways only are possible in which synthetical *Vorstellungen* and their objects can agree . . . either if the object alone makes the *Vorstellung* possible, or the *Vorstellung* alone makes the object possible. The former . . . is the case with phenomena in respect of what in them belongs to sensation"; whereas the latter, of course, is the case in respect of the forms of intuition and thought. Here it seems evident that the object which makes the *Vorstellung* possible so far as its sensational elements are concerned, cannot be the phenomenal object which is itself constructed out of such sensational elements; it must therefore be the noumenal object which affects sensibility; on the other hand it seems no less evident that the object which the *Vorstellung* makes possible must be the phenomenal object.

To sum up: the notion which Kant has formed of the

Object which he seeks to determine *a priori* is not adequately clear or consistent; for, in the first place, while interpreting objectivity to mean universal validity, he does not clearly recognise that the particular objectivity of our common material world, assumed in ordinary thought and the reasonings of physical science, lies beyond the range of his *a priori* explanation; and, in the second place, he surreptitiously includes in the notion of his (phenomenal) object the characteristic of existing in some manner independently of our sensibility, which is inconsistent with his reduction of its matter to mere modifications of our sensibility, combined and ordered by thought.

Let us now pass to consider the manner in which he deals with the problem as stated by himself; that is, with the ascertainment of the *a priori* characteristics of empirical objects. Before examining the particulars of Kant's treatment of this problem, we may, I think, reasonably scrutinise the general nature of the method adopted. As I before hinted, I do not claim, in asking how Transcendental Philosophy "is possible," to "suspend all Transcendentalists from their business" until the question has been satisfactorily answered: I am aware that in the progress of knowledge many things have been done which had been plausibly shown to be impossible, and perhaps the work of Transcendental Philosophy may be one of them. I only ask the general question, because the defects that I find in the details of Kant's method are just such as I should expect to find in the work of a philosopher who had never seriously applied to his own procedure the criteria by which that of his dogmatic predecessors had been tried and found wanting.

How, then, does Kant think that we can know the necessary intellectual conditions of experience? To a "dogmatic" metaphysician, of course, the question would not seem to present any particular difficulty; for these intellectual conditions are a part of the universe of being, and there would seem to be no obvious reason why they should not be known as well as anything else, and at least no *a priori* reason why they should not be known *a priori*. But the case is *primâ facie* different for Kant; since the great negative result of his 'Analytic' is that the categories or fundamental forms of thought are only of use for binding together the impressions of sensibility, and can only produce positive knowledge by their application to these impressions; so that no knowledge is possible of things that cannot be made objects of experience. But if we are unable to penetrate to things *beyond* experience, why should we be any more able to discover the

conditions which lie—if I may so say—*behind* it; since the latter cannot any more than the former become empirical objects, according to Kant's definition of the term?

To this question Kant's language in the 'Introduction' suggests the very naïve answer that I have got my mind by me and therefore must be able to find out all about it; so that there can hardly be any difficulty in framing a complete inventory of the "curta supellex" of my *a priori* possessions.[1] It does not clearly appear why the scantiness of our intellectual furniture should be thus taken for granted: *primâ facie*, the world of thought is as extensive as the world of things; how then can we know *a priori* that Thought's own resources are so limited? But granting this assumption, it is at any rate manifest that the inventory cannot be made out by any direct observation of my faculties, but only by a reflective analysis of their products, experience and thought about experience; and in fact, I presume, it is by such an analysis that Kant conceives logicians to have separated the formal *a priori* element furnished by the understanding in ordinary empirical judgments. Let us grant that this separation can be performed, and that the eleven or twelve forms thus obtained can be demonstrated to be necessary: it still seems to me unwarrantable to assume that they are derived from the mind and not from external sources. But as this fundamental assumption is common both to the 'Æsthetic' and to the 'Analytic,' it has been sufficiently dealt with in my former article, and I need not dwell upon it further. Here I will only observe that, even if we grant this assumption, and accept the general accuracy and "apodictic" certainty of the analysis of judgments performed by logicians: it still does not appear how the results of this analytical procedure can be known to have the systematic completeness which Kant repeatedly claims for them, and on which he lays great stress.[2] He seems to think that because the Understanding or Faculty of Judging has an essential unity—we will afterwards enquire how this, again, is known—therefore its fundamental forms have been obtained from a common principle, and therefore systematically, and therefore completely. But in fact he has established no kind of rational relation between the unity of the

[1] *Cf.* 'Einleitung,' § vii., p. 50. "Der Verstand . . . dessen Vorrath, weil wir ihn nicht auswärting suchen müssen, uns nicht verborgen bleiben kann," &c.

[2] *Cf.* 'Analytik der Begriffe,' 1st Hauptst. beginning pp. 91, 2, and the contrast of his method with that by which Aristotle's categories were obtained; also 3 Absch., p. 101.

understanding and the multiplicity of its forms—the categories are no more systematised by being referred to one understanding than beads are systematised by being strung on one string. What Kant does is simply to take these forms from the ordinary logic, subject to one or two changes for which the need, he thinks, is evident when we pass from the point of view of General to that of Transcendental Logic; and to assume their systematic completeness. His confidence in the traditional logic would seem to be due to what he notes as a remarkable characteristic of this science, *viz.*, that it was completed by its founder Aristotle, and has "taken no step forward" since his exposition. The characteristic would certainly be a remarkable one, if it were correctly attributed: but in fact it is rather Kant's historical blunder that is remarkable, since the very forms of judgment to which the Transcendental Philosophy gives special prominence—the different kinds of Relation—are not clearly or expressly distinguished by Aristotle, who pays no attention to any but categorical reasoning. There could not be a more striking proof that the method of reflective analysis, by which alone the forms of judgment and reasoning would seem to be ascertainable, does not ensure systematic completeness.

But let us suppose that Kant's inventory of the forms of judgment is perfect, and may be known to be so with apodictic certainty: the important part of his task still remains: he has to show with the same certainty how they are necessarily applied in our experience of objects. Now the cognition of an object through sense is not a judgment, though it may involve judgments, explicit or implicit: it requires, as Kant explains, the co-operation of Understanding, Imagination, and Sense: and it is in the account of this co-operation that the difficulty of obtaining any certain or trustworthy results by his method becomes most manifest. I suppose that every one who, accustomed to English empirical psychology, has come to Kant expecting to have the necessary conditions of experience demonstrated to him by a non-empirical method, must have felt astonished and bewildered at the elaborate psychological system put forward in the 'Transcendental Analytic'. Kant appears to be, if I may so say, at home among his faculties behind the scenes, where a process is supposed to go on of which only the results are presented on the stage of empirical consciousness: and in tracing this process he gives us statement after statement which if not empirical must be nakedly dogmatic—"synthetic *a priori*" propositions, in a region where it would seem that no *Anschauung* can be supposed to come in.

For instance; it is laid down at the very outset of the treatise that Sense is passive or "Receptivity," Understanding active or "Spontaneity"; and accordingly that sense-perceptions depend on "affections," conceptions on "functions" and "acts".[1] Now it is hardly necessary to say that Sense and Understanding are, in Kant's view, distinguishable by other characteristics besides the pair thus contrasted: *viz.*, that sense is the source of the concrete, particular element in our cognition, and Understanding of general notions. This is evident *(e.g.)*, from the argument in the 'Æsthetic' by which Space is shown to be a form of Sensibility as distinct from Understanding: since this argument does not introduce the distinction of "activity" and "passivity": its point consists entirely in showing that Space is not merely a generic term for many similar relations, including an indefinite number of spaces "under" it, but represents a concrete whole including "in" it all particular spaces. It seems clear therefore that in the statements that Sense is passive or a Receptivity and Understanding active or a Spontaneity we have, implicit or explicit, synthetical universal propositions; and hence, I conceive, Kant is bound to explain how these synthetical universals are supposed to be known. If they are to be "apodictically" certain, as is implied in Kant's account of his method, whence is this certainty to be derived? If it is obtained independently of ordinary experience we seem to require, on Kant's principles, some sort of transcendental intuition which shall present us not with things in space or events in time, but with the nature or relations of the "Vermögen" or "Fähigkeiten" of the human mind. If no such chimerical source of knowledge is assumed—and I need hardly say that it is not claimed by Kant—the only alternative is to suppose that reflection on ordinary experience shows us a *necessary* connexion of inactivity with particularity and of activity with generality in our cognitions. But if the terms "active," "receptive," &c., connote—as they seem to do—the presence or absence of the empirically known fact of volition, I cannot conceive how the connexion can be thought to be necessary; since experience—at least my experience—does not present it as universally subsisting: I can find numberless instances in my experience of general notions presenting themselves in

[1] "Functionen," "Actus," "Handlungen". I cannot profess to understand the exact relation of "Function" and "Handlung" in Kant's terminology; since I find that "Function" is stated to be "die Einheit der Handlung" &c., and on the other hand that "alle Urtheile" are "Functionen der Einheit".

consciousness without my being conscious of any antecedent volition: and I know no ground for assuming an unconscious volition in such cases. If, again, it be said that the terms "active" and "spontaneity" are not intended to imply conscious volition, I ask what conceivable attribute they can signify, and how this can be known, either in experience or out of experience, to be universally predicable of the mental source of general notions. Will it be suggested that the mind may be said to be "active" so far as the qualities or characteristics of *cognita* are regarded as effects of which the mind, and not anything outside the mind, is the cause? The least reflection will show that this cannot be Kant's meaning; since in this sense, "activity" must be attributed to the mind *quâ* sensible as well as to the mind *quâ* intellectual. For not only is the matter of sense-perception, according to Kant, necessarily "formed" by Sense no less than by Intellect; even this matter must be conceived to be what it is, partly because the human mind is such and such, and not merely because external causes are such and such.

I have laboured—I fear to the weariness of the reader—in endeavouring to find a plausible ground for this transcendental dogma of the essential activity of intellect in contrast to the passivity of sense, because the indirect importance of it in Kant's *a priori* construction of objects of experience appears to me very great; since it is, as I conceive, concerned in the parentage of two other synthetical universal propositions, which have somehow escaped the barrier of Criticism, and roam freely through the argument of the 'Analytic,' doing serious damage to its cogency. These are explicitly enunciated in the following passage at the commencement of the 'Deduction of the Categories,' as rewritten by Kant in his 2nd edition (§ 15, p. 114.)

"The connexion *(conjunctio)* of a manifold can never enter into us through the senses, . . . for it is an act of the spontaneity of the *Vorstellungskraft;* and as, in order to distinguish this from sensibility, we must call it understanding, we see that all connecting, whether we are conscious of it or not . . . is an act of the understanding. This act we shall call by the general name of *synthesis*, in order to show that we cannot represent to ourselves anything as connected in the object, without having previously connected it ourselves, and that of all *Vorstellungen* connexion is the only one which cannot be given through objects, but must be accomplished by the subject itself, because it is an act of its spontaneity."

It will be admitted that we have in this argument two synthetical universal propositions: first, that the Senses *cannot* be the source of that combinedness or connexion of manifold sense-data which is an element of the notion of an object of

experience: and, secondly, that the Understanding *must* be the source of this, being the sole faculty of synthesis. Now here again, as in the case of the proposition just discussed, I must ask the reader to bear in mind that my objections to Kant's argument are not dogmatic but critical: I do not profess to prove the contradictory of either of these fundamental assumptions: I merely urge that they require a justification which yet, on Kant's own principles, it seems impossible that they should obtain. How can I know as a necessary truth that the Faculty or Receptivity by which the concrete particular element of cognition is obtained cannot be the source of the unity in which the manifold data of sense are combined when thought of as qualities of an object? I imagine that Kant is led to affirm this dogma by first inferring from the physical separateness of the chief organs of sense that sensations, as physical facts, are originally separate and so require a process of combination, and inferring, secondly, from the passivity of sense that it cannot be the source of this combination. But it is, of course, obvious that we have here no concern with the physical antecedents or concomitants of sensation. From the point of view of transcendental analysis, I can only define Sense as the source of particular concrete elements of cognition; and if so, it is surely quite unwarranted, except on the assumption of some such transcendental *Anschauung* as I before suggested, to affirm that sense *cannot* present us with these elements as conjoined. Even supposing that in experience combination or conjunction was found to be always due to the activity of the mind—so far as this is empirically cognisable,—this empirical evidence could not, on Kant's principles, give his proposition the apodictic certainty with which he claims to lay it down.

But though the confirmation of experience could not supply Kant's argument with the basis that it requires, it may not be irrelevant to ask how far experience does confirm it. So far as my own experience goes, it seems to me certainly true that, for a clear and distinct perception of an object, some amount of voluntary attention is necessary: but it does not seem to me that the volition which thus comes in has any more relation to the unity of the object than it has to the manifold of sense-data: it rather appears that both the manifold elements and their conjunction are vaguely and obscurely given in the kind of sense-perception that can occur without conscious attention, and that both are *pari passu* raised out of this vagueness and obscurity by the voluntary act of attending to, or concentrating conscious-

ness on, them. Further, that the combination of sense-data may be perfectly involuntary would seem to be shown,—so far as experience can show it,—by the coalescence of primary and revived feelings through association to which our recent empirical psychology has given great prominence: since in many cases the coalescence is so complete that the distinctness of the elements is indiscernible in ordinary consciousness, and requires a trained faculty of analysis to apprehend it.

It may be said that this kind of coalescence is quite different from the conjunction of which Kant speaks, and could not give us our notion of the "unity" of the object. Even if this were granted, it would only make way for a similar argument against Kant's theory: since I do not see how the cognition of an object of perception as *one*, involving as it does a distinction of the one object from other concomitant sense-percepts, is in the least explained by Kant's reference of this unity to the necessary unity of self-consciousness. I have endeavoured to separate this reference from the argument discussed in the preceding paragraph, because I admit the proposition that self-consciousness[1] "must be able to accompany all my *Vorstellungen*" as one of which reflection shows the contradictory to be inconceivable. I cannot conceive a feeling, thought, or volition as mine, without conceiving it as referred to a permanent identical self; and in this reference it is implicitly conjoined with other phenomena of the same self. But I see no ground for identifying this conjunction with the conjunction of the manifold in an object. The differences between the two kinds of synthesis appear to me fundamental. First, self-consciousness accompanies all mental phenomena in the same manner—if not empirically in the same degree—and therefore conjoins all alike to each other; whereas an object is always known as distinguished from other objects and from merely subjective feelings of the percipient. Again, the essential characteristic

[1] I do not mean that this proposition is exactly Kant's: indeed in translating "das Ich denke" by self-consciousness I have excluded the implication that the "Ich" of self-consciousness is a "thinking" as distinct from a "feeling" Ego, in order not to anticipate the subsequent discussion as to the relation of self-consciousness to the operations of the understanding. I am also unable to follow Kant in the distinction that he endeavours to establish between "pure" self-consciousness, cognisable *a priori* as a necessary accompaniment of "Vorstellungen," and empirical self-consciousness. *E.g.*, his statement, "Das empirische Bewusstsein . . . ist an sich zerstreut und ohne jede Beziehung auf die Identität des Subjects," seems to me the reverse of true: I can suppose "Vorstellungen" to take place without self-consciousness, but I cannot conceive a consciousness accompanying these which does not involve a reference to the "identity of the subject".

of the unity given by self-consciousness is that it is a unity combining changes or successive differences: whereas the unity required for the notion of an object necessarily involves the combination of simultaneous differences. Indeed, if appeal be allowed to experience, nothing can be more manifest than that the conjunction of the varying elements of consciousness which is given by their reference to an identical self has no tendency to bind them into objective union. Thus *(e.g.)* when we wake from a dream, we are simultaneously conscious of the identity of our dreaming self with our waking self, and of the absence of any connexion between the apparently objective world of the dream and the world in which we find ourselves on waking.

But further: even if it were granted that the synthesis of the manifold in an object cannot be attributed to the mind *quâ* sensitive and merely receptive, but must be due to an "act of the spontaneity of the *Vorstellungskraft*," it still seems to me unwarrantable to identify the source of synthesis with the Understanding, as Kant has previously defined and used this term—that is, with the faculty of judgment, of which the fundamental forms are given in the list of categories. There is indeed a singular *naïveté* in the phrase by which Kant, in the passage above quoted, announces this identification. He says that "die Spontaneität der Vorstellungskraft" must be *called* Understanding "to distinguish it from Sense". But why must it be so called, or rather, *can* it be so called, consistently with the account that Kant has previously given of Understanding and its operations, without surreptitiously introducing a synthetical *a priori* proposition, at least as illegitimate as any of the dogmas of Rational Psychology that Kant afterwards attacks? What ground have we for assuming that the Faculty of Conception and Judgment or "mediate cognition through concepts" is also the faculty to which the synthesis that forms an object of perception out of sense-data is due; and accordingly assuming that the forms of judgment, as analysed and classified by logicians, will also regulate this latter synthesis? It is not enough to say that we cannot actually separate perception and conception, and that percepts can be "nothing to us as thinking beings" unless thought under general notions: because, so far as this is true, it is equally true of the sensations which Kant distinguishes as merely subjective, such as the "fine flavour of wine, which does not belong to the objective characteristics of the wine, even considered as a pheno-

menal object".[1] Such flavours, however, when reflected upon and considered merely as feelings, necessarily become —in the wider sense which I before distinguished from Kant's—'objects' of thought and judgment; they are classified in wider and narrower groups, distinguishable by differences of quality, which we apply as predicates in judging of all, some or one of the group, categorically, hypothetically or disjunctively. Thus I may judge that some or all various flavours are agreeable, that the flavour of this claret is full but not delicate, that if the flavour of Chablis be combined with that of oysters the pleasure of both is heightened, that the flavour of champagne is either sweet or dry, &c., &c. But it appears obvious to me, and I understand Kant to hold, that this application of the forms of judgment has no tendency to give objectivity—in the Kantian sense—to the merely subjective feelings thus reflectively compared and analysed: hence there is no apparent reason why it should have this effect in the case of the other sense-data which do become elements of phenomenal objects.

Again, even if it were granted that the object of experience is the result of a synthesis of which the modes or forms are identical with those of the faculty of judgment, I cannot see that it would follow necessarily that we should be able, as Kant says, to determine intuitions in reference to the categories: *e.g.*, to say *a priori* that among the manifold of sense-data we shall find some element that can only be thought as the subject of empirical judgments while other elements can only be thought as predicates. This determination, however, is essential for Kant's purpose of supplying a rational basis for physics. In considering this part of his argument it is necessary to take note of the distinction and relations conceived by him to exist between Understanding and Productive Imagination: which I have so far avoided noticing, because, while they have no fundamental importance in reference to my criticism, I could not pretend to give a consistent account of Kant's doctrine with regard to them: since he sometimes expressly distinguishes the synthesis of the Imagination from that of the Understanding, and sometimes, with equal definiteness, speaks of "one and the same spontaneity under the names of Understanding and Imagination". At any rate it is some operation of this double-named spontaneity acting on Time, the pure form of all sensible experience, which gives us the "Schemata" or

[1] 'Transc. Æsth.,' § 3, p. 63.

a priori rules for the application of the categories to phenomena: *i.e.*, certain "time-determinations" which must necessarily characterise objects of experience whatever the particular quality of their sensible matter may turn out to be. Now I cannot perceive that Kant gives any good reason for expecting to find this correspondence between categories and time-determinations: all that appears to me to follow from his previous arguments—granting them valid—is that, *if* in virtue of the forms of judgment we can affirm anything *a priori* of objects generally, it must be something relating to time. Since, however, he considers that he has worked out this correspondence with systematic completeness, let us proceed to examine its details.

According to Kant, the four classes of categories—Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality—are correlated respectively to the "series of time," the "content of time," the "order of time," and the "Zeitinbegriff in Ansehung aller möglichen Gegenstände". The last quoted phrase does not seem to me very lucid, especially as "Möglichkeit" is one of the categories whose application has to be determined; and since the schematism of the categories of modality does not lead to any distinct principles of *a priori* physics, I shall confine my remarks to the first three heads. In dealing with these it will be convenient to consider, along with the schemata, the principles that are supposed to be cognisable through the necessary application of the category in each case: for it is in this way that the forced and violent character of the whole procedure, especially as applied to the first two groups of categories, is most easily seen. To begin with the first head. The "schema" of Quantity—the time-determination by which the application of the logical category of Quantity to phenomena is regulated—is said to be Number. Number is a "Zeitbestimmung" which refers to the "series of time": and on this *a priori* application of the logical category of quantity to time depends the axiom that "all intuitions are extensive quantities". Now there is doubtless an important difference between logical quantity and arithmetical quantity: in passing from the former to the latter we advance from the merely indefinite plurality, involved in the relation between a general notion and the particulars which it classifies, to a perfectly definite plurality. But I cannot perceive that the transition introduces a time-determination. I do not see that the definite plurality involved in the notion of number has any more essential relation to our sense-perceptions than the logical categories have: and since Kant expressly tells us that his

categories "unabhängig von Sinnlichkeit blos im Verstande entspringen," I suppose that their essential characteristics must, in his view, be conceivable independently of any reference to our forms of sensibility. But if conceivable at all, they clearly must be conceived as *twelve:* their *twelveness* must be as independent of time as any other of their characteristics. And, more generally, it seems obvious that the parts of any logical whole, when definitely known, are as essentially numerable as the parts of a physical whole: so that in Kant's definition "number is the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition," the four last words appear to be an illegitimate restriction, according to his own view of the relation of Intuition to Thought. The only reason that Kant has for regarding Number as a time-determination would seem to be the fact that it takes time to count: the synthesis of which number is the result is effected, he says, "dadurch dass ich die Zeit selbst in der Apprehension der Anschauung erzeuge". But in counting six I do not make a synthesis of time any more than in the logical process of drawing a conclusion from premisses; though in each case the process no doubt occupies time. The parts of the number six, when conceived abstractly, are surely conceived as simultaneous, not successive: and whatever they are they are certainly not units of time.[1] But again: when we consider the schema of quantity in connexion with the principle based upon it, that "all intuitions are extensive quantities," we see that just as the transition from indefinite to definite plurality was ignored in Kant's account of the relation of the category to the schema, so here another important difference, that between discrete and continuous quantity, is unduly slurred over. I cannot say that Kant ignores it altogether: he certainly does mention it, as it were accidentally, in the course of a subsequent discussion of *intensive* quantity. But in all that he says of the extensive quantities or "homogeneous manifolds" of intuition, he does not hint that such quantities are continuous and not discrete; nor that some of the most familiar relations among them—as that between the circle and its radius—are incapable of being adequately represented

[1] I do not mean to say that Kant identifies the units of number with units of time: he is of course perfectly aware that the parts of time must be extended quantities. But I think that in his desire to work out his system symmetrically he goes as near this identification as he can without committing himself to a manifest error: when he says that "Arithmetik bringt ihre Zahlbegriffe durch successive Hinzusetzung der Einheiten in der Zeit zu Stande" (*Prolegom.*, § 10).

by the relations of definite numbers. If the ignoring of this distinction were merely a negative defect, it might be hypercritical to lay stress upon it; but it has, I conceive, helped to lead Kant into a positive misstatement. He says[1] that an extensive quantity is one in which the "Vorstellung" of the parts makes the "Vorstellung" of the whole possible, and therefore necessarily precedes it. Now if such quantities were discrete and consisted of a finite number of units, this might be said; but I do not see how it can be said of an extended quantum which is necessarily conceived as continuous and divisible without limit. Surely there is a serious error—which Kant's dialectical acumen would have been sure to note in any other writer—in the statement that in thinking any portion of time I think a successive progress "wo durch alle Zeittheile und deren Hinzuthun endlich eine bestimmte Zeitgrösse erzeugt wird"; so far as it implies, as it certainly seems to imply, that a definite consciousness of the parts precedes the consciousness of the whole. For, of however many parts we may be definitely conscious in forming the notion of a given time or line, as all these parts are themselves extended quantities, they must be conceived as in their turn divisible into other parts of which the definite consciousness has *not* preceded.

I have laid stress on this misstatement, because it seems to me a good illustration of the incorrectness of Kant's general assumption that the understanding "cannot separate what it has not previously bound together," in its application to phenomena. In my view the essential function of thought, in all its departments, is not primarily or mainly the binding together of isolated elements into a whole; but a process by which we pass from the consciousness of some vague manifold, the elements of which are (1) obscurely thought or even (2) have a merely potential existence, to a consciousness of the same manifold as not only more connected, but more distinct in its parts, and not only more distinct but fuller. Now in other parts of Kant's treatise he seems to me to recognise at least implicitly both effects of this process: thus in his account of analytical judgments ('Einleitung,' § iv., p. 40) he expressly notes the progress from obscurity to distinctness in the elements of a conception: and in his discussion of the 'Transcendental Ideal' he seems at least to suggest the progress from potential to actual fulness in our notions of individual objects. But in the 'Transcendental Analytic' he views the function of the Understanding as *merely* one of

[1] 'Axiomen d. Anschauung,' p. 156.

synthesis of what is given as separate, and accordingly falls, in the region of mathematics, into the manifest error just noticed.

I hold, therefore, that no support can be derived for Kant's general theory of Schemata from his application of it to the particular case of Quantity. But if the schematism of Quantity breaks down, that of Quality fares, I must say, much worse. I remember that an old commentator of Leibniz, when he comes to the *Monadology*, cannot refrain from suggesting that his author's real aim must have been to try "quousque tandem pergeret bruta hominum assentiendi humilitas". No one would think of attributing such a motive, even in jest, to the earnest and candid Kant; but I do not find in this part of his reasoning the patient ingenuity which rarely deserts him even when he is most astray from truth; and it seems to me to require a "bruta assentiendi humilitas" to accept it as a cogent establishment of the relation which he declares to exist between the (logical) quality of a judgment and the intensive quantity of a phenomenon.

He begins by affirming dogmatically that "reality is that in the object which corresponds to feeling . . . the transcendental matter of all objects". The statement appears to me surprising, and inconsistent with language used by Kant elsewhere. I do not understand why reality should be thus equated to matter alone, instead of form and matter combined. I should have thought that, though space and time were not real in abstraction, they were at any rate real as elements of formed phenomena: and I should have thought that Kant distinctly held this view, since he repeatedly asserts that in his system space and time have "empirical reality" —and it is with empirical reality that he is here concerned. But, suppose this proposition granted, I should have thought that the schema of the category of Reality was thus obtained: that the categories of Reality and Negation, in their application to phenomena, would be interpreted as representing the presence and absence respectively of Feeling, regarded as the content of Time. This, however, would not suit Kant's purposes; as he is desirous of connecting his schema with the principle that "the real in all phenomena has intensive quantity," and is capable of continuous diminution down to zero; and hence he lays down that the schema of a reality is the "continuous and uniform production of it in time". Now here again I wish to make clear that I am not raising any question as to the truth or falsehood of the above-mentioned proposition—or rather propositions, since

there are two which do not necessarily involve each other: I am only unable to understand the grounds on which Kant claims acceptance for them. They obviously cannot be generalisations from experience; and it seems absurd to say that they can follow necessarily from the application of the categories of Reality and Negation to the content of Time. For there is nothing more evident about the logical antithesis of affirmation and negation, when abstractly contemplated, than its absoluteness, and the apparent absence of any possible mediation or transition between the two terms. It presents itself as the simplest form, the purest essence, of all antithesis: that a thing must either be or not be is one of the fundamental "laws of thought" in the logical tradition. No doubt, in the physical world we find continuous transition everywhere; which constitutes a serious difficulty in applying to nature the results of logical analysis and division. But this *primâ facie* unadaptedness of logic to fact Kant does not in any way overcome: he simply *jumps* from the one to the other by the aid of an unwarranted dogma that "every feeling has a degree or quantity by which it can fill the same time more or less till it vanishes into nothing"—a dogma which is, in fact, substantially the principle itself that is afterwards supposed to be proved by it.

Not less remarkable is the deduction which Kant makes from his principle of the 'Anticipations of Perception': *viz.*, that we cannot have experience of a vacuum. We are first told that reality corresponds to feeling, and negation to absence of feeling; and the possible continuous diminution of the real down to zero is inferred as corresponding to a similar diminution of feeling. But then we suddenly find that we somehow know *a priori* that "every sense *must* have a definite degree of receptivity," and accordingly that below the point at which any kind of sensation stops—below what we may call the sensible zero—the transcendental matter corresponding to such sensation must be still conceived as possibly existing, in any one of an indefinite number of continually diminishing degrees. Thus "we see that experience can never supply a proof of empty space or empty time, because the total absence of reality in a sensuous intuition can never be perceived, neither can it be deduced from any single phenomenon, and from the difference of degree in their reality; nor ought it ever to be admitted in explanation of them": and thus the schematism of the category of Negation seems to end by demonstrating its strict inapplicability to phenomenal reality.

I hardly know where to begin to criticise this singular

argument. (1) If the matter of all phenomenal objects consists of mere modifications of our sensibility, how can we consistently suppose a phenomenal object to exist corresponding to modifications which, by the very nature of our sensibility, cannot possibly occur? And (2), if we could suppose this, by what transcendental intuition do we know that our senses *must* be incapable of perceiving phenomenal reality below a certain degree? And (3), even granting that we must suppose as possibly existent a phenomenon that cannot possibly appear, and therefore that we can never have direct experience of void space and time, it still is not clear why the assumption of such a void can never be admitted as an explanation of phenomenon: for, granting that an apparent void cannot be known to be real, it does not surely follow that it must be known to be merely apparent. And, finally, it seems to me that this corollary from the 'Anticipations of Perception' must land us in serious difficulties when we try to make it consistent with Kant's express interpretation of the first 'Analogy of Experience'—to the discussion of which I will now proceed.

The schematism of the categories of Relation—at any rate of the first two pairs—and the establishment of the corresponding *a priori* principles form a part of Kant's doctrine which has, on various grounds, more interest for most students than what has just been discussed. For, first, the principles in question are propositions which we commonly regard as requiring some kind of proof, whereas the 'Axioms of Intuition' would commonly be thought to be self-evident: secondly, the proof that Kant offers in each case, is one that does not seem to need as a basis Kant's general doctrine as to the relation of the understanding and its categories to time and the schemata; it would remain to be dealt with on its merits even if that general doctrine were abandoned as untenable; while at the same time, as was before said, the relation of the categories to time-determinations does not here appear to be so forced and artificial as it does in the case of the other categories. The relation of logical Subject to its Predicates is clearly analogous in some way to the relation of phenomenal Substance to its Accidents: substance, again, is conceived as remaining permanent while its accidents change: so that it is at any rate a plausible view that the schema of the category of subject—that in phenomena which may be known *a priori* to be cogitable only as subject and not as predicate—is the permanent. There are, however, two objections to the doctrine. In the first place we can obviously apply, and do

in ordinary thought apply, the category of subject to other elements of experience or consciousness besides the permanent matter that we conceive as underlying phenomenal change: all *cognita* whatever—not merely accidents as well as substances, but the merely subjective feelings which Kant distinguishes from the objective characteristics of phenomenal objects, must be made subjects of predication when our knowledge respecting them is made explicit: hence there does not seem to be any reason why we should also find for the category a special application to something that *cannot* be thought as predicate. And secondly, so far as we conceive the permanent substance as something that possesses equally permanent attributes, the distinction of subject and predicate is inevitably reintroduced *within* this notion of substance which is put forward as corresponding to subject only. And Kant, of course, does conceive his substance as having the attribute of quantity, which remains as unchanged as the substance: his first 'Analogy of Experience' expressly states "that the *quantum* of substance in nature is neither increased nor diminished".

Let us now consider the transcendental proof which Kant offers of this principle—which may, as I have said, be taken quite independently of the doctrine of the categories and their schematism. The proof is briefly this. All phenomena exist in Time, which does not itself change, all change having to be thought in it. As Time "für sich" cannot be perceived, there must be in objects something to represent time, unchanging and of which all change can only be thought as a determination. This is Substance: as it cannot change, its quantum cannot be decreased or increased.

Now, first, it does not seem to me true—that is, not truly to represent our common thought as expressed in our common language—to say in this absolute way that "Time does not change". I should say that change and permanence, succession and duration are inextricably combined in our notion of time, so that it is as true to say "Time *passes*" as that Time abides. However, I will not dwell on this point, as I am quite prepared to admit that I cannot conceive change without the conception of somewhat that remains unchanged besides Time. But I see no reason why this somewhat should necessarily be conceived as permanently unchangeable. For instance: suppose a manifold is presented consisting of elements which we may represent by the four letters *abcd*: it appears to me that I can perfectly well conceive the four elements changing one after another so that ultimately an entirely new manifold $a_1b_1c_1d_1$ should be

found to have substituted itself for *abcd;* provided that, while *a* is changing into a_1, *bcd* remains unchanged, and so on for each of the four elements.

Perhaps it may be said that this presentation of coexistent elements is not really possible, because "our apprehension is always successive"; or, as Kant states it more definitely in the 'Deduction of the Categories' in his first edition, "as contained in one moment, each *Vorstellung* can never be anything but absolute unity". I just note that we have here another of those strange dogmas of Transcendental Psychology which Kant can neither consistently support by an appeal to an experience nor claim to know *a priori:* and I remark further that this particular dogma is altogether contrary to my own experience, so far as I can know it by reflection; since I am continually conscious of an apparently presented manifold of quite simultaneous sensations and sense-perceptions. But even if it were granted that "apprehension," strictly speaking, is always serial; I do not see how Kant can deny that I can have a simultaneous manifold in my consciousness somehow, whether it be strictly presented or partially represented; and this is all that I require for the purposes of the above argument.

The notion, then, of an absolutely permanent substance does not appear to me to be necessarily involved in the notion of change, as Kant argues: and I do not see that he gives any other cogent reason for affirming *a priori* the existence of such a substance in nature. There are, moreover, other difficulties in the way of accepting his account of the notion. The language in which he introduces it seems to imply that substance can itself be perceived; since the necessity of finding it in the objects of perception is expressly stated to follow from the fact that "die Zeit für sich" cannot be perceived, and the consequence would seem to fail if Substance also was incapable of being "für sich wahrgenommen". Yet, whatever precise meaning we give to the words last quoted, it is hard to see how the characteristic they express can be attributed to Substance, as Kant conceives it—"the substratum of all the real"—any more than to Time. Then, again, what kind of quantity is it that is attributed to substance? Kant has distinguished two kinds of quantity, extensive and intensive: does he mean to attribute both, or if not, which of the two? There seems no doubt that he conceives his Substance as extended in space, as he identifies it with the Matter of which physicists assume the permanence. It remains, therefore, to ask whether the parts of this extended substance differ in their intensive

quantity or not. He has already, in discussing the 'Anticipations of Perception' rejected the assumption that "das Reale im Raume allerwärts einerlei sei": hence we must suppose that the parts of his Substance have different intensive quantities. But thus his Substance turns out to be an aggregate of heterogeneous substances: and yet, as the ground for assuming its existence was that we might have something to represent, in Mr. Caird's words, the "unity or self-identity of time itself," this heterogeneity is surely a very singular and inappropriate characteristic.

Here I must conclude. The category of Causality, which I refrain from touching, is perhaps the most interesting of all: on the other hand, the amount of discussion—in the English language—which has recently been bestowed on this is so disproportionately large, that I shrink from adding anything to it, if it be not absolutely necessary. The tree is known by its fruits, but it is hardly needful to dissect them all; and I conceive that I have already examined the particulars of Kant's system sufficiently to support my general objections to his method. In conclusion, I will only say that my objections are not urged from the point of view either of Empiricism or of the Common-sense Philosophy. I do not hold either that our common *a priori* assumptions respecting empirical objects require no philosophical justification, or that verification by particular experiences is the only justification possible. But I see no ground for expecting to get anything better by the method which Kant has miscalled 'Criticism'. This, as I have tried to show, is as dogmatic—in the worst sense of the term—as that of any preceding metaphysician: and I do not see that we are likely to gain by exchanging the natural and naïve dogmas of the older "transcendent" ontology, for the more artificial and obscure, but no less unwarranted, dogmas of this newer "transcendental" psychology.

H. SIDGWICK.

II.—MAIMONIDES AND SPINOZA.

Prof. Schaarschmidt in his excellent preface to Spinoza's *Korte Verhandeling van God, &c.* (Amsterdam, 1869), has drawn attention to the somewhat one-sided view usually taken of Spinoza's position in the evolution of thought: the importance attributed to the influence of Descartes and the slight weight given to the Jewish writers. He concludes his considerations with the remark:—"Attamen in gravissimis rebus ab eo (Cartesio) differt et his ipsis cum Judæorum philosophia congruit, quorum quidem orthodoxiam repudiavit, ingenium ipsum et mentem retinuit." (Præfatio xxiv.)

The subject is all the more important because even an historian like Kuno Fischer (*Gesch. der neuern Philos.*, 3rd ed., 1880) still regards Spinoza as a mere link after Descartes in the chain of philosophical development, rejecting the view that he belongs rather to Jewish than Christian Philosophy. The hypothesis that Spinoza was very slightly influenced by Hebrew thought has become traditional and is to be found in the most recent English works on Spinoza. Mr. Pollock writes that the influence of Maimonides on the pure philosophy of Spinoza was comparatively slight (p. 94). Dr. Martineau tells us somewhat dogmatically that "no stress can be laid on the evidence of Spinoza's indebtedness to Rabbinical philosophy" (p. 56). These opinions seem in part based on a perusal of Maimonides's *More Nebuchim* and of Joël's *Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinozas* (1871), taken in conjunction with Mr. W. R. Sorley's "Jewish Mediæval Philosophy and Spinoza" in MIND XIX. Neither Mr. Pollock nor Dr. Martineau seems acquainted with Maimonides's *Yad Hachazakah*. It is to the relation of this work to Spinoza's *Ethica* that I wish at present to refer.[1]

Maimonides (1135-1204) completed his *More Nebuchim* about 1190, its aim being to explain on the ground of reason the many obscure passages of Scripture and apparently irrational rites instituted by Moses. Hence the book was termed the "Guide of the Perplexed," being intended to lighten the difficult path of Biblical study. As might easily

[1] While on the subject of works concerning Spinoza and Jewish Philosophy I may give the following titles:—E. Saisset, "Maimonide et Spinoza," *Revue des deux Mondes*, 1862; Salomo Rubinus, *Spinoza und Maimonides*, Vienna, 1868.

be supposed it is only concerned in the second place with philosophical ethics. The influence of such a book on Spinoza is, as might be expected, most manifest in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.* The *Yad Hachazakah,* however, or the "Mighty Hand," written some ten years previously, has far greater importance for the student of Spinoza's *Ethica.* Its author originally termed it "The Twofold Law," *i.e.,* the written and traditional law—Bible and Talmud,—and under 14 headings or books considered some of the most important problems in theology and ethics. Portions of the *Yad* were in 1832 translated by Herman Hedwig Bernard and published in Cambridge under the title:—*The Main Principles of the Creed and Ethics of the Jews exhibited in selections from the Yad Hachazakah of Maimonides.* Of this book I propose to make use in the following remarks on the thought-resemblance between Spinoza and Maimonides.[1] I shall omit all matter which has not direct bearing on Spinoza's *Ethica,* however interesting it may otherwise be, and endeavour to make allowance for the age and theologico-philosophical language in which Maimonides wrote. We have rather to consider the spirit in which Spinoza read the *Yad* than that in which it was composed.

[1] Two other translations of the First Book of the *Yad* may be mentioned, both "edited" by the Polish Rabbi, Elias Soloweyczik. The first —into German (Königsberg, 1846)—omits the last or fifth part of the First Book containing: "The Precepts of Repentance". The second—into English (Nicholson, 1863)—nominally contains all five parts, but really omits many of their most interesting sub-chapters (*e.g.,* Part III., c. v.-vii., on the relation of a scholar to his teacher and on respect for the wise). This English edition too loses much of its scientific value owing to the omission or perversion of many paragraphs where the editor has with a very false modesty thought Maimonides too outspoken for modern readers. On the title-page stand the words: "Translated from the Hebrew into English by several Learned Writers." The chief of these "Learned Writers" is Bernard, who has been freely used without apparent acknowledgment. Portions of the remainder appear to be translated from the German and not directly from the Hebrew. Appended to this English Edition is a translation of the 5th Chapter of Book xiv. of the *Yad:* or "Laws concerning Kings and their Wars". Whatever may have been the causes which gave rise to this so-called English translation, it must be noted that Soloweyczik's German translation is an independent work, suffering from none of these faults and of considerable value to the student of Maimonides.

Before entering upon a comparison of the intellectual relation of Maimonides to Spinoza, I may refer to a close connexion between Spinoza's method of life and Maimonides's theory of how a wise man should earn his livelihood. It seems to me the key-note of Spinoza's life by the optical bench,—his refusal of the professorial chair. "Let," writes Maimonides, "thy fixed occupation be the study of the Law" (*i.e.,* divine wisdom) "and thy worldly pursuits be of secondary consideration." After stating that

Let us first of all consider Maimonides's conception of God. This is contained in the "Precepts relating to the Foundations of the Law," and the "Precepts relating to Repentance," especially in the chapters entitled by Bernard "On the Deity and the Angels" (p. 71) and "On the Love of God and the true way of serving Him" (p. 314), which correspond roughly to *Ethica* i. and v. of Spinoza. Maimonides, to start with, sweeps away all human attributes and affections from the Godhead. God has neither body nor frame, nor *limit* of any kind; He has none of the accidental qualities of bodies—"neither composition nor decomposition; neither place nor measure; neither ascent nor descent; neither right nor left; neither before nor behind; neither sitting nor standing; neither does he exist in time, so that he should have a beginning or an end or a number of years; nor is he liable to change, since in Him there is nothing which can cause a change in Him." (B. 78.) Add to this, God is *one*, but this unity is not that of an *individual* or a material body "but such an One that there is no other Unity like His in the Universe." (B. 73.) That God has similitude or form in the Scripture is due only to an "apparition of prophecy"; while the assertion that God created man in His own image refers only to the soul or intellectual element in man. It has no reference to *shape* or to manner of life but to that knowledge which constitutes the "quality" of the soul. (B. 106.) The "pillar of wisdom" is to know that this first Being exists, and "that He has called all other beings into existence, and that all things existing, heaven, earth and whatever is between them, exist only through the truth of His existence, so that if we were to suppose that He did not exist, no other thing could exist." (B. 71.) Among the propositions which Spinoza in the Appendix to *Ethica* i., tells us that he has sought to prove are, that God exists necessarily:—"quod sit unicus; —quod sit omnium rerum causa libera, et quomodo; quod

all business is only a means to study, in that it provides the necessities of life, he continues: "He who resolves upon occupying himself solely with the study of the Law, not attending to any work or trade but living on charity, defiles the sacred name and heaps up contumely upon the Law. Study must have active labour joined with it, or it is worthless, produces sin, and leads the man to injure his neighbour." . . . "It is a cardinal virtue to live by the work of one's hands and it is one of the great characteristics of the pious of yore, even that whereby one attains to all respect and felicity of this and the future world." (After *Soloweyczik*, Part III., Chap. iii., 5-11). Why does Spinoza's life stand in such contrast to that of all other modern philosophers? Because his life at least, if not his philosophy, was Hebrew!

omnia in Deo sint, et ab ipso ita pendeant, ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possint"—words which might almost stand as a translation of Maimonides. *Cf.* also *Ethica* i. 14 and Corollary, and 15.

That God is not divisible (B. 73) Spinoza proves, i. 13; that He is without limit, i. 19 or better, *Principia Cartesii* 19; that God is incapable of change, i. 20, Coroll. 2; the notion that God has body or form is termed a "childish fancy," i. 15, Scholium; while the infinite and eternal nature of God is asserted at the very commencement of the *Ethica*. Add to this that Maimonides's conception of the Deity, without being professedly pantheistic, is yet extremely anti-personal and diffused. Still more striking is the coincidence when we turn to the denial of human affections: Maimonides tells us that with God "there is neither death nor life like the life of a living body; neither folly nor wisdom, like the wisdom of a wise man; neither sleep nor waking; neither anger nor laughter; *neither joy nor sorrow*; neither silence nor speech, like the speech of the sons of men". (B. 79.) Compare with this Spinoza's assertions that the intellect of God differs *toto cælo* from human intellect (i. 17, Schol.) and that "God is without passions and is not affected by any emotion *of joy or sorrow*"—"He neither loves nor hates anyone" (v. 17 and Coroll.).

Curiously enough, while both Maimonides and Spinoza strip God of all conceivable human characteristics, they yet hold it possible for the mind of man to attain to some, if an imperfect, *knowledge* of God, and make the attainment of such knowledge the highest good of life. There would be some danger of self-contradiction in this matter, if their conception of the Deity had not ceased to be a personal one, and become rather the recognition of an intellectual cause or law running through all phenomena—which, showing beneath a material succession an intellectual sequence or mental necessity, is for them the Highest Wisdom, to be acquainted with which becomes the end of human life. This intellectual relation of man to God forms an all-important feature in the ethics of both Maimonides and Spinoza; it is in fact a vein of mystic gold which runs through the great mass of Hebrew thought.[1]

[1] The Talmudic picture of the world to come where "the righteous sit with their crowns on their heads delighting in the shining glory of the Shechinah" is thus interpreted: their crowns denote intelligence or wisdom, while "delighting in the glory of the Shechinah" signifies that they know more of the truth of God than while in this dark and abject body. The attainment of wisdom as the self-sufficient end of life is one of the

Before entering upon Maimonides's conception of the relation of God to man, it may be as well to premise what he understands by *intelligence*. The Rabbinical writers oppose the term *quality* or *property* to the term *matter* (B. Note p. 82); most frequently, and in the *Yad* invariably, when the two terms are opposed, the former signifies intelligence or thought; so that in the language of Spinoza we may very well term them *thought* and *extension*. If we leave out of account the angels, to whom Maimonides rather on doctrinal and theological than on philosophical grounds assigned an anomalous position, we find that all things in the universe are composed of matter and quality (*i.e.*, extension and thought) though possessing these attributes in different degrees. These degrees form the basis of all classification and individuality. (B. 82-84.) We now arrive at a proposition which may be said to form the very foundation of Spinoza's *Ethica*: "You can never see matter without quality, nor quality without matter, and it is only the understanding of man which abstractedly parts the existing body and knows that it is composed of matter and quality". (B. 105.) This coexistence of matter and quality or extension and thought is carried even, as in Spinoza's case, throughout all being. Even "all the planets and orbs are beings possessed of soul, mind and understanding". (B. 97.) Spinoza in the Scholium to *Ethica* ii. 13, remarking on the union of thought and extension in man continues—"nam ea, quae hucusque ostendimus, admodum communia sunt, nec magis ad homines quam *ad reliqua Individua pertinent*, quae omnia, *quamvis diversis gradibus*, animata tamen sunt". The parallelism is all the more striking in that in this very Scholium a classification is suggested based on the *degrees* wherein the two attributes are present in individuals. Dr. Martineau, in a note on this passage (p. 190), remarks on a superficial resemblance between Giordano Bruno and Spinoza: "Bruno animates things to get them into action; Spinoza to fetch them into the sphere of *intelligence*." It will be seen at once how Spinoza coincides on this point with Maimonides, who wished to explain how it is that all things in their degree know the wisdom of the Creator and glorify Him. Each intelligence, according to the latter philosopher, in its degree can know God; yet none know

highest and most emphasised lessons of the Talmud and its commentators. The strong reaction against a merely formal knowledge at the beginning of our era led the founder of Christianity and his earlier followers to a somewhat one-sided view of life which neglected this all-important truth.

God as he knows himself. From this it follows that the measure of man's knowledge of God is his intelligence. With regard to this intelligence it may be remarked that Maimonides identifies it—that "more excellent knowledge which is found in the soul of man"—with the "quality" of man, *i.e.*, his thought-attribute, and that this "quality" of man is for him identical with the soul itself. (B. 105.) The bearing of all this on Spinoza's theosophical conceptions must be apparent; yet this is but a stage to a far more important coincidence—the principle, namely, that the *knowledge of God is associated always in an equal degree with the love of God:* what Spinoza has termed the "*Amor Dei intellectualis*". Understanding the work of God is "an opening to the *intelligent* man to love God," writes Maimonides. (B. 82.) Further, "a man however can love the Holy One, blessed be He! only by the knowledge which he has of Him; so that his love will be in proportion to his knowledge; if this latter be slight the former will also be slight; but if the latter be great the former also will be great. And therefore a man ought solely and entirely to devote himself to the acquisition of knowledge and understanding, by applying to those sciences and doctrines which are calculated to give such an idea of his Creator as it is in the power of the intellect of man to conceive." (B. 321.) This intellectual love of God is for Maimonides the highest good; the bliss of the world to come will consist in the knowledge of the truth of the Shechinah; the greatest worldly happiness is to have time and opportunity to learn wisdom (*i.e.*, knowledge of God), and this maximum of earthly peace will be reached when the Messiah comes, whose government will give the required opportunities. (B. 308, 311, &c.) Furthermore, the intensity of this intellectual love of God, this pursuit of wisdom, is insisted upon: the whole soul of the man must be absorbed in it—"it cannot be made fast in the heart of a man unless he be constantly and duly absorbed in the same and unless he renounce everything in the world except this love". (B. 320.) It will be seen at once how closely this approaches Spinoza's "Ex his clare intelligimus, qua in re nostra salus, seu Beatitudo, seu Libertas consistat; nempe in constanti et aeterno erga Deum Amore" (v. 36, Schol.), and "Hic erga Deum Amor summum bonum est, quod ex dictamine Rationis appetere possumus" (v. 20). Spinoza's "third kind of intellection," his knowledge of God, is associated with the renunciation of all worldly passions, all temporal strivings and fleshly appetites; it is the replacing of the

obscure by clear ideas, the seeing things under the aspect of eternity,—in their relation to God. There is in fact in Spinoza's system a strong notion of a 'renunciation' or 're-birth,' by means of which a man becomes *free*, thenceforth to be led "by the spirit of Christ, that is *by the idea of God* which alone is capable of making man free" (iv. 68, Schol.). This notion of re-birth or renunciation has very characteristic analogues in the 'Nirvana' of Buddha and the 'Ewige *Geburt*' of Meister Eckhart. It is, however, peculiarly strong in the theosophy of Maimonides. Having called to mind that contemplation of the highest truths of the Godhead has been figuratively termed by Rabbinical writers, "walking in the garden," I proceed to quote the *Yad*:—

"The man who is replete with such virtues and whose bodily constitution too is in a perfect state on his entering into the garden and on his being carried away by those great and extensive matters, if he have a correct knowledge so as to understand and comprehend them—if he continue to keep himself in holiness—*if he depart from the general manner of people, who walk in the darkness of temporary things*—if he continue to be solicitous about himself, and to train his mind so that it should *not think at all of any of those perishable things, or of the vanities of time and its devices*, but should have its thoughts constantly turned on high, and fastened to the Throne so as to comprehend those holy and pure intelligences and to meditate on the wisdom of the Holy One . . . and if by these means he come to know His excellency—*then the Holy Spirit immediately dwells with him*; and at the time when the spirit rests on him, his soul mixes with the degree of those angels called Ishim, so that he is changed into another man. Moreover he himself perceives from the state of his knowledge that he is not as he was." (B. 112.)

Separate the notions of this paragraph from their Talmudic language and they contain almost the exact thoughts of Spinoza—the passage from obscure to clear ideas and the consequent attainment to a knowledge of God. Maimonides's assertion that the man himself perceives that he has attained this higher knowledge is perfectly parallel with Spinoza's proposition, that the man who has a true idea is conscious that he has a true idea and cannot doubt its truth (ii. 43.) The parallel between this Mediæval Jewish Philosophy and Christian Theology is of course evident, and probably due to the fact that both had a common origin in Ancient Jewish Philosophy,—if the analogy of Buddhism does not point to a still wider foundation in human nature.

Still one point in the relation of God and man, wherein Maimonides and Spinoza follow the same groove of thought. With the former the "cleaving to the Shechinah," the striving after God, is identified with the pursuit of wisdom. This is in itself the highest bliss—the attainment of wis-

dom is as well the goal as the course of true human life; wisdom is not to be desired for an end beyond itself—for the sake of private advantage or from fear of evil, above all not owing to dread of future punishment or hope of future reward—but only in and for itself because it is truth, it is wisdom. Only "rude folk" are virtuous out of fear. (B. 314.) Spinoza expresses the same thought in somewhat different words: he tells us, that the man who is virtuous owing to fear does not act reasonably. The perfect state is not the reward or goal of virtue, but is identical with virtue itself. The perfect state is one wherein there is a clear knowledge and consequent intellectual love of God; and this is in itself an end and not a means (iv. 63 and v. 42, &c.).

We may now pass to a subject which, in the case of both philosophers, is beset with grave difficulties—namely, God's knowledge and love of himself. We have seen that in both systems the knowledge of God is always accompanied by a corresponding love of God; we should expect therefore to find God's knowledge of himself accompanied by a love of himself. This inference, however, as to God's intellectual love of himself seems only to have been drawn by Spinoza; Maimonides is, on the other hand, particularly busied with God's knowledge of himself. To begin with, we are told *that God because he knows himself knows everything.* This assertion is brought into close connexion with another:—all existing things from the first degree of intelligences to the smallest insect which may be found in the centre of the earth exist by the power of God's truth. (B. 87.) Some light will perhaps be cast on the meaning of these propositions by a remark previously made as to Maimonides's conception of the Deity as an intellectual cause or law. Behind the succession of material phenomena is a succession of ideas following logically the one on the other. This thought-logic is the only *form* wherein the mind can co-ordinate phenomena because it is itself a thinking entity, and so subject to the logic of thought. The 'pure thought' which has a logic of its own inner necessity is thus the cause, and an intellectual one, of all phenomena. That system which identifies this 'pure thought' with the godhead may be fitly termed an intellectual pantheism or a pantheistic idealism. It is obvious how in such a pantheistic idealism the propositions—that God in knowing himself knows everything; and that all things exist by the power of God's truth—can easily arise. Such a passage as the following too becomes replete with very deep truth:—"The Holy One . . .

perceives His own truth and knows it just as it really is. And he does *not know with a knowledge distinct from Himself* as we know; because we and our knowledge are not one; but . . . *His knowledge and His life are one* in every possible respect, and in every mode of unity; . . . Hence you may say *that He is the knower, the known and knowledge itself* all at once. . . . Therefore He does not perceive creatures and know them, by means of the creatures as we know them; but he knows them by means of Himself; so that, by dint of His knowing Himself, He knows everything; because everything is supported by its existing through Him." (B. 87.) What fruit such conceptions bore in the mind of Spinoza must be at once recognised by every student of the *Ethica*.

Let us compare these conceptions with their Spinozistic equivalents. "All things exist by the power of God's truth." To this *Ethica* i. 15 corresponds—"Quicquid est, in Deo est, et nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest."

"God in knowing himself knows everything." I am not aware of any passage in the *Ethica* where this proposition is distinctly stated, yet it follows immediately from Spinoza's fundamental principles, and is implied in i. 25, Schol. and Coroll., and elsewhere (ii. 3, &c.) It is of course involved in God's *infinite* intellectual love of himself. (v. 35).

"God does not know with a knowledge distinct from himself." "His knowledge and His life are one." "He is the knower, the known, and knowledge itself." "His perception differs from that of creatures." Compare the following statements of Spinoza. "Si intellectus ad divinam naturam pertinet, non poterit, uti noster intellectus, posterior (ut plerisque placet), vel simul naturâ esse cum rebus intellectis, quandoquidem Deus omnibus rebus prior est causalitate; sed contra veritas et formalis rerum essentia ideo talis est, quia talis in Dei intellectu existit objective. Quare Dei intellectus, quatenus Dei essentiam constituere concipitur est re vera causa rerum, tam earum essentiae quam earum existentiae" (i. 17, Schol.). These words are followed by the remark that this is the opinion of those "who hold the knowledge, will, and power of God to be identical," which probably refers to Maimonides. "Omnia quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt necessario sequi debent" (i. 16.) "Sicuti ex necessitate divinae naturae sequitur, ut Deus seipsum intelligat, eadem etiam necessitate sequitur, ut Deus infinita infinitis modis agat. Deinde, i. 34, ostendimus Dei potentiam nihil esse, praeterquam Dei actuosam essentiam" (ii. 3, Schol.). Such expressions sufficiently show that God's

knowledge, *i.e.*, his "intellectus," and his action—*i.e.*, his life are one and the same. "Nam intellectus et voluntas, qui Dei essentiam constituerent, a nostro intellectu et voluntate toto cœlo differre deberent" (i. 17, Schol.). Which sufficiently marks the difference between the divine and human intellect. Shortly, although in certain formal assertions of the *Ethica* this view is somewhat obscured, yet I venture to suggest that the only consistent interpretation of Spinoza's system is summed up in the following words:—that the intellect of God is *all;* his thought is the existence of things; to be real is to exist in the divine thought; that very intellect is itself existence; it does not understand things like the creature-intellect because *it is them.*[1] This is almost the exact equivalent of Maimonides's proposition that God is "the knower, the known, and knowledge itself".

As a step from theology to anthropology we may compare the views of the two philosophers on the immortality of the soul. We have seen that Maimonides identifies the soul with the "quality," *i.e.*, the thought-attribute in man. This quality not being composed of material elements cannot be decomposed with them; it stands in no need of the breath of life, of the body, but it proceeds from God (the infinite intellect). This "quality" is not destroyed with the body, but continues to know and comprehend those intelligences that are distinct from all matter (*i.e.*, it no longer has knowledge of material things and therefore must lose all trace of its former individuality), and it lasts for ever and ever. (B. 106.) A certain crude resemblance to *Ethica*, v. 23 and Schol., will hardly be denied to this view of immortality; but a still closer link may be discovered in the question whether this immortality is shared by all men alike. From the above it would seem that for Maimonides this question must be answered in the affirmative, but when we come to examine his notion of future life we shall find this by no means the case. For him goodness and wisdom—wickedness and ignorance—are synonymous terms.[2] He classifies all beings from the supreme intelligence down to the smallest insect according to their wisdom, the degree of "quality" in them. The wise man who has renounced all clogging passions and received the Holy Spirit, is classed

[1] *Cf.* also Kuno Fischer's identification of Spinoza's Substance with Causality.

[2] Many passages might be quoted from the *Yad* to prove this. A somewhat similar though not quite identical distinction of good and evil occurs in the *More Nebuchim* (b. i., c. 1), where they are held equivalent to true and false respectively.

even with a peculiar rank of angel—"the man-angel". On the other hand, the fool, the evil man, may be in possession of no "quality" and therefore incapable of immortality. The future life of the soul of the wise is a purely *intellectual* one; it consists in that state of bliss which Spinoza would describe as perceiving things by the "third kind of intellection": it is perceiving more of the truth of God than was possible while in the dark and abject body; it is increased knowledge of the Shechinah; or again, to use Spinoza's words, a more perfect "Amor Dei intellectualis". (B. 296.) On the other hand, the reward of the evil man is, that his soul is cut off from this life; *it is that destruction after which there is no existence;* "the retribution which awaits the wicked consists in this, that they do not attain unto that life, but that they are cut off and die." (B. 294.) Shortly, Hell and Tophet are the destruction and end of all life; there is no immortality. I will only place for comparison by the side of this a portion of the very remarkable Scholium with which Spinoza concludes the *Ethica*:—"Ignarus enim, praeterquam a causis externis multis modis agitatur, nec unquam vera animi acquiescentia potitur, vivit praeterea sui et Dei et rerum quasi inscius, et simul ac pati desinit, *simul etiam esse desinit*. Cum contra sapiens, quatenus ut talis consideratur, vix animo movetur, sed sui et Dei et rerum aeterna quadam necessitate conscius, *nunquam esse desinit*, sed semper vera animi acquiescentia potitur". Obviously Spinoza recognised some form of immortality in the wise man, which the ignorant could not share; the one ceased, the other never could cease to be.[1]

The influence of Maimonides on Spinoza becomes far less obvious when we turn to his doctrine of the human affections. On the one hand, this is perhaps the most thought-out, finished portion of Spinoza's work; on the other hand,

[1] It is a curious fact that the *last* words of the *Ethica* are very closely related to a paragraph in the *last* chapter of the *More Nebuchim;* wherein we are told that it is knowledge of God only which gives immortality. The soul is only so far immortal as it possesses knowledge of God, *i.e.*, wisdom. To perceive things under their intelligible aspect is the great aim of every human individual, it gives him true perfection and renders his soul immortal. In striking correspondence with this is Chap. 23 of the 2nd Part of the *Korte Verhandeling van God, &c.* We are told that the soul can only continue to exist in so far as it is united to the body or God. (1) When it is united only to the body it must perish with the body. (2) In so far as it is united with an unchangeable object, it must in itself be unchangeable. That is in so far as it is united to God, it cannot perish. This "union with God" is what Spinoza afterwards termed the "knowledge of God". The coincidence has been noted by Joël *(Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinozas).*

Maimonides's somewhat crude "Precepts relating to the Government of the Temper," are an unsystematic mass of moral precepts, exegesis, and interpretation of the Talmud; added to which only certain portions are yet available in translation. Nevertheless, we may find several points of contact and even double contact.

According to Spinoza the great end of life—the bliss which is nothing less than repose of the soul—springs from the knowledge of God. The more perfect the intellect is, the greater is the knowledge of God. The great aim then of the reasoning man is to regulate all other impulses to the end that he may truly understand himself and his surroundings—that is, know God (iv. Appendix c. 4). All things, therefore, all passions, are to be made subservient to this one end—the attainment of wisdom. Following up this conception Spinoza proves that all external objects, all natural affections, are to be so treated or encouraged, that the body may be maintained in a state fit to discharge its functions, for by this means the mind will be best able to form conceptions of many things (iv. Appendix c. 27, taken in conjunction with iv. 38 and 39). For this reason laughter and jest are good in moderation; so also eating and drinking, &c.; music and games are all good so far as they serve this end; "quo majori Laetitia afficimur, eo ad majorem perfectionem transimus, hoc est, eo nos magis de *natura divina participare* necesse est" (iv. 45, Schol.) Nay, even marriage is consistent with reason, if the love arises not from externals only but has for its cause the "libertas animi" (iv. App., c. 20). Shortly, Spinoza makes the gratification of the so-called natural passions reasonable in so far as it tends to the health of the body, and hence to the great end of life—the perfecting of the understanding or the knowing of God. We may gather a somewhat similar idea from Maimonides. I have already pointed out that in the terminology of the latter's philosophy "to be wise," to "delight in the Shechinah" or "to serve the Lord" are synonymous. Remembering this, the following passage is very suggestive:—"He who lives according to rule, if his object be merely that of preserving his body and his limbs whole, or that of having children to do his work, and to toil for his wants—his is not the right way; but his object ought to be that of preserving his body whole and strong, to the end that his soul may be fit to know the Lord . . . it being impossible for him to become intelligent or to acquire wisdom by studying the sciences whilst he is hungry or ill, or whilst any one of his limbs is ailing. . . . And

consequently he who walks in this way all his days, will be serving the Lord continually even at the time when he trades, or even at the time when he has sexual intercourse; because his purpose in all this is to obtain that which is necessary for him to the end that his mind may be perfect to serve the Lord." (B. 174.) Elsewhere Maimonides tells us that a man should direct all his doings—trading, eating, drinking, marrying a wife—so that his body may be in perfect health and his mind thus capable of directing its energies to knowledge of God. (B. 172.)

Other points of coincidence may be noted. Spinoza attributes all evil to confused ideas, to ignorance. Maimonides states that desire for evil arises from an *infirm* soul (here it must be remembered that soul is the "quality" of a man, his thinking attribute). "Now what remedy is there for those that have infirm souls? *They shall go to the wise,* who are the physicians of soul." (B. 159.) Here evil is brought into close connexion with ignorance as its cause.[1] The characteristic of the wise man is that he avoids all opposite extremes, and takes that middle state which is found in all the dispositions of man; the rational man calculates his dispositions (*i.e.,* his affections or emotions) and directs the same "in the intermediate way to the end that he may preserve a perfect harmony in his bodily constitution." (B. 152.) There is an echo of this in Spinoza's "Cupiditas quae ex Ratione oritur, excessum habere nequit" (iv. 61). Maimonides holds haughtiness and humility extremes; the wise man will steer a middle course between them. (B. 154.) Spinoza tells us "Humilitas virtus non est, sive ex Ratione non oritur" (iv. 53). In the *Yad* we read, when a man is in a country where the inhabitants are wicked (*i.e.,* ignorant), "he ought to abide quite solitarily by himself." (B. 176.) In the *Ethica*:—"Homo liber, qui inter ignaros vivit, eorum, quantum potest beneficia declinare studet" (iv. 70). According to Spinoza all the emotions of hate, for example vengeance, can only arise from confused ideas, they have no existence for the rational man who

[1] It may be worth while remarking how the key-note to the moral Reformers who preceded the so-called Reformation is the conception that the wicked man and the fool are one and the same person. In woodcuts (*cf.* those in the *Narrenschiff,* 1494, and the recently discovered Block-book c. 1470) and in words (*cf.* Sebastian Brand, Geiler von Kaiserberg, and Thomas Murner) it is the ever-inculcated lesson. It is curious that this re-establishment of morality on a higher *intellectual* basis in preference to the old penal theory has ever—from Solomon to Spinoza—found such strong support in Hebrew Philosophy.

marks the true causes of things. Maimonides writes of vengeance that it shows an evil mind, "for with *intelligent* men all worldly concerns are but vain and idle things, such as are not enough to call forth vengeance." (B. 197.) Spinoza terms the passions obscure ideas (iii. Final paragraph), and in so far as the mind has obscure or inadequate ideas its power of acting or *existing* is decreased. Curiously enough Maimonides speaking of the passion anger says:—"passionate men cannot be said to live." (B. 164.)

Taken individually these coincidences might not be of much weight, yet taken in union I think they show that Spinoza was even in his doctrine of the human affections not uninfluenced by Maimonides; albeit to a lesser degree than in his theosophy.

It may not be uninteresting to note one point of divergence, namely, on the insoluble problem of free-will. Spinoza reduces man's free-will to an intellectual recognition of, and hence a free submission to, necessity. Maimonides on the other hand tells us distinctly that "free-will is granted to every man"; that there is no predestination; every man can choose whether he will be righteous or wicked, a wise man or a fool. (B. 263.) With regard to the question of God's pre-knowledge and whether this must not be a predestination, Maimonides writes: "Know ye that with regard to the discussion of this problem, the measure thereof is longer than the earth and broader than the sea". He hints, however, that its solution must probably be sought in the fact that God's knowledge is not distinct from himself, but that he and his knowledge are one ("the knower, the known and the knowledge itself are identical"). Maimonides cautiously adds that it is impossible for man fully to grasp the truth regarding the nature of God's knowledge; and, while granting God pre-knowledge, still concludes: "But yet it is known so as not to admit of any doubt that the actions of a man are in his own power and that the Holy One, blessed be He! neither attracts him nor decrees that he should do so and so." (B. 270.) Perhaps the ordinary work-a-day mortal will find Maimonides's evasion of the problem as useful as Spinoza's attempted solution!

In the above remarks I have considered only the *Yad Hachazakah*, because hitherto attention seems to have been entirely directed to the *More Nebuchim* (*cf.* Joël, Sorley and others). It is not impossible that in the intervening ten years Maimonides somewhat altered his views. I should not be surprised to hear that the *More* was held more 'orthodox' than the *Yad*. The latter, despite much Tal-

mudic verbiage and scriptural exegesis, notwithstanding many faults and inconsistencies, yet contains the germs of a truly grand philosophical system, quite capable of powerfully influencing the mind even of a Spinoza. Such a reader would, while rejecting the exegesis, recognise the elements of truth in the pure theosophy (*cf.* Joël, *Zur Genesis*, p. 9), and this is the point wherein the two philosophers approach most closely. In the second place, I have confined myself entirely to the influence of the *Yad* on the *Ethica*. Greater agreement would have been found with the *Korte Verhandeling van God, &c.*, while Spinoza's views of Biblical criticism (especially his conceptions of prophets and prophecy as developed in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus)* owe undoubtedly much to the *Yad*. Yet I wished to show that the study of Maimonides was traceable even in Spinoza's most finished exposition of his philosophy. Those who assert that Spinoza was influenced by Hebrew thought have not seldom been treated as though they were accusing Spinoza of a crime. Yet no great work ever sprung from the head of its creator like Athena from the head of Zeus; it has slowly developed within him, influenced and moulded by all that has influenced and moulded its shaper's own character. Had we but knowledge and critical insight enough, every idea might be traced to the germ from which it has developed. While recognising many other influences at work forming Spinoza's method of thought, it is only scientific to allow a certain place to the Jewish predecessors with whom he was acquainted. Critical comparison must show how great that influence was. We naturally expect to find considerable divergences between any individual Jewish philosopher and Spinoza; these divergences have been carefully pointed out by Mr. Sorley, but they are insufficient to prove that Spinoza was not very greatly influenced by Hebrew thought. My aim has been to call in question the traditional view of Spinoza's relation to Jewish philosophy, *i.e.*, that he learnt enough of it to throw it off entirely. I cannot help holding that, while Spinoza's form and language were a mixture of mediæval scholasticism and the Cartesian philosophy, yet the ideas which they clothed were not seldom Hebrew in their origin. He might be cast out by his co-religionists, but that could not deprive him of the mental birthright of his people—those deep moral and theosophical truths which have raised the Hebrews to a place hardly second to the Greeks in the history of thought.

Hebrew Philosophy seems to have a history and a de-

velopment more or less unique and apart from that of other nations; once in the course of many centuries it will produce a giant-thinker; one who, not satisfied by the narrow limits of his own nation, strives for a freer wider field of action, and grafts on to his Hebrew ideas a catholic language and a broader mental horizon. He becomes a world-prophet, but is rejected of his own folk. Such an one of a truth was Spinoza, and another perhaps, albeit in a lesser degree, Moses, the son of Maimon.[1]

KARL PEARSON.

[1] When the *More Nebuchim* became generally known, its author was looked upon by a large section of the Jews as a heretic of the worst type, who had "contaminated the religion of the Bible with the vile alloy of human reason"!

III.—MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S THEORY OF SOCIETY.

I. THE IDEAL STATE.

WHEN in 1879 Mr. Herbert Spencer published his *Data of Ethics* in advance of the second and third volumes of his *Principles of Sociology*, he gave as reasons for thus departing from his philosophic programme his fear lest he should not be able to reach in its proper order the last part of the task which he had marked out for himself, and his unwillingness to leave altogether unfulfilled the purpose which ever since 1842, when he wrote his letters on *The Proper Sphere of Government*, had been his "ultimate purpose lying behind all proximate purposes," that, namely, of "finding for the principles of right and wrong in conduct at large a scientific basis".[1] All his many readers are glad in thinking that hitherto this fear has proved groundless, and now that *Ceremonial Institutions* and *Political Institutions* have been investigated, we may hope for the completion of that work on Morality of which the *Data of Ethics* forms but the introductory part. It may seem, therefore, that the present is not a well-chosen moment in which to criticise Mr. Spencer's ethical principles and method as apparent in his already published works, but it may possibly add to the interest with which we shall read any book or books that he may have in store for us if in the meantime we consider what he has led us to expect.

Not the least interesting fact about Mr. Spencer's conception of Ethics is that its chief outlines have remained unaltered for at least thirty years. While he has been maturing an idea of evolution of which but faint glimpses were granted to us in 1851, two cardinal doctrines have been undisturbed from first to last, or rather after every expedition into the material, moral or social world he has returned to his original theme with new faith, new proofs and illustrations. Scientific Ethics must still begin with a study of the relations which will exist between men in that ideal state of society to which we are tending. A law of equal liberty is still the main law, perhaps the only knowable law of those

[1] *Data of Ethics*, Preface.

relations. Mr. Spencer has indeed cautioned us[1] that *Social Statics* "must not be taken as a literal expression of his present views," and has given us certain more definite warnings concerning the qualifications with which it should be read, warnings to which it is hoped that due regard will be paid in what here follows; still Mr. Spencer "adheres to the leading principles set forth" in his early work, has found new arguments for them in his *Data of Ethics*, and has applied and defended them in many another book and essay. It would seem, therefore, to be our own fault if we fail to understand the general nature of that undertaking which lies before him in the last part of his task.

Out of the many passages in which Mr. Spencer has stated his general doctrine of ethical method, the following may be chosen as one of the most concise :—

"One who has followed the general argument thus far, will not deny that an ideal social being may be conceived as so constituted that his spontaneous activities are congruous with the conditions imposed by the social environment formed by other such beings. In many places, and in various ways, I have argued that conformably with the laws of evolution in general, and conformably with the laws of organisation in particular, there has been, and is, in progress an adaptation of humanity to the social state, changing it in the direction of such an ideal congruity. And the corollary before drawn and here repeated, is that the ultimate man is one in whom this process has gone so far as to produce a correspondence between all the promptings of his nature and all the requirements of his life as carried on in society. If so, it is a necessary implication that there exists an ideal code of conduct formulating the behaviour of the completely adapted man in the completely evolved society. Such a code is that here called Absolute Ethics as distinguished from Relative Ethics—a code the injunctions of which are alone to be considered as absolutely right in contrast with those that are relatively right or least wrong; and which, as a system of ideal conduct, is to serve as a standard for our guidance in solving, as well as we can, the problems of real conduct." [2]

Absolute Ethics stands to Relative Ethics, or Moral Therapeutics, in somewhat the same relation as that in which Physiology stands to Pathology.[3] We must have a science

[1] *Social Statics*, Preface to American edition of 1864, adopted in Preface to stereotyped edition of 1868.

[2] *Data of Ethics*, § 105.

[3] *Social Statics*, c. 1, § 3 ; *Data*, § 105.

of social and moral health, before we can have a science or an art which shall deal with social and moral disease. And moral health implies social health; the perfect man cannot exist in an imperfect society, nor the fully evolved man in a partially evolved society. To make any progress in ethical science we must conceive a "perfect," "normal," "ideal," "fully evolved" society. In the comparison thus instituted between Relative Ethics and Pathology, one who has had no "preparation in Biology" may fancy he detects some confusion between immaturity and disease, but it will be better for him not to meddle or make with these comparisons. In the *Social Statics* the doctrine seems clear enough that, in so far as an existing society differs from society as it will ultimately be constituted, it is diseased.[1] Whether Mr. Spencer would hold such language now may be doubted, but the theory that Absolute Ethics is a Physiology to which Relative Ethics is the corresponding Pathology is restated and defended in the *Data*.

Now Mr. Spencer differs from some other promoters of ideal commonwealths in this, namely, in believing that the natural and normal course of human progress tends towards the realisation of his ideal. Not that he thinks all movement progress, for he points out that there has been in some instances positive retrogression. There are backwaters in the stream of history, not to speak of stagnant pools. There is social dissolution as well as social evolution. Still social evolution is in some sense normal. There are always forces which are making for it, though they may be thwarted and neutralised. Indeed, it seems to be his present opinion that the ideal state contemplated by Absolute Ethics can never be quite attained, though we shall approach indefinitely or perhaps infinitely near to it, always provided that cosmic processes do not outrun the evolution of humanity, "reduce the substance of the earth to a gaseous state"[2] and end all things in the complete equilibration of universal and, it may be, eternal death.[3] I know of no formal proof that the ideal state contemplated by Absolute Ethics is necessarily beyond our attainment, but in *First Principles* this seems to be either assumed or implicitly proved both as to the balance between mankind and its environment and as to the balance between society and the individual. The former "can never indeed be absolutely reached," and the process which adapts individual to society and society to individual must go on until the balance

[1] Ch. 1, § 3. [2] *First Principles*, § 181. [3] *Ibid.*, § 182.

between the antagonistic forces approaches "indefinitely near perfection".[1] Perhaps there is something in the doctrine of rhythm as conceived by Mr. Spencer which forbids our hoping for more than this. At one time he took a more cheerful view, for we were told in *Social Statics* that all imperfection must disappear, that "the ultimate development of the ideal man is logically certain—as certain as any conclusion in which we place the most implicit faith; for instance, that all men will die". This Mr. Spencer formally proved as follows:—"All imperfection is unfitness to the conditions of existence. This unfitness must consist either in having a faculty or faculties in excess; or in having a faculty or faculties deficient; or in both. A faculty in excess is one which the conditions of existence do not afford full exercise to; and a faculty that is deficient is one from which the conditions of existence demand more than it can perform. But it is an essential principle of life that a faculty to which circumstances do not allow full exercise diminishes; and that a faculty on which circumstances make excessive demands increases. And so long as this excess and this deficiency continue, there must continue decrease on the one hand and growth on the other. Finally, all excess and all deficiency must disappear; that is, all unfitness must disappear; that is, all imperfection must disappear."[2] Where Mr. Spencer now finds the error in this plausible reasoning is not so plain as might be wished,—but certainly he is not now convinced by it.

In the *Data of Ethics* we are told that "however near to completeness the adaptation of human nature to the conditions of existence at large, physical and social, may become, it can never reach completeness".[3] And here what seem to be very serious limitations are set to the process of adaptation, so serious that the passage may perhaps betray some momentary "lack of faith in such further evolution of humanity as shall harmonise its nature with its conditions".[4] We learn that "in the private relations of men, opportunities for self-sacrifice prompted by sympathy, must ever in some degree, though eventually in a small degree, be afforded by accidents, diseases and misfortunes in general . . . Flood, fire and wreck must to the last yield at intervals opportunities for heroic acts."[5] Now poor unscientific Virgil painting his golden age got rid of the possibility of wreck by "omnis feret omnia tellus," a suggestion which betrays a want

[1] *First Principles*, § 175. [2] *Social Statics*, c. 2, § 4. [3] *Data*, § 96.
[4] *Data*, § 67. [5] *Data*, § 96.

of "preparation in Biology". Mr. Spencer, though he certainly does not regard the enterprises of industrialism as "priscæ vestigia fraudis," should, one would imagine, be ready to say that the fully evolved sailor, with body and mind perfectly adapted to all the rhythms of season and wind and wave, will think any talk of wreck no better than a pedantic allusion to the classics. But so long as we are subject to accidents, diseases and misfortunes in general, we have hardly come even "indefinitely near" the perfect state which allows no "scope for further mental culture and moral progress".

Were we here speculating as to the future of the human race it would become us to consider what are Mr. Spencer's reasons for setting to progress bounds which it shall not pass, and also to ask whether, if mankind is always to fall so very far short of adaptation to its environment as to continue permanently subject to flood, fire and wreck, accidents, diseases and misfortunes in general, there must not to the very last be at times a very wide divergence between the desires and aims of the individual and those of his neighbours. So long as we have not discovered all truth discoverable by man, so long as there is scope for further mental culture, there may well be danger lest some new discovery or invention should throw the social machine out of gear and introduce discordant notes into the pre-established harmony.

But here we are dealing with the ideal of Absolute Ethics, the fully-adapted man, the fully-evolved society. Nor have we plausible pretext for grumbling if Mr. Spencer will not allow us to be quite perfect. All tends towards the best in this only possible evolution. The life of man will be sociable, rich, nice, human, long, and not only long but broad. There will be the greatest totality of life, quantum of life being estimated "by multiplying its length into its breadth".[1] Industrialism will have supplanted militancy, the religion of enmity will be reconciled with the religion of amity, and egoism will lie down with altruism. Without further question, therefore, whether we are embarking under a Christopher Columbus who will make for a real concrete America hereafter to be peopled by an ingenious and thriving race, or under a Raphael Hythlodaye who steers for Utopia, we will suppose this ideal state made real and see what may be said of it.

In the first place, we must notice that in this state there

[1] *Data*, §§ 4, 8.

will not be any right or wrong in our sense of the words; certainly no wrong in any sense at all, and with us right seems to imply possibility of wrong. The four sanctions of morality will have become useless, and their existence will perhaps be pronounced essentially unthinkable. No religious sanction, for no fear of the supernatural; no legal sanction, for no command of earthly superiors; no social sanction, for society will never be displeased; no internal sanction, for no war in our members, no lusting of the flesh against the spirit, or the spirit against the flesh. If such words as *right, duty, ought* survive at all, they will survive as pretty archaisms of uncertain meaning. May not even the same be said of *liberty;* what meaning can it have when no one is ever tempted to interfere with his neighbour's desires? *Law* goes too, at least *law* in one of its meanings. When we say of these fully-evolved men that they will obey the law of equal liberty or any other law, we can only mean that they will obey in the sense in which matter is sometimes said to obey the law of gravity. In short, our ideal code is a code "formulating," not regulating, "the behaviour of the completely-adapted man in the completely-evolved society".

This, as I think, is Mr. Spencer's view of the ideal state. In the most interesting chapter of his *Data*, he has sought to show that not only the external sanctions of morality, theological, legal, social, but also the internal or specifically moral sanction are the accompaniments of imperfect evolution.[1] As we become better and better adapted to our environment, self-coercion, like every other form of coercion, tends to disappear. We are brought to the "conclusion, which will be to most very startling, that the sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralisation increases". "Evidently, then," we are told, "with complete adaptation to the social state, that element in the moral consciousness which is expressed by the word obligation, will disappear."[2] This is just what we should expect: the notion of obligation or duty disappears. But here as well as elsewhere Mr. Spencer can not be brought to say, perhaps would deny, that the ideal will ever be quite perfectly realised. "In their proper times and places and proportions, the moral sentiments will guide men just as spontaneously and adequately as now do the sensations. And though, joined with their regulating influence when this is called for, will exist latent ideas of the evils which nonconformity would bring, these will occupy the

[1] *Data*, c. 7. [2] *Data*, § 46.

mind no more than do ideas of the evils of starvation at the time when a healthy appetite is being satisfied by a meal."[1] . . . "With complete evolution, then, the sense of obligation, not ordinarily present in consciousness, will be awakened only on those extraordinary occasions that prompt breach of the laws otherwise spontaneously conformed to."[2] This, however, though for some reason or other it will be the last stage of human progress, is clearly not the ideal state, for further adaptation is conceivable. "Ideal congruity" is not yet realised. The ideal man must be adapted to "extraordinary occasions," as well as to ordinary occasions. The perfect man will never be prompted to break the law. The moral sentiments will lose their "regulating influence" over competing motives, and the "ideas of the evils which non-conformity would bring" having become latent must finally vanish. Whether absolute perfection be practically possible or no, whether or no there will always be some slight tremors and oscillations about the point of equilibrium, it must be with the perfectly-adapted man and the perfectly-adapted society that Absolute Ethics must deal. Obviously to accept as ideal anything short of absolute perfection would be to vitiate the whole procedure. "No conclusions can lay claim to absolute truth, but such as depend upon truths that are themselves absolute. Before there can be exactness in an inference, there must be exactness in the antecedent propositions. A geometrician requires that the straight lines with which he deals shall be veritably straight; and that his circles, and ellipses and parabolas shall agree with precise definitions—shall perfectly and invariably answer to specified equations. If you put to him a question in which these conditions are not complied with, he tells you that it cannot be answered. So likewise is it with the philosophical moralist. He treats solely of the *straight* man. He determines the properties of the straight man; describes how the straight man comports himself; shows in what relationship he stands to other straight men; shows how a community of straight men is constituted. Any deviation from strict rectitude he is obliged wholly to ignore. It cannot be admitted into his premisses without vitiating all his conclusions. A problem in which a *crooked* man forms one of the elements is insoluble by him."[3] The geometrician is not to be put off with slightly crooked lines because they are the straightest that can be made, nor can the moralist accept as straight a man

[1] *Data*, § 46. [2] *Data*, § 47.

[3] *Social Statics*, c. 1, § 3, cited and defended in *Data*, § 105.

who is on "extraordinary occasions" prompted to break the moral law.

This should be well understood, for Mr. Spencer not unfrequently sets before us a less remote ideal, a state through which we shall pass on the way to an ultimate goal, but not itself by any means the goal. There will be a time—we might call it the Silver Age—when society will still coerce the individual but only for a few purposes. There will still be laws in the lawyer's sense of the word, the individual will still be compelled to submit his will to the wills of others. But the sphere of political coercion will be much smaller than it at present is. To enforce the law of equal liberty, to protect life, limb, reputation, and property, to compel the performance of contracts, will still be the function of the state. Within this narrow sphere the coercive force will for a time be more active than it is at present. When Mr. Huxley labelled Mr. Spencer's political theory as "Administrative Nihilism"[1] the latter replied that what he desired was "Specialised Administration," and he has said that the phrase *laissez faire* does not fairly represent his opinions.[2] The state should give over meddling with many or most of those matters which are now thought proper subjects for coercive regulation and should concentrate its efforts on the provision of justice swift, cheap, foreknowable in accordance with the law of equal liberty. Political coercion should be specialised. Bentham himself has not spoken more strongly than Mr. Spencer of the ills which flow from our law's delay, and Mr. Spencer thinks that the remedy lies in concentrating upon the administration of justice those coercive governmental forces which are now dissipated in a thousand and one channels. But beyond this provisional paradise there lies the veritable land of promise. Perhaps the individual's "right to ignore the state" of which we read in *Social Statics*[3] will never be admitted as a right in our sense of the word, for the existence of a right seems to imply some probability or at least possibility of infringement, but the day will come when coercive co-operation will give way to voluntary co-operation, and no society will attempt to retain a member who wishes to be quit of it. Whether any particular type of voluntary society will be called a state, or a body politic, or the like, would seem to be a question barely about the future history of language, but membership of every social body will be terminable at the will of the

[1] *Critiques and Addresses*, I. [2] *Essays*, Third Series, v. [3] c. 19.

member, whose will, however, cannot but be consonant with the will of each of his fellows.

It is necessary to state this clearly, for in his *Data of Ethics* Mr. Spencer sometimes uses words which, if I have caught his meaning, might mislead an unwary reader. Thus a department of Ethics is marked off which "considering exclusively the effects of conduct on others, treats of the right regulation of it with a view to such effects".[1] This division of Ethics comprises the field of Justice. We then read as follows:—"This division of Ethics, considered under its absolute form, has to define the equitable relations among perfect individuals who limit one another's spheres of action by co-existing, and who achieve their ends by co-operation. It has to do much more than this. Beyond justice between man and man, justice between each man and the aggregate of men has to be dealt with by it. The relations between the individual and the state, considered as representing all individuals, have to be deduced—an important and a relatively-difficult matter. What is the ethical warrant for governmental authority? To what ends may it be legitimately exercised? How far may it rightly be carried? Up to what point is the citizen bound to recognise the collective decisions of other citizens, and beyond what point may he properly refuse to obey them?"[2]

This passage certainly starts in the key of Absolute Ethics; we are "among perfect individuals"; but seemingly at the mention of the state it passes into some Relative mode. If we are still dealing with perfect individuals, and the questions which we are asked are "relatively-difficult," the other questions of Ethics must indeed be superlatively easy. What is the ethical warrant for governmental authority? None; for no perfect individual will coerce his equally perfect neighbour. As to obedience and disobedience, the only doubt is which of these two words is the more inappropriate when we speak of the relations between fully-evolved men. Of course, therefore, these questions are questions of Relative Ethics; one of the factors they involve is the infliction of pain, and of this Absolute Ethics has nothing to say. "The law of absolute right can take no cognisance of pain, save the cognisance implied by negation."[3]

Again, in the "prospects" which Mr. Spencer takes at the end of each section of his *Sociology*, he seems to contemplate as the final condition of humanity a condition which

[1] *Data*, § 109. [2] *Ibid.*, § 109. [3] *Ibid.*, § 101.

neither he nor others would call absolutely perfect. Thus he raises the question—What is to be the ultimate political *régime*?[1] He thinks that it will not be the same in all communities, and then speculates as to the future of the British Constitution, and ends by saying that "neither these nor any other speculations concerning ultimate political forms can, however, be regarded as anything more than tentative". In the immediately preceding sentence he says that "municipal and kindred governments may be expected to exercise legislative and administrative powers subject to no greater control by the central government than is needful for the concord of the whole community". The age of ultimate political forms during which mayors and aldermen (in their ultimate form) exercise legislative powers under the control of the central government is not, I take it, the final epoch of equilibrium in which there will be no "scope for further mental culture and moral progress"; it is at best a penultimate age. So again, when "somewhat more definitely and with somewhat greater positiveness," Mr. Spencer infers the political functions which will be carried on by those ultimate political structures, and predicts that citizens whose natures have through many generations of voluntary co-operation and accompanying regard for one another's claims, been moulded into the appropriate form, will entirely agree to maintain such political institutions as may continue needful, and then mentions among such institutions "the agency for adjudicating in complex cases where the equitable course is not manifest, and for such legislative and administrative purposes as may prove needful for effecting an equitable division of all natural advantages"[2]—when Mr. Spencer speaks thus, he has not before him the ideal of Absolute Ethics, but some preparatory millenium during which adjudication and legislation will still be necessary. Adjudication implies conflict. So legislation also implies an imperfect adaptation of man to circumstances; for even if it be said that all the citizens will of their own free-will and without fear of punishment obey every law when made, the dilemma must yet be met: either the laws will bid them do only such things as they would have done if no laws had been made, or the laws will in some instances bid them do other things; in the former case the laws are futile; in the latter either the laws are pernicious, or the citizens are not yet perfect. In the ultimate state there will be no place for command, place only for counsel or advice, for arguments which will convince the

[1] *Political Institutions*, § 577. [2] *Ibid.*, § 579.

reason, not coerce the will of the citizen; and in this sense must be understood the saying that, "however great the degree of evolution reached by an industrial society, it cannot abolish the distinction between the superior and the inferior —the regulators and the regulated".[1] The final form of regulation is advice.

No one will blame Mr. Spencer for failing in his *Political Institutions* to describe that ideal state which is the subject-matter of Absolute Ethics. But even when in the *Data* he is dealing expressly with Absolute Ethics he sometimes writes as though he had not firmly grasped this ideal state. As is well known, he classifies the duties of one individual towards other individuals thus: he first distinguishes Justice from Beneficence, and then divides Beneficence into Positive and Negative. This may be a sound classification in Moral Therapeutics, and conceivably, though in a somewhat non-natural sense, it may be applied to the conduct of the fully-evolved man in the fully-evolved society. Duty in our sense of the word there will be none, for every man will always do his duty. Still, conceivably we may be able to classify the social actions of fully-evolved men as just, positively beneficent, negatively beneficent. But then on one of the last pages of the *Data of Ethics* we are told that "under ideal circumstances" Negative Beneficence "has but a nominal existence". The reason given is as follows:—"In the conduct of the ideal man among ideal men, that self-regulation which has for its motive to avoid giving pain practically disappears. No one having feelings which prompt acts that disagreeably affect others, there can exist no code of restraints referring to this division of conduct."[2] Here Mr. Spencer seems to be gliding into the opinion that Absolute Ethics is a code of restraints for ideal men in the ideal society. Let us be fair, then, and treat Justice in the same way as we treat Negative Beneficence. Under ideal conditions Justice also must have "but a nominal existence," whatever that may mean, for surely among ideal men the regulation, whether imposed on the individual by society or on a man by himself, which has for its object to prevent unjust action "practically," not to say theoretically, "disappears". No one is to have feelings which prompt acts that disagreeably affect others, and therefore surely there can exist no code of restraints which will coerce the ideal man into justice. We must not play fast and loose with the conditions of our ideal state.

[1] *Political Institutions*, § 578. [2] § 110.

Mr. Spencer, however, is not going to let Justice escape with a nominal existence, for is there not the law of equal liberty, and is not this law a law of Absolute Ethics? Very well, but that law is not an ideal code of restraints which are enforced by any forum, external or internal, against the ideal man, the promptings of whose nature are in perfect harmony with his environment. It can only be a formula which states in general terms what will be the conduct, or some part of the conduct of ideal men towards each other. What shape, then, does this formula take?

Now I understand Mr. Spencer to be still of opinion that the maxim of Justice is as follows:—Every man has the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other man.[1] The maxim has a negative side:—No man may claim to exercise any liberty which is incompatible with the exercise of the like liberty by every other man. This maxim is perfectly intelligible when applied, as it is in *Social Statics*, to the actions of us imperfect men, though to the mode in which Mr. Spencer applies it some objections might perhaps be taken. So applied it is a test whereby we may judge of the rightfulness of any law or other interference with the liberty of the individual. Every individual is to enjoy equal freedom. If I may be allowed the phrase, the *objective* freedom of one is to be the same as that of any other. A law does not sin against this supreme rule merely because it is felt as more oppressive by one than by another. To respectable members of society a law against theft is no curtailment of *subjective* freedom, but there are disreputable members who do feel it to be a restraint on their liberty. The law, however, in this case allows to the vagabond the same sphere of objective freedom that it allows to the man who would never dream of taking his neighbour's goods. Such at least seems to be Mr. Spencer's view, for he thinks that the maxim of equal liberty allows or even demands the existence of proprietary rights.

But now this maxim is to be transfigured into a formula expressing the conduct of ideal men. How can this be done? Mr. Spencer is not of the number of those who believe that in the Golden Age all men will be equal, in the sense that they will all be able to do and think and feel the same things. Quite the contrary: society becomes ever more heterogeneous, and in the ultimate form of society the limit of heterogeneity is reached. There will be more difference between the powers bodily and mental of the ultimate philosopher

[1] *Social Statics*, c. 4, § 3; c. 6, § 1.

and the ultimate coal-heaver than there is between the powers of their present half-evolved antitypes. Men will neither do the same things nor be able to do the same things; the division of labour and the accompanying specialisation of abilities will have touched their utmost bounds. Not in this direction may we look for equality. But may it not be that though the activities of men will not be equal, yet they will enjoy equal spheres of action? Such language is perfectly intelligible when used of such men and such societies as at present exist; for when we say that a man is at liberty to do many things that he does not want to do, for instance, that every man is free to construct a system of philosophy, or to speak his mind, or to buy whatever is offered for sale, we have before our minds the fact that there are many things which a man may wish to do, and which but for legal or social coercion he would do, but which he is restrained from doing by restraint which he feels as restraint. He is restrained because he is not in complete harmony with the environing society; there is not yet "a complete equilibration between man's desires and the conduct necessitated by surrounding conditions". But when it has become impossible for any man to have any wish that society will not gladly see him fulfil, can it in any sense whatever be said of him that he is free to do anything save what he actually does? Such an assertion seems to me simply impossible. If ideal men were to be equal in all their faculties and capacities, then it would be possible to say that every one of them would have an equal sphere of action, but as they are to be unequal and yet are not to be prevented either by social pressure or by moral self-coercion from doing anything that they wish to do, their spheres of action, if that phrase be at all appropriate, will be unequal. There can be no "freedom of speech" where no one is ever tempted to say anything that will give pain to his neighbour. There can be no "freedom of contract" where no one dreams of entering into any agreements save those which the whole society will admit to be advantageous to it and to every member of it. The inference that I draw from this is that Mr. Spencer's ideal code, "formulating the behaviour of the completely-adapted man in the completely-evolved society," should have nothing to say about equal liberty, but meanwhile we must be on our guard, and when we ask for "a straight man" see that we get him.

Of course it may be true that, in a society such as our own, to enforce the law of equal liberty is the best means of hasten-

ing the advent of the happy time when man will be fully evolved and 'true self-love and social be the same'. Still, this is a matter which requires to be proved, and cannot be proved by the meaningless assertion that this law will be enforced in, or hold good of, a society fully evolved. For instance, if we be discussing freedom of speech, it is quite possible to maintain that perfect adaptation may most readily be produced rather by a rigorous suppression of all speech which can possibly give pain than by granting a wide liberty to those who have unfavourable opinions of their neighbours. This assertion may be very untrue; still it cannot be met by saying that in the ideal state there will be unbounded liberty of speech, any more than it can be met by any other phrase that has no meaning.

Whether Mr. Spencer still adheres to the "first principle" of *Social Statics*—the law of equal liberty—as an accurate and sufficient formula of Justice, is perhaps not quite certain, and since my own opinion is that from that formula it is impossible without a liberal use of quasi-legal fictions to deduce any code of conduct whatever, I would gladly believe in its abandonment. Still, it is quite plain that the Golden Age is to be the reign of Justice. Saturn returns to us and brings back the freedom of contract which our politicians have banished to his planet. Also, it is still plain to Mr. Spencer that Justice is (in some sense or other) Equality. For this identification he argues in his last work as in his first. Therefore I may be allowed to point out that the objection here taken to the law of equal liberty as a description of the relations which will exist between fully-evolved men applies also to any theory which finds equality in those relations. Society will be more heterogeneous than it is at present. There will be greater inequality between the faculties and capacities of different men than there is at present. Every faculty, every capacity will be fully exercised and satisfied. Therefore men will not have equal spheres of action; for if every faculty be fully exercised its sphere of action will be completely filled by its action.

I can well understand, though not altogether agree with, Mr. Spencer when in *Social Statics* he writes thus:—"This sphere of existence into which we are thrown not affording room for the unrestrained activity of all, and yet all possessing in virtue of their constitutions similar claims to such unrestrained activity, there is no course but to apportion out the unavoidable restraint equally. Wherefore we arrive at the general proposition, that every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties compatible with the

possession of the like liberty by every other man."[1] This is a piece of Relative Ethics, of Moral Pathology. The sphere of existence does not afford room for the unrestrained activity of all, because we are not yet fully adapted to our environment. But I cannot understand Mr. Spencer when in the *Data* he writes thus:—"This division of Ethics" [the division which deals with Justice] "considered under its absolute form has to define the equitable relations among perfect individuals who limit one another's spheres of action by co-existing, and who achieve their ends by co-operation."[2] Of course the word *equitable* as here used does not imply that the relations among perfect individuals could possibly be other than they ought to be, that they could possibly be inequitable or iniquitous. But Mr. Spencer certainly does mean that in some form or another equality ("equity or equalness"[3]) is to be found in them. But how? Again, when it is said that these perfect individuals "limit one another's spheres of action by co-existing," these words must be used in a queer sense. There will be no coercion, no restraint, no pain inflicted by one on another, no "fear of the visible ruler, the invisible ruler, or of society at large," finally no self-coercion, for "that element of the moral consciousness which is expressed by the word obligation" will have disappeared. In short, a man's sphere of action will be limited only by his own spontaneous wishes and his physical constitution. There can be no talk of "the sphere of existence into which we are *thrown* not affording room for the unrestrained activity of all"; for it is just the essence of the sphere of existence into which we shall have *grown* that it does give every one room to fulfil his every desire.

Immediately before the passage just quoted, which speaks of the department of Ethics concerned with Justice as having to define the equitable relations among perfect individuals, we may read the following:—"Though having to recognise differences among individuals due to age, sex or other cause, we cannot regard the members of a society as absolutely equal, and therefore cannot deal with problems growing out of their relations with that precision which absolute equality might make possible; yet, considering them as approximately equal in virtue of their common human nature, and dealing with questions of equity on this supposition, we may reach conclusions of a sufficiently-definite kind."[4] I have quoted this passage because I may have spoken too hastily in saying that Mr. Spencer is not of

[1] *Social Statics*, c. 4, § 3. [2] § 109. [3] *Data*, § 60. [4] *Ibid.*, § 109.

the number of those who believe that in the Golden Age all men will be equal. If, however, the words just cited describe the problems with which Absolute Ethics must deal, then he does seem to think for the moment that completely-adapted men in the completely-evolved society will be so much alike in their powers and wishes that Absolute Ethics may ignore the differences between them and yet obtain "conclusions of a sufficiently-definite kind". Sufficiently definite doubtless, but also one would think sufficiently untrue. Surely in this procedure our strictly scientific Ethics would be substituting the perfectly homogeneous for the superlatively heterogeneous, the least stable for the most stable, the crooked for the straight. I do not think that this is really Mr. Spencer's meaning; rather he is thinking not of what men will do but of what they will not be restrained from doing by legal or social pressure. But I can only repeat that such pressure, these men being completely-adapted men in a completely-evolved society, is out of the question.

Similar difficulties are occasioned by what is said concerning Positive Beneficence.[1] We have already seen that the ultimate state of man will still afford opportunities for self-sacrifice though these opportunities will be rare. Flood, fire and wreck, accidents, diseases and misfortunes in general, are to be ours to the last, and will give us now and then a chance for an heroic act. This may be the ultimate state, but seemingly it should not, cannot be the ideal state. The geometrician would not put up with a straight line which on "extraordinary occasions" fell into crookedness. Self-sacrifice implies crookedness somewhere. Either he who offers the sacrifice ought to feel it no sacrifice, or he who for whose sake it is made ought not to need the sacrifice. It is, as I think, Mr. Spencer's opinion that Absolute Ethics has no place for self-abnegation. This could hardly be otherwise. It will be so even in the relation of parent to child. The ideal parent will not be called on to give up any pleasure for the sake of the ideal child. In doing for the child all that the child wishes the parent will find pleasure. Whether the day will ever come when the promptings of an inherited experience will teach the weaned child to leave your cockatrice alone, may perchance be doubted, but failing this adaptation of children to their environment, the adaptation of parents to children will probably insure as literal a fulfilment of prophecy as a judicious interpreter should

[1] *Data*, §§ 96, 110.

desire. But though self-sacrifice can have in Absolute Ethics no place at all, Mr. Spencer apparently thinks that there may be a place for Positive Beneficence. He says:— "Of positive beneficence under its absolute form nothing more specific can be said than that it must become co-extensive with whatever sphere remains for it; aiding to complete the life of each as a recipient of services and to exalt the life of each as a renderer of services. As with a developed humanity the desire for it by every one will so increase, and the sphere for exercise of it so decrease, as to involve an altruistic competition, analogous to the existing egoistic competition, it may be that Absolute Ethics will eventually include what we before called a higher equity, prescribing the mutual limitations of altruistic activities."[1] This last sentence has its difficulties, for an ideal code formulating the relations of perfect men begins to grow more perfect before our very eyes. It is perhaps to include eventually what it does not include now. Once more we must ask, whether perfect men will need, will be able to conceive, a code prescribing what they are to do, and placing them under an obligation to do it. And even this scheme of the higher equity which Absolute Ethics *may* eventually formulate is not apparently the ultimate state; it is not even the penultimate. For a time there may be an all too brisk competition among wealthy pleasure-hunters for the few remaining chances of an exquisite altruistic gratification, and the higher equity may be needed to prevent philanthropic jobbers from engrossing the occasions of beneficence or forming a 'ring' to 'corner' all those that are in misery and distress. But as adaptation goes on, the acceptance of a benefit will become very rare, and "altruistic competition, first reaching a compromise under which each restrains himself from taking an undue share of altruistic satisfactions, eventually rises to a conciliation under which each takes care that others shall have their opportunities for altruistic satisfaction".[2] Eventually perhaps Absolute Ethics will formulate first the compromise and then the conciliation, and yet it would seem as if men would not be quite perfect, for this "taking care" implies some self-restraint, some sense of obligation. What then does Absolute Ethics say now about Positive Beneficence? The perfect man will by the same course of conduct secure both his own greatest happiness and the greatest happiness of all. "The moral conduct will be the natural conduct,"[3] or rather morality will be a thing of the

[1] *Data*, § 110. [2] § 97. [3] § 47.

past. But we have excluded Negative Beneficence from our ideal code on the ground that "no one having any feelings which prompt acts that disagreeably affect others, there can exist no code of restraints referring to this division of conduct". Is there then to be even eventually and in the ideal state a code of restraints referring to the division of conduct called Positive Beneficence? If so, are men yet perfect in this ideal state? Seemingly beyond the higher equity there lies the compromise, and beyond the compromise the conciliation, and beyond the conciliation of each man with competing philanthropists must lie the conciliation of each man with himself. "That element in the moral consciousness which is expressed by the word obligation, will disappear," and the natural conduct will be—well it will be the natural conduct.

Possibly to a perception of this consequence we must attribute Mr. Spencer's apparent reluctance to admit that the ideal of perfect adaptation can ever be reached. We must not have our "straight man" all too straight, or there will be no place for any theory of Justice or Equality. The seer must keep his telescope just a little dusty, in order that the outlook may not be too blank for intelligible description. The sinless innocence of the jelly-fish or the angel is not a good material whereof to fashion the citizens of an instructive model commonwealth, without some admixture of sinful human nature, and "latent ideas" of nonconformity. Whether this has weighed with Mr. Spencer, or whether there is something in the doctrine of rhythmic motion that prevents our accepting really perfect social equilibrium even as an ideal, it is not for me to guess, but I think it clear that Mr. Spencer should deal with Positive Beneficence and with Justice or Equality as he has already dealt with Negative Beneficence, and say that under ideal circumstances they can have only a nominal existence, which is, humanly speaking, no existence at all.

F. W. MAITLAND.

IV.—THE WORD.[1]

It is a common accusation brought against the Doctors of the old Scholastic philosophy, that these writers have made their philosophical subservient to their theological system, and have so confounded the proper limits of each as to generate a common suspicion that the former is not the pure outcome of disinterested thought. At present it does not concern me to determine what, if any, foundation there may be for such an accusation. Those who are sceptical as to the existence of a supernatural revelation in the strict sense of the term protest, consistently enough, against any imagined connexion between the two; but believers in such a revelation conceive that it may be of aid to philosophy in three ways. It may call attention to a philosophical truth which, but for the particular dogma revealed, would have probably escaped the notice of the human mind. It may serve to confirm, with its own high authority, philosophical conclusions already obtained by mere process of reason, while itself receiving elucidation from the philosophy which it confirms. Lastly, it may serve for purposes of illustration. In the present article two dogmas of the Christian Revelation—those of the Blessed Trinity and of the existence and nature of Angels—have been introduced for the last two reasons indicated above, principally for the last. I have judged that light would be thrown on the sense in which these doctrines are accepted by the Catholic Church, and, in particular, that the nature of the intellectual acts of Angels—whose existence is demonstrable by reason (as I hope to prove elsewhere)—would serve to illustrate the main subject of consideration in this paper. I do not then claim for the doctrines in question any demonstrative force. This they could only have for such as accept them on a Divine authority; and it is not to such exclusively or even principally that I address myself. If, therefore, there are those among my present readers, to whom the introduction

[1] The following article is printed as a representative specimen of a mode of thought which, having survived all through the modern period, is now asserting itself as an active factor on the philosophical field. As such, it needs to be understood alike in its principles and results. The author's frankness in his declaration of principles will be recognised. He kindly supplied the introductory paragraph, at my request, after the article was accepted for the Journal.—Editor.

of these articles of faith would prove a stumbling-block rather than an aid, let them omit the allusions. The main arguments will remain unimpaired.

The word is a term pregnant with mysteries; though practically nothing more universal, common, constant. In its exhaustiveness as inclusive of concept and language it is proper to man; in its fullest latitude it is common to all spiritual natures. In the Divine Trinity the Word is the Wisdom of the Father in its ultimate expression,—the substantial speech of the Three Divine Persons Each to Other.

In Angels, or pure Intelligences, there is not only the internal word, but there is likewise an external word or sort of speech by which each communicates with other. Of what character is this angelic speech? Who can adequately answer this question? Yet two things may be confidently predicated of it, each of which has important bearings on the burden of the present paper. The words of Angels are not their bare thoughts; otherwise all the thoughts of Angels would be, as it were, common property, and each much-containing thought of an Angel nearest the Throne could be spoken to one of the lowest orders. The other point is this: the words of an Angel are a transcript of his thoughts in some way or other, and run parallel with them. Hence, as in the thoughts of the hierarchies of heaven there are thoughts common and thoughts special; so in the words of Angels there is a speech common and a speech which is an esoteric language communicating either with the Divine Majesty or with such of the Angelic hosts as, by virtue of their essential nearness, are competent to understand it. Once more: an analogy drawn from human conversation justifies us in inferring that the transformation of an Angelic thought into a word is subject to volition; more particularly when we bear in mind that no Angel can act upon another at a distance, and that the personal presence of one Angel with another is the result of an action of the will.

But it behoves us to determine what that something is, by virtue of which the secret thought of an Angel is transformed, as it were, into a communicative word. It must be something real, as is plain; otherwise Angelic contemplation could be but congregational worship, or a sermon delivered before the spirits of Angels and of Saints,—not always understood or at least comprehended by the many. It is as plainly something not substantial or essential; for

in such case it could not be subject to the individual will. Neither can it be a pure accident in the specific sense of the word; because Angelic language is absolutely (*de potentia absoluta*) inseparable from Angelic thought, though Angelic thought is separable from Angelic language. What remains, then, but that it should be an accidental mode, completorial after a manner of the representativeness before others of the concept? To explain: a thought, purely *as* thought, is an impress of the object, but not an express image of the object. It is in the Spirit as a cognition, an intuition (for pure Intelligences do not reason), but voiceless, so to speak, and consequently uncommunicative. It is presentative of the object to the subject of cognition; and in reflex thought is really representative, but such *to the thinker* exclusively. Somehow it must be complemented, in order that it may be able to pass from spirit to spirit in the way of Angelic colloquy.[1]

An illustration of the same truth is to be found in the mystery of the B. Trinity, as taught in the Church of Christ. The substantial Wisdom of God is common to the three Divine Persons, being in all things identical with the Divine Essence. The second Person is the Divine speech (so to speak), generated by the Father as the expressive Word of His Wisdom, the Image of His Brightness, the substantial Voice of the Divine Interlocution; so that there are Fathers of the early Church who have not scrupled to affirm that without His Word God would be mute.

Now, if the Divine Word is the infinite Archetype of all created words, we are naturally led to conclude that, between the concept or intuition of a pure Intelligence and the communicative expression of the same, there is a real difference which, forasmuch as an Angel falls inconceivably short of the simple perfection of God, could not be resolved in the embrace of an all-containing oneness. So it is. As the concept of an Angel forms no part of his substantial nature, but is a spiritual accident; so neither is his word, by which he communicates his thought to another pure Intelligence, a substantial reality, but rather a spiritual mode complementary of the concept as medium of communication, and revocable at will. The result is a spiritual composition of some sort, and a purely modal termination.

[1] Gonet after explaining the doctrine of Scotus and Suarez on this point, adds: "D. Thomas vero (in *Summa et Verit*, Q. ix., *a.* 4, 9m et 11m) dicit locutionem angelorum consistere *in sola ordinatione conceptus loquentis ad eum qui loquitur.*"—*Clyp. Thomist. De Angel, Disp. xv., a.* 3, *Sect.* 11.

Thus much has been purely introductory and elucidative. I now proceed to the question which I have proposed to myself in the present paper,—the nature and characteristics of the human word. It is plain that the human soul is the lowest in the order of spiritual beings and, consequently, the most composite. Its faculties form no part of its essence, but are properties flowing from the essence; wherefore between the two there is a real metaphysical difference and composition. It is further plain that the human intellect is capable of an inner or spiritual word by means of which it is able to communicate with other spirits; otherwise a disembodied soul would be absolutely dumb. But these forms of spiritual communication it shares in common with pure Intelligences. There is one point, however, that is characteristic of the human soul, and constitutes an essential difference between it and a pure spirit. The human soul of its nature is an incomplete substance. It is created to be the form of the human body. Man is made of soul and body. He is not soul only, or body only, but a rational animal;—that is to say, he is a person having a body that is informed by a rational soul. Hence, two things: as formally *act* of the body, the human soul postulates certain lower faculties that have their seat in, and energise by means of, the bodily organs. For so long as the soul is united to the body, these faculties persist; even though sometimes impeded, and even rendered impotent of act, by some lesion of the organ. But as soon as the soul is disembodied, they only remain potentially in it; that is to say, they no longer exist in themselves, but the soul is competent to reproduce them, whenever it is reunited to the body and consequently to the proper organ which is the partial subject of these faculties respectively. The other point, which is of the gravest importance in relation to my present argument, is this: man receives his primitive impressions of external objects from these lower faculties, which we may henceforth call the senses. Further: For so long as the soul is cabined in the body, the intellect neither has nor can have any object capable of determining its indifference and arousing it to the energy of act, save through these sensile impressions. These are the fontal source from which all human cognition, even the most abstract and universal, primordially proceeds. Hence the saying of Aristotle, which has become a proverb in the School: *There is nothing in the intellect, which has not had a prior existence in the senses.* So far does this intimate and, in the present life, indissoluble union between the intellect and the senses extend, that no

thought is possible without an accompanying phantasma,—that is to say, either some new sensile impression or the resurrection of some old one. In the actual order,—*i.e.*, so long as man lives this mortal life,—every concept of the mind must be accompanied by that which in one way or other is a sensile counterpart of itself. As the human soul, then, cannot think to itself without the aid of the senses; in like manner it is prone to conclude that it cannot intercommunicate with another human soul without the aid of some bodily organ. Not only so; but the communicated thought cannot reach that other soul for which the communication is intended, save through the instrumentality of some other organ in the latter. This conjoined instrument is Language, or Speech, which postulates a tongue at one end and an ear at the other. Writing is not considered as an entity distinct from speech, since it connotes only a diversity of organs;—a hand at one end and eyes, or fingers for the blind, at the other. The virtual identity of the two is plainly seen in their easy mutual transformation. A book read becomes speech; a speech taken down in short-hand becomes writing. Thus our past examination brings us face to face with the outside word of man,—that which is usually called human language.

There is, however, one other preliminary point to be settled, before entering upon the main inquiry. Is it possible for the human mind to form a universal; if so, what is the nature of the operation? The common sense of mankind, experience, and the constant testimony of consciousness afford a certain answer to the first question. One of the primitive ideas of a child is more than a universal. It is a transcendental. When first the curiousness of the young intellect is aroused by attention to the sensile perceptions of the external objects that surround it, the little one conceives every object that it perceives to be *a thing;* and it then strives, by its own infantine observations as well as by questions put to such as for the time being are its infallible authorities, to discover differences, by means of which it descends from the highest genus through subaltern genera till at length it attains to an acquaintance with the specific nature of the thing. Nor does the ordinary pronominal prefix—*this* watch, for instance—interfere with the universality of the concept; it only exhibits the attachment of the awaking mind to the singular concrete,—in other words, to the phantasmata of sense. The intellect supplies that which is represented by the noun; the phantasma suggests the individual repre-

sented by the demonstrative pronoun. The result is, a universal in a singular. The answer to the second question is equally sure, though more recondite. It is clearly shown in psychology, that the proper object of the intellect is a universal, and that the intellect is only bound down (as it were) forcibly to singularity or individuation in its concept by the active presence of the sensile phantasma. But I do not purpose to delay over this primitive, though disputed, fact of ideology; because its full exhibition would postulate a space larger than I could hope to occupy, and would send us off drifting from the main conclusion at which I am aiming. I will therefore pursue an easier path. When several human beings—to supply an illustration—become present to the mind by means of sensile perceptions, the mind discovers by a sort of instinctive reflection that the objects thus represented have, all of them, certain points of similarity in which they accord with one another and differ from other objects that surround them. They have the power of talking with one another,—can read and write when taught,—can laugh at things funny,—can argue, &c. These powers the thinker likewise recognises in himself. All such notes he separates from the individuals which primitively exhibited them, and unites them in the idea of *rational*. But he goes on to compare this class of individuals with other objects of sensile perception, and he finds certain characteristics common to both; locomotion, for instance, senses, a nervous system, sundry organs and members. These too he finds in himself. He includes these under the one common idea of *animal*. Thus by conjunction of the two sets of notes he conceives the first-named objects of his senses under the universal concept of *rational animal* or *man*. I do not say that this is the only or even ordinary method of conceiving an absolute universal; for the absolute universal is object of intuition in the way already stated. Yet we come across instances of the formation of universals by comparison, as in botanical and zoological classification; and this latter process is more easily tested by experience.

From these data thus much may be gathered; that universals, *as such*, have no objective existence. They are partly conceptual, partly real; and their reality is recognised in that similarity of notes as derived from a common model,—the prototypal idea that is the measure of their eduction and development. The same twofold nature is discernible in concrete as well as in abstract universals, but in the latter the conceptual element assumes wider proportions;

and it seems advisable for this reason to add a few words concerning them. They are of two kinds:—*viz.*, such as have been obtained from substances, and such as have been obtained from accidents. To begin with the former: From *animal*, which is a concrete universal, the mind is capable of extracting the idea of supposit—that which completes the substantiality by giving to substance its incommunicability to another *as* substance or nature. After such abstraction there remain the essential notes by which *animal* is distinguishable from another whatsoever group of being; and these notes, embraced in one comprehensive idea, are conceived as a form (metaphysical) informing the supposit and determining it to its specific nature. This idea we express by the term, *animality;* just as from *man* we form the abstract concept of *humanity* or *human nature*. Abstract universals derived from accidents exhibit a more complex process of abstraction. According to the essential condition of an accident, in the order of nature it must inhere in some substance as in its proper subject. Accordingly, it is declared to be *being of being (ens entis)* rather than *being* absolutely; although it has a real entity of its own. Now, after abstraction made of the individual notes (which is a prerequisite of every sort of universal), abstraction is, or may be, made of the substantial subject, and the accident remains in its own solitary state as possible accident of an indefinite number of material substances. Thus, for instance, we may begin with a *red rose;* and thence arrive at the simple attribute, *red*. But the process of abstraction may be carried yet further. The mind may direct its attention to the accident, exclusively as to a form capable of informing its subject. It may intend to represent its essence as it is in itself. It reduces the accident to the condition of a *quasi*-substance; and thus conceives the idea of *redness*,—a quality capable of producing in the sense of sight this particular colour. True it is that, as I have already stated, there is more of the ideal entering into the composition of these abstract accidents; yet even in these the fundamental reality on which they are constructed is apparent. This, too, is worthy of close attention, that by how much these abstract universals recede further from the contingent beings which are the source of the genesis of such ideas, by so much do they approach nearer to that prototypal idea which, though in its own being singular, *as an exemplar* is a practical universal; just as a negative in photography is potential of an indefinite number of positives. Accordingly, this is one reason why all science

is of universals. That the human intellect has this abstractive power, is demonstrated in ideology; and one easy proof is derived from the testimony of consciousness.

Let us now return to the main theme of this paper,—human speech, or language, as the *word* by which man conveys his thoughts to his brother man. There is a problem connected with its genesis, which is only indirectly connected with the main drift of the present article, and is perhaps the most difficult that linguistic offers. I shall only refer to it very briefly, and in so far as it affects the conclusion at which I am driving. One theory, connected with the origin of speech, is included in the well-known definition of Aristotle, who declares speech to be "a sound" of the human voice "symbolical according to agreement".[1] The Philosopher, then, seems to consider that language is the result of a voluntary compact; and this is one of the theories that has been advanced touching the origin of languages. But there appear to me to be insuperable difficulties in the way of such a hypothesis. (1) In order that men should be rendered capable of such a compact, it would be necessary that they should be able to intercommunicate with one another in order to arrive at a common agreement; and bodily signs or gestures would be far too rude an instrument for such an enterprise. (2) This difficulty would be considerably augmented in the instance of what may be called—as it has been called—the formal part of a language, in which the special relationship of cognate languages is discoverable. Now, the said forms mainly consist in the prefixes and suffixes, modes of declension and conjugation. But agreement touching these could never be indicated by telegraphic signs between those who are supposed to compose the convention. (3) The theory in question is incompetent to offer a reasonable explanation of the marked differences between the forms of one language and those of another; more particularly if we take into consideration the common affinity, mediate or immediate, by which the languages of the world attest their derivation from one original source. What sufficient reason can it proffer for the adoption of a new system of grammatical forms after the migration of a race from their home to other distant quarters? Whence comes it that, in order to express the future tense of a verb, some nations have adopted the conversive *vau*, others a change of suffix, others again a distinct auxiliary verb? One can hardly understand how

[1] *φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην. De Interpret.* c. 2.

the busy and hazardous work of migration could leave leisure for so arduous an undertaking. Yet after settlement in their new homes, up to which time they must have used their native tongue, it is unconscionable to suppose that they would set about the formation of a new speech with new modes of declension and conjugation; unless, indeed, it can be made to appear that there is certain historical evidence in favour of the supposition. (4) This difficulty, in presence of the compact-theory, becomes intensified by the opposite method of writing and reading in the Semitic and the Aryan groups of languages,—the former writing from right to left, the latter on the contrary from left to right. One is puzzled to imagine how such a difference or change could have been introduced by authority of a tribal synod.

It is perfectly true that a language, *subsequent to its substantial constitution*, continues thenceforth to be enriched by the coinage of new words or by adaptations from other languages. But three things are noticeable touching these additions. One is, that these words are for the most part technical. Thus, many words have been borrowed by us from the French in the sciences of cookery and of war; and physicists in most modern languages are coining each year a multitude of new words. Another remark is, that these additions never touch the forms of a language; on the contrary they are for the most part submitted to the regulation of such forms. Thus, in French mensuration the term *centimètre* has a Latin head, a Greek body, but a French tail. How far such composites are an ornament to a language, is a question of taste. The last and most important remark is, that in all these cases of new nomenclature the first introduction of the word is never effected by a national compact or anything like it, but invariably begins with the use of the term by some individual. If the word in question is a technical term that has been coined by one who has acquired a great reputation in a special branch of knowledge, and if his reason for adopting the term seems to be a sufficient one, the new coinage is at once stamped in the mint of public opinion. The word, *concept*, introduced by Sir William Hamilton, is a notable instance in point. If, on the other hand, the new term is added to the common language of literature, it has to submit to a more serious ordeal. Should it begin to appear in the leaders of our more prominent newspapers and in periodical literature, its life is ensured,—in many cases, to the detriment of the language. Such is the importation

of new words or of a new sense to a recognised word, as, for instance, *location, stores;* and in like manner misspellings, such as *marvelous* for *marvellous*, and *develop* for *develope*. There is another important class of words that are rendered necessary by some new invention; such as *locomotive, sleepers, shunt, breechloader, telegraph, telegram, &c.* But in no one of these instances of augment in the vocabulary of a language is the introduction of the term due to other than individual use; though it is sanctioned afterwards by a more or less general public sanction. Finally, the words so introduced are commonly concrete not abstract; though in time they may give occasion to a corresponding abstract,—as, for instance, *telegraphy* from *telegraph*.

I have discussed the above theory touching the genesis of language, not only or principally because of the grave authorities, ancient as well as modern, who have adhered to it, but more particularly because it is the one theory that seems to lend a certain air of plausibility to nominalism under its various forms; and it is towards the exposure of Nominalism, by a careful examination of *the word* in its universal acceptation, that the present paper is directed.

Now, the human word, like the Angelic and in a manner the Prototypal or Divine Word, is twofold. There is an internal and an external word. The former is the completed concept as representative of the object to the conceiving soul itself exclusively. It is, therefore, necessary to both Angelic and human thought and is no wise subject to volition, presupposing the normal presence of the object and the requisite conditions. The latter is the same concept as communicable to others. It has been seen that in all probability Angelic speech is the result of a modal termination of the concept itself; in man, on the contrary, speech is the result of bodily organism. In like manner, the Divine Word is justly understood to be both internal and external,—or, as the Greek Fathers expressed it, ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός. As internal, He is the expression of the Divine Wisdom within the infinite abyss of the Divine Essence; the External Word may be said to include all the Theophanies in time, but pre-eminently that of the Incarnation. The first is absolutely necessary; the Theophanies are subject to the Divine Volition.

For the avoiding of confusion and error, it is of importance to remark, that the internal human word must not be confounded with those soul-echoes of human speech, which in the order of this life are the necessary accompaniment of

all abstract thought, and of all thought whatsoever that is not formally intuitive of its object. These are simple phantasmata of a special kind, and are the product of the lower or sensile part of the soul. The internal word of the human soul is the complete concept as representative to the conceiving mind, of its object. When a phantasma of the object is not directly present, its place is occupied by a phantasma of the object's name; for the human intellect, so long as it is connected with the body, cannot energise in thought without an accompanying phantasma of some sort. This latter is a condition *sine qua non* of human cognition, presupposes the corresponding concept, but has nothing in common with the intellectual act itself.

Let us now revert to that which is fundamental and incontrovertible in Aristotle's definition of speech. It is a sound of the voice that is symbolical. There are other sounds that are not symbolical in the strict sense of the term, such as coughing, laughing, humming, whistling, &c. Thus *sound of the human voice* is the genus of language, and *symbolical* is its differentia. But of what is it symbolical? Clearly enough of thought; for it is plain from experience and from our own self-consciousness that such is *de facto* its universal use. It is true that there are interjections which are expressive of feeling rather than of thought; but these are very imperfect words, since by a mere change of tone you may make one and the same interjection to represent a multitude of distinct feelings, as, for instance, the interjection *oh,* which can alternately express pain, or indifference, or joy, or surprise, or tenderness, or terror, or admiration, &c. Such symbolical sounds of the human voice approach most nearly to the sounds of brute animals, and it may be said that they are, as it were, accidents of language. Yet even in these sounds (whether human or animal), if and so far as they are symbolical, two things are evident: the one is, that the feeling at least in order of nature precedes the sound; the second is, that the feeling generates the sound, not the sound the feeling. In like manner, whereas language is symbolical of thought, it is the thought which primitively gives birth to speech, not speech which gives birth to thought.

Such a necessary priority is involved in the nature of a symbol, whatsoever the form this latter may assume. A symbol is a symbol of something,—an expression of something. In itself it is either a purely mechanical contrivance or a physical act. There is no reason why the elevation or the depression of a piece of wood should affect the

engine-driver; nor indeed could it do so, unless it were invested with a meaning previously conceived in the mind of the signal-master. But the thought must have been previously connected with the sign in the intellect of the driver likewise; otherwise, he would be as puzzled at the motions as a person who cannot read in presence of a book spread out before him. One is compelled to own that in the mind of the engine-driver the signal is *provocative* of the thought. But this admission in no way impairs the argument. For it is of the nature of a symbol that it should imprint its meaning, or the thing symbolised, in the recipient; because its *raison d' être* is, to be communicative. In like manner, on the principle of sufficient reason, there would be no human voice if there were no human ear. But the question with us concerns the origin of speech,—of words,—not the origin of hearing.

It will not be amiss to pursue this argumentative analysis somewhat further. If any word whatsoever could *of itself* generate a thought in the human intellect, this word must have proceeded either from another person or from the thinker himself. But the former hypothesis is impossible. For, in order that a certain combination of vocal sounds may be able to give birth to a concept in the mind of the hearer, it is necessary that the concept should beforehand exist virtually in the mind of the latter; should this not be the case, the articulate sound would prove only an empty beating of the air, and its product an unintelligible word. If one were to address an importunate beggar in the streets with the words *πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης*, the phantasma excited in the sense of hearing would awaken in the mind no corresponding concept,—to put it in plain English, the vagrant would have no idea of what the speaker meant. This articulate sound of the human voice would not be symbolical to him, and accordingly would not be speech for him in the true meaning of the term. I cannot help thinking that such is the meaning of the *κατὰ συνθήκην* included in the Aristotelian definition, and that its supposed reference to the genesis of language is a misapplication of the term. It has been already stated that two points are essential to language, as being a communicating symbol,—*viz.*, that there should be a voice and an ear. Now, by ear is not only intended either the bodily organ (the external sense) or the sense of hearing (the internal sense), but a common agreement between speaker and listener touching the symbolism of the communicated word or speech. It is absolutely necessary that the listener, either by dictionary or

other means, should know more or less the meaning of the articulate sound; under no other circumstances could language become an intelligible symbol. But what constitutes the meaning of a word or sentence, if it be not the concept intended to be conveyed by the speaker? It is obvious, then, that a spoken word cannot be accredited with the genesis of thought. There is absolute need of a virtual agreement between him who speaks and him who listens touching the particular symbol and the particular thought or object symbolised. Is not this the genuine meaning of Aristotle's *κατὰ συνθήκην*? This is plainly the opinion of St. Thomas,[1] who, commenting on the definition, remarks: "Some, on the other hand, have maintained that words do not derive their signification from nature (such is the contention of Aristotle in this place); but in this respect they derive their signification from nature, that their signification is in accordance with the nature of things, as Plato has remarked." According to Aristotle, then, the words do not in their own nature exhibit the thought intended to be conveyed, but have been arbitrarily adopted for this purpose. Who, indeed, could imagine otherwise, in presence of so great a multiplicity of languages? Of course, Aristotle had in his eye the languages and existing state of things in his own day. Accordingly, his definition could not have been intended to include the primitive or paradisal speech about which he in all probability knew nothing; whereas the form of expression in the Pentateuch [2] seems to suggest that the Adamic vocabulary was a natural symbol of both the concepts and the objects of the concepts.

Thus, then, it is clear that speech could not of itself give birth to new concepts in the mind of the listener, but presupposes the symbolised concept already latent in his memory. The origin of language, however, could not be attributed to him who hears but to him who speaks. Let us now, therefore, betake ourselves to the second alternative.

Is it possible that any man should pronounce a word in the actual order of things, which could convey to his own mind an idea that was not there before? The question

[1] "Quidam vero dixerunt quod nomina non naturaliter significant quantum ad hoc quod eorum significatio non est natura, ut Aristoteles hic intendit; quantum ad hoc vero naturaliter significant, quod eorum significatio congruit naturis rerum, ut Plato dixit."—*De Interpr.* L. i., lect. 4.

[2] *Genesis* ii., 19, 20.

necessarily includes the supposition that the vocal sound had not been previously conveyed to him by another; otherwise, it would be included under the former alternative. Further, I suppose an externally spoken word; since, according to the hypothesis, this latter must precede the internally spoken word, which is a phantasmic echo of the former. The question thus conditioned admits but of one answer; the thing is naturally impossible. For what after all is a speech-sound? Certain undulations of the air strike upon the tympanum of the ear, and thereby produce in the sense of hearing the perception of an articulated, complex sound. This is all. What proportion is there between this purely sensile perception and a concept of the intellect? Sound is not representative of an object in the same way or to the same extent as the perceptions of the other senses; for the other senses represent either active qualities or the quantity, —sometimes both,—of the object; whereas the perception of sound does little more than represent the object as cause. Accordingly, the sensation of sound, even when purified by the acting intellect with the purport of rendering it fit for determining the intellect to a perception of the object, offers comparatively few notes or marks characteristic of the object. Yet even in this respect it presupposes the object which it represents according to its nature. But the question I am now mooting is concerned with the symbolic power of articulate sound; and here the difficulty is all but infinitely greater. A man is supposed to utter some word, of the meaning of which he is wholly ignorant; and yet it is suggested that such sound is capable of infixing an idea in the mind of him that utters it. What possible proportion can there be between the two? How can a perception of the senses of itself cause a concept, utterly distinct from the energising voice, in the intellect of the speaker? The former we share with the beasts and is material; the latter is a spiritual act which is common to us with the Angels. It may be said that the word is sufficient as a symbol; for even pieces of wood, lamps, flags, cannon, rockets, &c., are capable of communicating an idea. Most true; but the reply has been anticipated. It is necessary, in order that any entity may be able to function as a medium communicative of thought between two persons, that the speech of such symbol should have been previously understood and agreed upon by both of the intercommunicators. But in the assumed instance the two persons are one; and, according to the hypothesis, this one is ignorant of the symbolism of the vocal articulated sound. If, then, this sound generates a concept, it must be *naturally*

in virtue of itself. Yet how is this possible? The symbol has no message to give, none therefore to receive. If *good*, for instance, can naturally impress upon the intellect the idea which the term represents; how is it that *buono*, *bon*, *ἀγαθόν*, the Hebrew *tob*, are equally capable, according to the hypothesis, of impressing the same idea?

Again, if the doctrine were true, that language of its very nature is competent to generate thought; then it would cease to be symbolic,—to be a simple instrument for the communication of thought,—and would become a physical efficient cause of thought; for its expression would be sufficient, apart from everything else, to produce a new thought in the intellectual faculty.

Yet again, if a spoken word has the natural faculty of implanting in the intellect a new concept, surely it must acquire the power from the rightful disposition of parts,—that is to say, from the exact selection and collocation of syllables and letters. In a newspaper that fell into my hands some time ago I found it stated, that there is a Viennese word to express 'the bursting of a water-pipe': and this word is *Hochquellenwasserlieferungerohrenfatalität*. Now, the question is: How did this word *first* become a conventional symbol of the idea indicated? There must have been some one man who originally introduced it; unless we are driven to maintain that it was the result of a miraculous interference. But how could any man construct this complex compound word without any previous idea of the object symbolised? What principle of selection would guide him? What faculty of the soul is there, which would be competent to direct him towards the precise choice of syllables and letters whose combination, by its natural and singular nature, should impress on his mind an idea of which he had been previously unconscious? Perhaps it may be urged in reply, that the term is a compound of words already received, and that the combination, in accordance with the genius of the language, would be comparatively easy. True, but this only throws the difficulty further back. To take one of the component words: some one must primitively have chosen *Wasser* to express the object which we call *water;* and, according to the hypothesis, of this object he had no previous idea. He has uttered the word as the only means of informing himself in the cognition. Further, there are probably other possible combinations by which the Viennese inventor might have given expression to the same idea; unless we are prepared to maintain, in defiance of the evidence for the existence of synonyms in every language, that there is but one natural

expression in human speech for one concept. Such a contention, however,—to say nothing of other inconsequences that beset it,—is incompatible with the existence of more than one language. For, if one articulate sound is a natural development of the given idea; it does not stand with the ordering of nature which admits nothing superfluous, that another articulate sound should be endowed with the efficacy of impressing precisely the same idea.

Lastly, it tells strongly against the theory in question, that it represents the human word as being in direct antagonism with the Prototypal Word no less than with the Angelic Word,—I mean, with the external or communicative word of this latter. In the Divine Theophanies, pre-eminently in that of the Incarnation, the Word is external in both senses of the term. These Economies are so many temporal manifestations to man of the Wisdom of God. But such Economies, or temporal Manifestations, of the Word are but Revelations of the everlasting Word Whom they represent after a limited manner to this or that person or to a certain body of men. So is it likewise with that greatest of Theophanies,—the Incarnation of the Son of God. The human nature was itself a speech; but the words which Jesus uttered were a formal communication to us of the Divine Wisdom as substantially expressed in the Word, though limited and partial. They were so many echoes of Truths existing eternally and immutably in the one idea which is the Wisdom and Word of God. But all these Economies or Theophanies presuppose the Word or the Divine Wisdom of which they are a communication. The Word does not presuppose them; they presuppose the Word. So is it with the intercommunion of thought between Angel and Angel and of Angels with men. Angelic voices are probably a mode, or accidental termination, of their cognitions, their internal words. They are so many negatives, present at will, by which spirit can photograph (so to speak) his thought on other spirits and even on the human soul,—voiceless yet expressive,—that which poets not inaptly term, "whispers of Angels,"—those unexpected suggestions of good and intuitions of latent evil which are given us by their ministry. But all these voiceless voices are a photographed thought, contemplative or practical; and without the preceding thought there can be no photograph. It is not the photograph that generates the negative, but the negative that produces the photograph.

Are there, then, any sufficient or even plausible reasons for supposing that in this respect the human word is the

exact reverse of its great Archetype or of the language of Angels? Forasmuch as the human soul is not a complete substance but postulates a body as the necessary complement of completed unity of substance, it is true that the soul communicates its inner word by means of a special bodily organism, to which there is a corresponding organism in the person receiving the communicated word; yet this fact in no wise affects either the analogy which is here maintained or the confirmatory argument deduced from it. For in proportion as the medium of communication is more pronouncedly distinct from the cognition which it contains, so does the symbolic nature of the medium become more important and prominent.

In answer it may be urged, that these arguments have a certain amount of cogency in regard of concrete words and propositions which correspond with, and presuppose, perceptions and direct judgments of existing objects cognisable by sense; but that they have no force when applied to universals concrete and abstract. The former terms represent the perception of a real existent object; the latter, an object purely ideal and having no substantive existence outside the mind of the thinker or speaker. It is easy to understand, the objection might proceed, how concrete terms in the most rigorous sense of the phrase could, according to the convention-theory, have been invented and adopted. The way that a child picks up by degrees the simpler elements of its native tongue is a conspicuous example in point: *What's that?* pointing at the same time with its tiny finger. The pointing alone (be it observed) would prove a sufficient substitute for the demonstrative pronoun. The nurse plucks the flower, and says it is a rose. The little one toddles off with the flower to its mother, and cries out, *Ma, rose.* It has learned its early lesson. It smells, touches it (let us suppose it to be a moss-rose), looks at the colour, pulls it to pieces and gets a faint idea of its form. Thus it gradually by perceptions of sense gathers together the characteristic notes of the object; and henceforth the name recalls the object as made known by its differential qualities. It is noticeable that the speech of a child at first represents the singular and concrete, and it expresses for the most part no judgments which are really such, but only propositions which are symbols either of interrogation or of feeling. Then it learns after a time to form judgments and to pronounce them. Finally, after reading for some time in books and listening to conversations, it becomes familiar with universals and abstract

names. Is it not plain, then, that in the last-named instances the word introduces the fictitious idea; not the idea, the word? Add to this, that these so-called ideas are not representative of an objective reality, but are a mere coinage of human industry through the medium of language; and can, therefore, be taught only by the instrumentality of language. Lastly, the extreme section of the philosophers who maintain this view does not hesitate to declare that these abstract universals have no objective equivalent, that they are certain artifices of speech invented by men for convenience of classification and for other cognate uses.

What is to be said in answer to these nominalist theories?

At the outset I am free to confess that there is an undeniable difference between singular and universal names; because there is an essential difference between a singular and a universal concept, of which the former are the vocal expressions. The object of a singular concept, if the object be a reality, is an existent entity formally as such. The object of a universal is conceptual in its form and neither has nor can have any existence outside the mind. There is no *αὐτοσκεῦον* that embraces all individual shoes; as Aristotle smilingly remarks in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. Hence, the same Philosopher declares in his short work on the *Categories*, that first or individual substances are to the human mind the foundation of second or universal substances. *Man*, for instance, does not and cannot exist in nature outside intellect of some sort; though *this* or *that individual* man can and does so exist. Yet, on the other hand, first substances are the real foundation of second substances; wherefore, universals are neither purely logical nor pure forms of speech, but conceptual,—that is to say, they are logical in form, though built up on a real foundation. It must further be admitted, in justice to the more moderate school of nominalism, that there is likewise a conspicuous distinction between a concrete and an abstract universal, in that the latter is the abstraction of an abstraction. A concrete universal represents a universal supposit of some sort, personal or other; while the abstract universal represents the simple essence without representing the substance as ideally terminated by its own incommunicability and in full possession of itself. This will be best explained by an illustration or two. *Water* is a concrete universal, representing the substance as substantially incommunicable to any other substance and in possession of itself; *wateriness* is an abstract universal, representing the essence as a meta-

physical form by virtue of which water is what it is. It represents the form without connoting the subject. In universal accidents, from the very nature of an accident, the distinction is more obvious. Thus, *white*, which is a concrete universal, connotes a subject that is white; *whiteness*, which is an abstract universal, does not connote a subject, but merely denotes the essence of the accident. Similarly, the term *man* is a concrete universal, since it connotes *person*, or intellectual supposit (not an individual person, observe); while *humanity* is an abstract universal, inasmuch as it exclusively denotes the specific form by virtue of which man is man. In all these and similar examples the concrete universal exhibits the essential form as inherent in the subject; while the abstract universal makes abstraction of the subject. It is therefore doubly impossible, so to say, that an abstract universal should formally represent any object capable of existence outside of any whatsoever intellect. Nevertheless, there is a real foundation for both concepts. For the abstract universal represents those specific notes which characterise each and every individual man, —to resume my last instance; while the concrete universal in addition represents universally that substantial mode by which human nature is terminated to its personality,—that is to say, the mode by which each individual nature is terminated to be this or that person, incommunicable as a nature to any other. Spite of the above concessions, it must nevertheless be maintained that universals, whether concrete or abstract, form no exception to the general law of all human speech. They, like all other words, are symbols of concepts; and consequently they presuppose the concept of which they are the sign. In the instance of him who uses them they do not generate thought, but the thought generates them. Besides the reasons already given, which equally apply to universal as to singular nouns, the following additional arguments, as it seems to me, remove the doctrine defended out of the category of doubtful opinions.

(1) In the first place: Unless it is clearly apparent that an invincible obstacle intervenes, no sufficient reason can be adduced why a part of the words that constitute a language should be symbolical or communicative of thought, while the other part is not genetically symbolical or productive of thought. Now, if it admits of being clearly shown that an invincible obstacle intervenes, the argument must be either *à priori*, derived from the nature of the object or subject, or *à posteriori*, from the evidence of experience.

But it is impossible to prove such an obstacle *à priori*,—in other words, it cannot be demonstrated that there is a metaphysical repugnance in regard of the nature of the subject or of the object. For self-consciousness teaches us, that the human mind is endowed with the faculty of abstraction and of generalisation which is a sort of correlative of the former. In the next place, in every object presented to the intellect by sensile perception there are confessedly certain real notes of similarity with other objects, which form a sufficient objective foundation for the concept of a universal. Both these propositions have been already established in an earlier part of this article, and the second point will be further illustrated presently. As assuredly, the theory in question cannot rest on facts of experience. We are all conscious of the existence in the mind of universal concepts which, when compared with the individual intellectual perceptions virtually included under the former, are found to possess a real objective significancy distinct from that of the perception of the individual. The absolute universal concept represents the essence,—the notes of similarity common to all actual or possible individuals under a particular class,—does not connote existence, and excludes or ignores every individual note, while connoting a prototypal or exemplar Idea (real and objective) from which the individuals derive a common unity; while the singular perception formally exhibits the individual notes, and connotes the essence together with existence. It is further plain that these universal concepts exist in the intellect prior to the external word that symbolises and communicates them, for reasons already given. To take an instance: Sir William Hamilton could never have introduced the term *concept* unless he had previously had in his mind the idea of the completed act as distinguished from the process of conceiving,—of the psychological fact as distinct from the objective representation.

(2) While the object of sense-perception is an individual; the formal object of the intellect is a universal. So far as the intellect does represent individual differences in its idea, it is forced to do so, as it were, by its contact with the concomitant phantasmata of the senses, by the intervention of which it is rendered capable of becoming present to the object.

The formal object of the intellect is a universal; because the essences of things are the formal object of the intellect, and essences are absolute universals. Accordingly, in the genesis of human thought the primordial universals are

intuitive concepts; and these intuitive concepts become more numerous in proportion as the sphere of objects continues to enlarge. These intuitions of essences are natural, necessary, and in the infancy of thought vague and generic. The reflex universal, on the other hand, is voluntary, philosophic, and represents more or less definitely the specific nature of the object; though this last property it shares with the intuitions of the adult intellect, which are sometimes perfected by their reflex co-ordinates. Thus absolute universals are pouring into the human mind from the time it begins to energise. Now, if there be such universals, it is consonant with the order and analogy of nature, that they should be represented by their appropriate word. Hence it will appear, how singularly infelicitous it is to introduce into the nominalistic plea the instance of a child in its first efforts of thought; for, when carefully examined, this example affords one of the strongest *à posteriori* arguments in favour of the opposite theory. It is true that a child's intuitions are always singularised; but it does not follow from this that they are singular. As the intellect is determined to its intuition of the particular object by the presence of a sense-perception in the soul, and as the infantine mind is very feeble at the outset; it naturally leans on the phantasmata at that date much more than afterwards, since it cannot walk far in its own strength. But the intuition of a universal is there, enveloped (so to say) in the individuality of the object of sensile perception. Three characteristics of a child's talk corroborate these assertions. In the first place, very often when a child begins to lisp its thoughts, it uses its hand or finger instead of the demonstrative pronoun which is the expression of individuation; sometimes it uses both at once. An object of sensile perception, *purely as such*, does not need for symbol more than a bodily gesture, like the postures of a pointer or a setter. But, in the next place, the child's question does not extend to the individuation or individuating notes: oftentimes the child does not even discern these latter. Its demand is: *What is this?* Translate the phrase; it means, *Tell me the name for this species of things.* The child has already in a rough and imperfect way recognised in its mind the essence of the thing, and it seeks to know the name for it. Confirmation of this may be found in the frequent practice of the little one, after it has acquired the name. Let us say that the object of original inquiry is a rose. The child has learned the name; the next time it sees, not the same rose, but another, it cries out: *Mamma, rose,*—or, *a rose.* It has

gained the word of its universal concept, and at once proceeds to communicate its idea. *Rose*, or *a rose*, is a universal, and only becomes in intention a singular by gesture. Lastly, one of the child's first words,—one that is perpetual in all its questionings is *thing;* but *thing* is a transcendental, —an all-embracing universal.

The proposition I am now defending is further confirmed by an analogical argument derived from the Prototypal Word and from the language of Angels. The Wisdom of God is infinite and infinitely simple; consequently, in one infinite and infinitely simple Word He conceives and expresses all reality—His own essence as well as all those finite realities, created by His Omnipotence, which are distant shadows or finite likenesses of Himself. Thus His substantial Concept and Word—to speak after the manner of men—is infinitely universal at once and infinitely singular; infinitely universal because of His Omniscience, infinitely singular by virtue both of His Omniscience and of His Simplicity. The Thought of God is not only infinite in Its breadth, but infinite likewise in Its height and depth. Again: As the theologians and philosophers of the School commonly teach, the intellect of Angels is always actual; and of their own nature Angels intue their own nature as an intellectual substance in act; and they naturally intue God the Supreme as imperfectly imaged forth in their own purely spiritual being. But how do they intue the natures of other angels, since, according to St. Thomas and the more received opinion, each angel is specifically distinct from all others? How, again, do they intue material things? If they cognise them, how do they cognise them? universally only, or each according to its individual difference? The same authorities give for answer that in their creation these intellectual substances, or separated Forms, were furnished with certain intellectual species—impresses of the Divine Exemplar Ideas in the work of creation—by and in which they are cognisant of all the typal forms of the world visible as well as invisible; that in these universal cognitions they intue the differences of each individual under a common species, so that these same universals are likewise virtually singular, including *the whole* of comprehension as well as *the whole* of extension; and that in proportion to the higher rank of an angel in the heavenly hierarchies, the number of these intellectual forms diminishes, and the unity of angelic science approaches nearer to that of the Divine Omniscience. We may fairly conclude, therefore, that the concepts of the human intellect are likewise universals, though specifically inferior to angelic

cognitions. This is confirmed by the teaching of St. Thomas in regard of the assimilation of subject to object in all cognition, human, angelic, and Divine. "That the intellectual species," he writes, "and the entities which they represent retain a likeness to each other, may come to pass in two ways: (1) either in that the one is cause of the other; . . . and in this way the Divine and human intellect retain a likeness to the entities represented in the intellect, although in an opposite manner. For the Divine Intellect imprints on an entity the form by which such entity is made like to itself; while the human intellect receives from the entity the specific form by means of which it is made like to the entity; (2) or in such wise that both the one and the other are, from one and the same cause, impressing a like form on each. And it is in this manner that the Angelic intellect is made like to the entities that are the objects of its cognition. For the forms which have been impressed by God on entities for the purpose of their subsistence, have been also impressed on an angel for purposes of cognition."[1] According to the Angelic Doctor, then, the Divine Wisdom and Word is the Measure of all truth in the creature, as being its adequate and only cause; human cognition is measured by its object—the world of being. Angelic cognition occupies a middle place between the two. It is not measured by the world of being, but rather becomes a subordinate measure of the truth of finite being, in virtue of those forms or intellectual species—corresponding with the determinating forms of finite being—which have been implanted in these purely intellectual substances. Limiting oneself, therefore, to the universality of the respective cognitions, it may be affirmed that the Divine Word is one, simple, all-embracing cognition. The angelic words, or internal concepts, are all universals, increasing in extension and intention and decreasing in number proportionally to the higher nobility of the angel. It is natural to conclude, then, that the concepts of the human intellect are likewise universals; and that, as the objects in the two former cases are essences which are absolute universals, so in like manner the native objects of the human intellect are also essences or absolute universals. What an absolute universal definitely is, will appear in the next argument.

An additional confirmation of the same proposition is derived from human language. If we set aside (as we undoubtedly have a right to do) proper names, of all the parts

[1] 2 d. iii., q. 3, a. 3, 2m.

of speech the only one that is *directly and formally* capable of representing individuality is the demonstrative pronoun. I say *directly and formally*, because, indirectly and as though by accident, adverbs significative of time and place may indicate the singularity of the subject of the sentence. For time and place connote existence. With these exceptions, all words in a language are universals; and such is the tendency of the human mind to form universals, that it not unfrequently transforms proper names into common. *Cæsarism, Machiavelianism, Darwinism, Mahometans, the names of Scotch clans,* are instances of such conversion.

The above arguments seem to justify the conclusion, that the formal object of the intellect in its own proper act is a universal. Its acts, therefore, are universal concepts; and its primordial acts, naturally necessary in presence of their object, are *direct* universals. They are in uitions of the essences of things. But, as the primordial acts of the intellect, like those of any other faculty, are comparatively feeble, the conceptual representations of the essence are like the first chalking in of the artistic idea on the canvas; and it is not until after the intellect has by reflex acts returned over and over again to the object represented and tested it by analysis, synthesis, and comparison, that the outline is definitely filled in. Then at length more or less of an equation is effected between the objective essence and the subjective cognition. *Thing* is identical with *being*. When a child uses the word, *thing*, how much does it know of being? Compare such infantine cognition with that complete philosophic concept of being, in which the whole of extension approximates towards the whole of comprehension; the difference between the direct and reflex universal will at once be seen.

(3) Classification—if it is not wholly arbitrary, and then it can hardly be called classification according to the strict acceptation of the term—presupposes a real objective foundation on which such classification is based. But a class is of itself a *relative* universal. This, then, is the fitting place to explain the difference between an absolute and a relative universal. An absolute universal is a universal *potentially* only. It neither includes nor formally excludes individuation. Moreover, it stands (as it were) in its own right, and does not connote a correlative. Take *virtue* as an instance. The concept absolutely represents the essential difference of moral action. It is not individuated, as *this moral action* plainly is, though not excluding the individual but ignoring it. Accordingly, it is *capable* of becoming a universal properly so called,—in other words, it is a potential universal.

Thus, in the proposition, *Virtue is its own reward*, the subject is an absolute (or potential) universal. It is assumed by the mind as a whole of comprehension, not as a whole of extension. A relative universal, on the other hand, is formally such. Accordingly, it positively excludes individuation; and connotes its correlative,—the species or individuals included within its periphery. Thus, *All virtue is either natural or supernatural*, is a formally universal proposition; and the subject, *all virtue*, is a relative universal, connoting the two subordinate species by which it can be dichotomically determined. So much will suffice for a right understanding of the present contention. Now, a class is essentially a relative universal, though after its institution it may be used conventionally as an absolute universal by disregarding its relation to its subordinates. For a class denotes a collection of individual entities, intellectually conceived according to some common basis of similarity. By the fact that it is a *collection* it excludes the possibility of any real singularity; and by the fact that it is a collection of *individuals* it is relative, connoting its relation as a conceptual whole to its subordinate parts or constituent members. All classification of whatsoever kind connotes the classified. But, according to the definition just given, though the universal is not physically real but conceptual, nevertheless, there is a real basis for the classification; since the class is conceived according to some common similarity. To take an instance: In the old Linnean system of botany the classification is almost exclusively derived (as it should be) from the reproductive organs of plants. Therein may be found a particular class, called *pentandria*. This class consists of hermaphrodite plants,—that is to say, of plants whose flower contains both stamina and pistil,—having five stamina or sperm-cells, with distinct filaments not connected with the pistil, or germ-cell. Here the common basis of similarity, which gives birth to the conceptual whole, is clear enough; for all the plants contained under it possess the following properties in common, *viz.*, that the sperm and germ cells exist in the same flower, that each flower has its five stamina, and that these stamina are disconnected from the pistil. These three properties, discovered by experimental observation, are realities which justify the mind in conceiving the various plants that exhibit the said properties as a separate collection. Yet *pentandria* is not the concept or name of a singular plant, but of a certain class of plants. It necessarily is not singular. The naturalist who first discovered these properties in a certain number of different plants and conceived them as on this

account specifically one, may have given to them the name of *pentandria* (that is to say, five-stamina) or any other name he pleased, because he had previously formed in his mind the universal or common concept; but how could the name have taught its first inventor the idea? or what concept could it generate in the mind of the listener, unless this latter had previously possessed the idea? The name would be nothing but an articulated sound symbolical of nothing, and no more human language than the cadences of a snorer, in the absence of the universal concept of which it is the symbol. Hence the usefulness and frequent necessity of the meanings of words in dictionaries. It is not, then, the name that generates the universal concept; but the universal concept that finds its expression in the symbolic name. Neither is the concept a mere logical entity, unrepresentative of anything outside the mind; but it is based on an objective reality.[1]

(4) There is no science, either properly or improperly so called, that has not a universal for its formal object. Irrespectively of the, morally speaking, universal authority of all philosophers up to this comparatively recent period of philosophic anarchy, the truth of the proposition is patent to common sense. If science could have a singular for its formal object, there might be as many sciences as there have been and are individuals. Indeed, the universality of human thought and of the range of the human intellect seems to postulate the existence of these sciences. But in such case the number of sciences would be practically infinite, certainly incalculable; and what could we learn from them? They would add next to nothing to that which is derived from a purely sensile perception of the object,—an individual possessed of such and such determining accidents,—and each object would remain in its own isolation, the subject of an equally isolated thought. Thus human knowledge would scarcely reach the level of the sheep's estimate of a wolf. Further: Human science from a subjective point of view is a habit cognoscitive of the essence of things whether by intuition or by ratiocination.

Such is science, properly so-called, in its most generic signification as inclusive of Divine, Angelic, and human cognition. But the essences of things are the real meta-

[1] The moderate nominalists of modern England,—*e.g.*, Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, Adam Smith, admit "that perceived resemblance is the foundation of classification". Sir W. Hamilton: *Metaph.* Lect. xxxv., Vol. II. But such an admission looks very like a surrender of the citadel. Nominalism has shifted into conceptualism.

physical forms which determine the species, and are in their nature absolute universals, represented by universal concepts. Again: assuming it from the same point of view in its strictest sense as the demonstrative habit (ἕξις ἀποδεικτική), science postulates universals as its terms; for the three judgments of the demonstrative syllogism must be universal. Yet again: scientific cognitions are necessary, immutable. But a singular object (with but one exception) cannot give birth to a necessary and immutable cognition, because itself is contingent and mutable; consequently, a cognition that should represent it otherwise, would be a false cognition. God is the only apparent exception; but the exception is really no exception. For in Him the two wholes of extension and intension meet. Moreover, He is necessary and immutable Being,—the Source, infinite Continent, exemplar Cause of all being. Once more: Demonstration is the logical form and necessary medium of human science strictly so called. Now, in the parent or most perfect demonstrative syllogism the middle term is the definition of the subject (or minor term) and after a way of the attribute, passion, specific property (or major term). But a definition, properly so-called, must be a universal, because it exhibits a genus as determined by a specific difference to the constitution of the species; and genus, difference, species, are each of them universals. To exhibit the same conclusion under another form: In the perfect demonstrative syllogism with which every demonstration must begin, the subject or minor term is—to speak logically—a species; the middle term or medium of demonstration, the definition of the subject and passion; the major term, the passion or attribute. But all these three terms are of their nature universals. Hence the Philosopher says in his *Posterior Analytics*, that "It is necessary" to the existence of demonstration, "truly to predicate one thing of the many; for there will not be the universal, unless this be so; and if there be not a universal, there will not be a middle term; so that neither will there be a demonstration" (B. i., c. 11). Lastly, all science is essentially unitive from first to last. Even in its preparatory and imperfect stage, while labouring by process of induction to elicit laws and first principles out of the facts of experience and observation, it is reducing individual phenomena under some common law, or evolving therefrom some indemonstrable principle which either lies at the foundation of all certain cognition or serves as the major premiss of the mother-syllogism in some particular science. Thus it commences its work by

gathering up an indefinite number of individual entities into one whole. Now, where induction ends, there deduction, and demonstration in particular, commence. The process of the one is predominantly analytical; that of the other synthetical. Deduction, or rather demonstrative deduction, takes the universal of induction, which scientific intuition now exhibits as an immutable and necessary truth, and fills it in with specific attributes. Induction discovers the whole; demonstration discovers the essential totality of the whole. The former by comparison of like and like as well as by elimination of the unlike exhibits the universal; the latter developes this universal, proving its essential properties by means of the definition as its middle term. Now, throughout this procedure science indirectly lays bare certain off-shoot truths that are as so many hooks linking on one science (*objectively* such) with another,—equal, with equal, inferior with superior. These latter are the subalternant and subalternate sciences; as, for instance, the scientific part of mechanics is subalternated to pure mathematics. Hence we discover that there is a hierarchy of sciences,—such as are inferior yielding to a wider universal and a more comprehensive unity. Is, then, this quest of the human mind after unity of knowledge labour in vain? Is there a hierarchy of sciences without a high priest invested with plenary jurisdiction? Do the mutual bonds of unity suddenly stop short, and leave us in the hands of an oligarchy? Is there no supreme science? The concurrent testimony of Greek philosopher, of mediæval Doctor, of the true philosopher in more modern times, assures us that there is such a science, stretching from end to end of human thought and of the objects of human thought, and that its name is Wisdom. Within the strict limits of the natural order this supreme science is metaphysics. Thus, then, science deals, and necessarily deals, with universals from the first; and, as it progresses, it encounters on its road higher and yet higher universals, till in the supreme science it arrives at the transcendentals which permeate, so to say, all being. Are these universals mere creations of the voice? If so, then all science is vanity; and the only truths if you can call them such, which are not logical fictions, would emerge out of a complete identity between subject and predicate, representable by the now familiar formula,—A = A. But the facts of nature give the lie to so monstrous an hypothesis. In the varied orders of being the inferior is virtually, and in many cases actually, contained under the higher,—simple bodies under compounds, compound bodies under vegetative life, this latter under animal life, animal

life under man, the human soul under the pure Intelligences, all under God as the Supreme, all-containing Reality; not in any case by identity of essence but by an infinite supremacy of Being; after a not unsimilar manner as to the inclusion of the less number under the greater in arithmetic.

(5) I must add in the last place, by way of confirmation, an argument which will not seem trivial to such as have carefully considered the question. Abstract and, generally speaking, universal *terms* are national—that is to say, each nation has its own vocabulary; whereas the *concepts* represented by the terms are œcumenical. But, if the articulated sound were parent of the concept (or of the fiction that would stand for the concept), as diverse as are the words, so in proportion would the corresponding mental figments be diverse. If, on the other hand (as sane philosophy teaches), the concept claims some term that may symbolise and transmit it to others, one can well understand, taking into account the diversity of races and families of men, how a variety of articulated sounds may be made to represent one and the same idea.

To sum up the doctrine evolved in this article, by way of conclusion: The perceptions of sense are singular, and represent an individual existent thing exclusively, as manifested by its group of accidents that are pervious to the sense. Hence, a sensile perception exhibits two things only, to wit, quantity, shape, colour, and other qualitative accidents on the one hand, the collection of these into unity of some sort on the other hand—that act of the *common sense* which collects in one the impressions of each particular sense, and completes the sensile perception. Such perceptions are common to man and irrational animals. But in these *essence* is neither denoted nor even connoted, but only objectively presupposed. The intellectual act represents the same object as an essence, or specific form, which of its nature is an absolute universal. This essence the intellect may represent either as individual, and then its concept connotes existence; or it may represent the same purely as a form, in which case it does not connote existence. Existence predicated answers the question, *Whether a thing is*, and connotes the individual; sensile as well as intellectual perception respond to the question, *What a thing is*, but each in a different way. The perception of sense exhibits what a thing is by its individual accidents only, and as a consequence must be singular; intellectual perception represents the essential notes of the object, and accordingly in its own right (so to say) is a universal; when it includes or connotes

singularity, it does so under compulsion of the sensile perception by which the intellectual faculty was first determined to the representation of such object and of the sensile phantasma which invariably accompanies every act of the human intellect in the actual order. Hence it follows that every concept of the mind in its own native power is a universal. If so, universal ideas are the property of the intellect of man, and begin with the first exercise of reason. These universal concepts, direct and necessary, are concrete; but the human mind from these can form abstract universals, reflex and voluntary, by its faculty of abstraction. Neither the one nor the other class of universal concepts is the formal representation of a *physical* reality, because all things that are physically real are singular; nevertheless each is *metaphysically* real, because it represents the essential notes —really existing in each individual of a group according to a common type—by which every individual entity is determined to its own grade in the universe of created being. These essential notes are the real foundation for the concept, and give to it a universality unlimited by space or time; so that, wherever and whenever an entity shall appear with such notes, it will of necessity be covered by the species, or universal, that exhibits these notes. Such are the internal words of the human intellect; and they postulate a common term as medium of intercommunication between mind and mind. This is in strict analogy with the internal and external words of angels, and more particularly, with the Prototypal Word in the Blessed Trinity. That the intellect of man has naturally such universals as its proper object is clear from the instance of children when they first arrive at the age of reason, from an examination of the parts of speech in all languages, from the specific order of the universe, from the nature of science, from the sensile origin of individual differences. That the universal reflex and philosophical concept is possible, clearly appears from the fact that the human mind has those faculties of abstraction and generalisation which are necessary and sufficient for the production of such concepts. That language cannot give birth to the concept—the external word generate the internal —is an evident deduction from the symbolical nature of language, from the innate deficiency of the supposed cause, and from the fact that universal concepts are common to all men, whereas the terms which express them differ in different languages. Whether these conclusions square or not with the nominalist theory, I leave to the judgment of the reader.

THOMAS HARPER, S.J.

V.—NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

MIND AND BODY.

In Mr. Malcolm Guthrie's recent volume devoted to the criticism of Mr. Herbert Spencer's Philosophy, noticed in MIND XXIX. 116, he assigns a considerable amount of space to the "double aspect" expression of the mind; and honours my remarks upon the subject with a share of attention. I have no reason to complain of either the tone or the matter of his criticisms; yet I think some remarks upon his strictures may have a bearing beyond the personal question.

I may premise that in the work of mine criticised by Mr. Guthrie—*Mind and Body*—there are three problems considered. The first is the thorough-going concomitance of mind and body, on which I produced all the evidence that I could command on the affirmative side. This is purely a question of fact; it is, moreover, a practical question of the very utmost importance; indeed, I call it the only practical question, for reasons to be given.

The second problem is—How to state, or express in words, the nature of the connexion. Provided we do not trench upon the integrity of the previous doctrine, I do not call this a practical question; no practical consequences depend upon it. The holders of the most various modes of statement may agree in their mode of conducting themselves as to the management of our bodily and mental constitution. It is not unimportant in itself; but the importance is of a different kind, namely, that we should so express ourselves in all scientific questions as to keep clear of self-contradiction. The history of Philosophy proves that this is sometimes tremendously difficult; and the difficulty has to be met in a way peculiar to itself. We have to pass out of the limits of common speech, and to invent subtleties of language that shall express the facts, and avoid the contradictions. We must still look at the facts, but not in the same way as when we are bent on finding out what they are. We have to provide them a fitting dress; and, for that purpose, may have to take a more careful measure of them than even their first discoverers thought necessary.

The third problem raised in the work in question, is the relationship of our mental workings to the nervous system as known to us. Certain points are singled out, on which hypotheses are framed. The means of proving these are as yet extremely inadequate; and they must, therefore, be estimated by whatever logical tests are properly applicable to hypotheses in that condition.

Now on the first question—the question of fact and of practical application—Mr. Guthrie agrees with Mr. Spencer and myself. His principal quarrel with us both is on the unpractical, but not unimportant question—How shall we put in proper words the connexion of the two classes of facts, commonly called physical and mental, objective and subjective? It is indeed a question of words, but for all that, a great question.

Before endeavouring to formulate in unexceptionable language the relationship of body and mind, I make a reference to one of the current modes, adopted even by thinkers that believe in the thorough-going concomitance; namely, that the mind acts upon the body, and the body upon the mind. To this I object, as assuming the independent existence of the mind. I affirm, on the contrary, that the inter-actions of mind and body are sequences where mind and body are coupled both in the antecedent and in the consequent. A fright depresses and deranges the bodily functions; yet the antecedent fact is not a piece of pure disembodied consciousness; it is a consciousness that would be non-existent but for its being embodied in a series of nervous disturbances; and its efficacy is due to those disturbances, and not to any power that it possesses as a purely subjective phenomenon.

Now for this view of the case, I have employed various forms of language: and these forms Mr. Guthrie would fain make out to be self-contradictory and absurd. He does not seem to consider, that it is a matter of some difficulty to find any expression that may not be objected to; he makes no allowance for the metaphorical character of nearly all the terms that we are obliged to use; he does not himself, except by way of suggested variations, say how the case should be stated; and worst of all, he strains the language used beyond its obvious purport.

In order to avoid the error above spoken of, I introduced the phrase "two-sided cause": a mere condensation of the explanatory remarks as to the inseparable union of the two factors. Mr. Guthrie twists this expression into a variety of contortions; he makes it out to mean or to imply a plurality of causes; he fathers upon me his own interpretation, namely, that the physical side is a cause and the mental side also a cause, which is in flat contradiction to the whole of my explanations, and to any reasonable rendering of the phrase "two-sided cause". If I had meant what he supposes, I should have used a quite different expression, such as "double or conjoint cause," or united streams of causation. Then, he tells us that a "*two-sided cause*" is one of those figures of speech which are the crutches of metaphysics, and enable halting theories to make progress. In point of fact, however, everybody must use figures of speech, for the tissue of language is made up of them; we can but do our best to guard ourselves against their misleading use; we need to explain fully in what sense we intend the words to be used, as I think I have

done in this instance. I have said quite enough to show that the cause is one cause, although that cause is a complex fact; a physical series with a mental manifestation. Body acts upon body; but then it is a kind of body that has mind for its accompaniment; mind must not be dropt out of the phenomenon. It is, I have said, "mind-body giving birth to mind-body"; on which Mr. Guthrie remarks—"The only intelligible position is not contained in any compound word which resolves all mysteries by means of a hyphen". This is as if any one were to denounce the Binomial Theorem as an imposture because it rests upon a cross after every term. A hyphen is an abbreviation for "together with": "mind together with body" is the real antecedent in the supposed case of mental states causing other mental states. I fail to see any absurdity in this mode of expressing the conjunction of the two factors of our being: nor do I catch in Mr. Guthrie's own language any superior form.

What Mr. Guthrie is driving at in his criticisms of Mr. Spencer on this subject, is to obtain an answer to the question, which he puts in various forms—Can feeling be explained by physical antecedents alone? Or, has the feeling anything to do with the result; might this have been the same in the absence of the feeling? Would the history of a physical organism, or of a species, have been just the same without it, as it actually has been with it? The point of these questions, in Mr. Guthrie's view, is their application to Mr. Spencer's Unification of Knowledge, which he is engaged in challenging throughout a great part of his book.

In my opinion, the question, so put, is unanswerable. I would neither answer it myself, nor would I admit the competence of any one else to answer it. Suppose we say, that the physical sequence might have existed exactly as it is, without the feeling or subjective aspect. We should then carry the automatism-theory of Descartes up to man. How can we support this view; on what facts or reasonings can we ground it? There is only one argument that I am aware of, and that is the analogy of the reflex movements of animals, where a series of movements occurs without consciousness; there being a stimulation from without, leading to responsive movements from within. If this particular nervous circle can be completed without consciousness, it is only a question of complication and degree, whether still higher movements might not happen in the same way. The analogy assists us so far, but it is not enough. It might seem to go the length of attesting at least the possibility of our being automatons all through; but we are not sure of even this much; and possibility is a long way off from proof.

Suppose then we say, next, that the higher developments of mind could not have existed without the subjectivity. How can we be sure of this? If we could not affirm the possibility, with any confidence, still less can we affirm impossibility. The only

ground that we are entitled to take up, as to what could have been, is to refuse palpable self-contradictions. If B is plainly implicated in A, then we are not at liberty to say that A could have been created without B: but if there is no implication, we must refrain from affirming what could have been. Now subjectivity is allied with objectivity as a matter of fact, but without any implication that we are able to discover. In our present state of knowledge, we are obliged to say that the two are united, but not necessarily united; there is neither implication nor causation.

If I were pressed to say which course I would take, under the scheme of Evolution, on reaching the stage when conscious beings arise—Would I follow physical causation solely, or would I introduce feeling as a co-operating factor, as something more than an accompaniment or additional expression of the physical? —my answer would be: I would keep to the physical, and say nothing of the mental, in the line of causation. The physical we could work, if its mere complications were not fatal to anything but the statement of very general tendencies; but I do not see how we could make an agent out of the subjectivity, keeping to the strict limits of our experience. In our psychological books, we can lay down cause and effect among subjective elements; sensations giving birth to ideas, to emotions, and to volitions, and these again to other ideas, emotions, and volitions; but we know that these are not a stream of pure subjectivities; they have their physical supports, which we may or may not take into our statements. But, in the evolution of conscious beings, we must put the physical in the foreground, and not in the background; we can record the rise of the subjective aspect with the development of the physical situation, but we cannot even say that the subjective side re-acts upon the other side, and furthers its own development. We assume that, if anyhow we can procure a certain arrangement of nervous and other organs, a subjective manifestation will follow as a thing of course; while with more advanced and complicated arrangements, there will be an advanced subjectivity.

It is a curious but unanswerable question—Does subjectivity cost anything physically? Of course there must be a series of physical actions, with expenditure or transfer of force; but these have their physical results, as well as their subjective concomitants. Are these physical results less than they would be if they had no subjective side? We can conceive a mode of putting this to an experimental test, but probably the most advanced means of research may not overcome its difficulties. The position may be illustrated by the case of Light, considered as one of the correlated forces. While Mechanical Energy, Heat, and Chemical Force, have ascertained numerical equivalents, there is as yet no similar statement for Light. The case was put by Thomas Graham in this way. We can convert, say, a pound of carbon

into carbonic acid, in perfect darkness, and we know the precise amount of heat generated: we can burn the same pound of carbon, so as to give off a large amount of illumination. Well then: estimate the illumination, in wax candles, or any other way; measure also the heat evolved along with the light; subtract this estimate from the heat of the other pound that gave no light, and the difference would be the equivalent of the light. Although this operation has not as yet been actually performed, it is manifestly within the compass of our experimental resources, and probably will not be long delayed.

Now the case of nerve force and subjectivity is so far similar. We have nervous actions without subjectivity; and other actions with subjectivity. In both classes there is an expenditure of force, with physical results. The point would be to observe whether the physical results were not, in the case of subjectivity accompanying, the full physical equivalent of the forces expended. The problem is thus quite intelligible; what the answer would be, if it could be actually compassed, no one can pretend even to guess. The difficulty is merely another form of our difficulty in answering Mr. Guthrie's question—Might all the objective phenomena of an animal have been the very same, without the subjective part?

But to return to Mr. Guthrie's criticisms of my language. What I have said is my answer to his criticism of my phrase, "two-sided cause"; which he denounces as metaphorical and unmeaning. I, on my part, could just as easily object to his "double aspect"; he will probably allow that it is not less metaphorical than "two-sided"; while, in my opinion, it is simply a variation of metaphor, safer because conveying less than "two-sided cause"; it evades the attempt to express causation at all. We must depend upon metaphors in any form of language: "double aspect," "two-sided cause," "double-faced unity," are all metaphors; and I cannot see in any one, such an irresistible supremacy, as to entitle it to trample the others under foot. In classifying the theories of the relation of Mind and Body, I employ another variety of wording, *viz.*, "guarded or qualified materialism, saving the contrast of mind and matter".

I have given further offence to Mr. Guthrie, by not resting in the double-aspect, but in going on to a new and unnecessary subtlety, in which I fall back into the slough of obsolete metaphysics. There seemed to me to remain still a difficulty growing out of the contrast of objective and subjective, as the extended and the unextended. Mr. Guthrie scouts this difficulty; the word unextended being negative, he says has no positive meaning; it is an "objectivised abstraction apparently referring to some entity which has no existence". Here he is at issue with the whole series of psychological thinkers since the fifth century. The object world has dimensions in space; the subject world,

pleasure and pain for example, is a real and existing world, yet wants the property of extension. While I am mentally occupied with a tree or a house, I am cognisant of the extended; while I am engrossed with pleasurable warmth, with a sweet odour, or a melodious sound, I have no cognisance of extension. These last experiences are, nevertheless, real; they are not coined or invented by psychologists. The "double aspect" theory is not stultified by drawing such a distinction; if it is, so much the worse for it.

Mr. Guthrie may never have heard of the puzzles of the Schoolmen and others, as to the locality of the mind: these puzzles may no doubt be ascribed to stupidity, but they revealed a difficulty—the difficulty of uniting phenomena that have no extension with phenomena that have extension. I have endeavoured in my own way to meet this difficulty; that is, I have sought to express the fact of union without localising what has no extension. If I had two extended things to join, I could easily express their junction in terms of local position; they would lie alongside, or one above the other, or one inside the other, and so on. But when the one is without extension, the union must be expressed in a more guarded and round-about way. I describe the transition from the objective to the subjective, as when we pass from looking at the sky to the feeling of cold, as a change of *state*; borrowing an expression from a certain theological school, which speaks of heaven under that phrase. Mr. Guthrie is down upon me here, for deserting the paths of science, and sitting at the feet of theologians; as if I could not borrow a term that suits my purpose, without endorsing its application to its original purpose! Mr. Guthrie admits that "the question is certainly interesting: How came the material and extended under certain laws of its own to have a subjective aspect? This is a natural question to ask, but it meets with no elucidation from Dr. Bain's treatment of the subject." Here I thoroughly concur with Mr. Guthrie; neither my treatment nor any other body's treatment has as yet elucidated this question. My aim was entirely different.

It seems, according to Mr. Guthrie, I go still deeper into the mine of mysticism, when in following out my attempt not to entangle the unextended with the extended, by assigning local union, I say that the only union is a union in succession or Time. As a remark by the way, he asks if close succession be union at all? I think it may be well enough, but let that pass. I use this expression, by way of taking extreme precaution in the course indicated:—"We are entitled to say that the same being is, by alternate fits, object and subject, under extended and unextended circumstances." Mr. Guthrie remarks—"This again is not explaining a mode of union nor a change of state: it is merely stating an inexplicable mystery." Now my purpose is to state, and not to explain; I am trying to find language that shall not

be self-contradictory, and, therefore, I go about the bush in this way. The "two aspects," or the "two sides," leave unattempted what I am endeavouring to do; my absurdity may be great, but it lies in my aim more than in my execution. If such a point is to be raised at all, my mode of disposing of it is worthy of being considered; and that is all that I claim in the matter.

Mr. Guthrie spends many pages in criticising my hypothesis of the nervous activities concomitant with our intellectual processes. It is not necessary that I should follow him point by point; I wish merely to show how far he expects what I never intended to give. For one thing, he obviously expects that I should answer the question already put, as to whether feeling is a factor in the nervous sequences that accompany it; a question that I may not have explicitly disclaimed answering; but which I certainly did not give any ground for supposing that I meant to answer. Mr. Guthrie, however, is so completely possessed by this one question, that he cannot enter into any other inquiry apart from it; whatever problem may be proposed in regard to nervous and mental activity, is tested by him under this exclusive bearing. Now, my speculations concerning the nervous processes underlying the intellectual operations, had ends in view totally apart from that. They were addressed to certain difficulties encountered by us, when we compare the known facts of intellect with the known mechanism of the brain. Enough is known on the constitution of the senses and of the nervous system to make hypothesis admissible, and even profitable. Well, there were two things that I felt an interest in trying to do. One was to see if the elements of the brain were numerically adequate to the extent of our intellectual acquirements, on the most obvious supposition that we could make as to the embodiment of these acquirements. The other point was to imagine how the distinctness and isolation of our ideas could be brought about under the received plan of the nervous system. If I trouble the reader with recalling these hypotheses, it is not so much to reply to Mr. Guthrie's criticisms, as with the view of stating the changes of opinion that subsequent reflection has induced on some important points.

My computation of the nervous elements making up the brain —cells and fibres—was probably not very far wrong, as I find eminent physiologists coming to nearly the same estimate. The number of cerebral cells I took at a thousand millions; and, as each cell is connected with one or more fibres, assuming an average of five fibres to the cell, there would be five thousand millions of fibres.[1] These enormous figures would seem adequate

[1] There was, however, an oversight here. Every fibre joins *two* cells, so that the number of fibres should be only half the amount stated, on the supposition of an average of five to each cell.

to our acquisitions, vast as they are, even on the assumption that each cell would undergo but one modification or take a part in only one grouping. For just suppose the case of a man's acquisitions amounting to a hundred thousand (taking some simple type as the unit, say the association of a name and an object, *e.g.*, the sun) which is undoubtedly a large figure,—then, for each one of the nervous groupings involved, there would be available 10,000 cells and 50,000 fibres. This assumes, however, that the nervous mechanism lends itself to an economical distribution of the groupings corresponding to the various associations that make up our permanent stock of ideas.

The attempt to compute the actual number of our acquisitions is of course extremely perilous, and needs a very wide margin. I gave a hypothetical approximation which I supposed to be fairly within the probability of the case, when I took the total of 50,000 for an ordinary mind, and 200,000 for a mind of extraordinary capacity. I do not repeat here the items that make up the total, nor give the data that rendered the fixing of numbers possible; I wish merely to indicate what I now consider the omissions that vitiate the result, showing that it errs on the side of being too little. There are two considerations that I deem of psychological importance, apart from the present speculation.

The first is this. In addition to our fully formed sequences or associations, meaning those that are sure in their reproductive operation, we have a much greater number of partially forged links, which are not devoid of value, seeing that a comparatively small amount of farther repetition can at any time raise them to full efficiency; and, moreover, in co-operation with other weak links, they may attain the full power of resuscitation. I can form no estimate of these imperfect associations, farther than that they must enormously exceed the number of the perfect class. To call them ten or twenty times as many would be a very moderate assumption. They are the associations that are wakened up into full efficiency in the extraordinary excitement of the brain during the delirium of fever.

If we wished to single out the very lowest stages or degrees of acquirement, we should take note of those occasions when, by virtue of the power of similarity, we have the consciousness of repetition in the case of some new impression. A stamp too feeble to be ever reproduced by contiguous association, or to subsist as an idea in (present) consciousness by its own internal coherence, may yet rise up under a present resemblance; the fact being shown by our having the consciousness of identity or repetition. We often say to ourselves, on seeing or hearing something new, "I have the consciousness of having seen or heard that before". When we stop short at this bare consciousness of identity, when we cannot recover time, place, or circumstances, we may be said to have hunted up a former impression of the very lowest degree of coherence, something that perhaps has occurred to us only

once, and with the least possible aids to retention. When we include, in the total of our acquisitions, this very low order of adhesions, the number amounts to something that I can speak of only in the vague terms above suggested. Yet—and here is the pinch—the feeblest impression that possesses a character, or identity, must have a nervous embodiment or grouping devoted to itself.

The second consideration is still more important in the psychological point of view; but would take more space to explain fully. We might suppose that very simple impressions, such as alphabetical letters and symbols would connect themselves with their meanings, and with other marks of the same order, at the least possible expense of nervous elements. Such, however, does not appear to be the case. Very small distinctions, taken by themselves, are impressed with difficulty: and the way out of the difficulty is to convert them into some more complex equivalent. For example, the difference between the two names "*e*fferent" and "*a*fferent," applied to the nerves, is a very small difference both to the eye and to the ear; and we find it very difficult to remember the distinction as so expressed. In one view, there would seem to be an economy of nerve in making it so small; but there is no economy of the retentive power. We find that by a more ample distinction, we can sooner fix the correct associations. We may use various mnemonic devices; all, however, involving a greater area of nervous action. We may resolve the prefixes into their full prepositional forms—*ex*ferent, and *ad*ferent. This gives us the advantage of superior expressiveness; which we should also get by the English forms—*out*-carrying, and *in*-carrying, or by centri*fug*al, and centri*pet*al. But even supposing we had no syllables whose meaning gave the precise distinction, we should find that we should sooner remember the distinction if it were embodied in a greater number of letters,—say, "*is*ferent," and "*ol*ferent," or "*ens*ferent," and "*pod*ferent". In short, there is a certain pitch of complication and plurality that is needed for easy retentiveness; and the exaction of nervous matter for the embodiment does not seem to impoverish our capabilities of acquirement. The greater the number of accessories to any fact, the better seems our hold of that fact. In the case of the fine distinction already instanced, I can suppose another way of impressing it. If we were to hear the words for the two sets of nerves markedly pronounced by a lecturer, while on a diagram he indicated the two contrasting directions, the complicated situation would impress itself at once; we should remember the distinction by reverting to the whole scene, and the action of the lecturer; which, however, would seem a very costly process. Yet so it is, we can afford à very great number of these recollections where simple impressions are aided by complex accessories. It often astonishes me to remark the amount of local surroundings that attend the recollection of very small things. The names

that we best and soonest remember are remembered in connexion with definite scenes, and with persons in the act of pronouncing them. We seem to be able to imbibe these surrounding circumstances without any limit: and to prefer a complex object that takes hold of us at many points, to a simple object that takes hold at very few. The brain appears never to want room for the most variegated objects; our difficulty is to secure a connexion in the absence of variety and abundance of accessories. There must be some limitation here: but it is not easy to state it. It is much the same case as the almost indefinite power of accumulating local memories. We know that this cannot go on for ever: but the strange thing is that our failure does not seem to be due to the deficiency of nerve-elements. For example, no memory could hold the monotonous streets of London; but let the same number of streets be varied in their aspects, let them be presented with sensational accessories, requiring more brain to contain them; and then we could carry the recollection to a much greater length. To combine interesting accessories with objects to be learned, is a well-known art of memory; and we have never yet been able to say at what point the practice is abused and defeats its own end. The obvious mischief that it does, is to stand in the way of working with generalities; we become the victims of too much individuality and concreteness. There must be a medium position, which it would be of consequence to define; where the accessories are enough for easy retentiveness, and yet not needlessly voluminous, so as to crowd the brain, and contract its capacity for acquisition generally. It would be easy to impress a hundred facts of any natural science, but a tolerable mastery of the science would need many thousands of associations; and the means of providing costly accessories must at last come to an end.

Dwelling upon this point, I become appalled at the number of nerve-combinations seemingly necessary, and am led to consider the estimated number of cells and fibres as little enough, except on a farther assumption that I will advert to presently. I have endeavoured to indicate the only way that we can conceive of the isolation of our various acquisitions. It has to be considered that each simple impression on the sense has a different response according to the other impressions that accompany it; a with b gives response x; a with c, y. There must be a certain place where the communications with a encounter the communications with b; and that place of encounter is the source of outgoing action expressed by x. It is the number and the complicacy of those meeting-places that render the demand for nervous elements so imperious. The other case that I have dwelt upon is variety of *degree* or intensity in the same nervous line; a weak impression gives one response, a stronger, another. There must be distinct embodiments for all the gradations that we are conscious

of, as shown in the distinctive actions flowing from them, or the distinctive linkings in the sequences of thought.

I am now brought back to the question—Is it likely that the fibres and cells, as we recognise them by the microscope, serve each for a single line of communication, or do they admit of a plurality of communications, all held distinct? This opens a vast possibility of enlargement of our nervous storage; but it is difficult to conceive, and still more difficult to prove. The more that the number of our acquisitions is studied, the more desirable it will seem to have this outlet. It is easy to talk of having thousands of fibres and cells for a single acquisition, say the name and the thing seen; but simple as these two elements appear, a very large number of ultimate fibres must be concerned in the support of each. A single alphabetical letter, whether sounded or written, is a complicated impression to begin with; and in the unions that make words, the complication increases almost in geometrical progression. So, a circle, of one definite size, is simple, as among our acquisitions, but highly complex as a nervous effect.

Mr. Guthrie expends upon the foregoing nervous hypothesis several pages of criticism which it would be too long to follow in detail. I will single out what seems to be his strongest objection, and in fact summarises many of the others, namely, that while I provide a nervous embodiment for two of the fundamental facts of Intellect—Discrimination and Retentiveness—I say nothing of the third—Identification or Similarity. To this my reply is, that what I have done is not in anyway invalidated by the omission, unless some one could show that there was an absolute incompatibility between the scheme of Retentiveness and any possible mode of embodying Similarity. I am not aware, however, that there is any such incompatibility; nor do I think it impossible to give a hypothetical rendering of the nervous operations connected with the attraction of like for like. The expression would not be very easy; and, seeing that the whole attempt is venturesome and precarious, although not illegitimate, I am content to stop short with Retentiveness, which I consider by far the most important stretch, and the one that involves the greatest compass of hypothetical assumption.

A. Bain.

ON THE ENGLISH OF *DING-AN-SICH*.

The phrase *Ding-an-sich*, which plays such an important part in German philosophy, is usually rendered in English by 'thing-in-itself,' or more frequently by the plural 'things-in-themselves'. The usage has prevailed so long and so widely that perhaps it is vain to protest against it; yet one may pluck up

courage to do so on considering how very bad the phrase is—bad translation, bad sense, and bad metaphysic. On all these grounds 'thing-*by*-itself' seems preferable, and accordingly I have sometimes ventured to employ the latter expression in the pages of MIND.

First as to the mere question of translation: it is not necessary to pretend to exact and authoritative German scholarship; for the best dictionaries are open to all who are strong enough to lift and open them, and upon them I propose to rely. The point at issue is clearly the English equivalent for the German *an:* does it ever mean the same as our 'in'? According to Hilpert, *an* with the dative (which is all we need consider) is variously equivalent to 'at,' 'on,' 'by,' or 'as to'; though the phrase *an meiner Stelle* is rendered 'in my place'. *An*, therefore, though in the great majority of cases rendered otherwise, may sometimes be used as we sometimes use 'in'. But, according to Grimm, the German *an* and *in* (which last commonly corresponds to the English 'in'), though allied, differ in this, that "*an* bezeichnet die Oberfläche, *in* das Inwendige". Whence we may infer that primarily *an meiner Stelle* does not mean 'occupying the same position and outline of cubic space,' but refers to the ground or seat occupied, so that the *an* might be more logically translated 'at' or 'on'.

The particular phrase *an sich* is given by Grimm as equivalent to *per se*, of which it is probably a translation; and *per* is to be rendered (as we may learn from Dr. Smith) 'through,' 'by,' or 'for'—rarely 'in,' and perhaps never 'in' with its most appropriate sense, where 'by' or 'through' would not serve as well or better. But *per se* is not always translated into German by *an sich*. The third definition of Spinoza's *Ethica* runs:—*Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est et per se concipitur: hoc est id, cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat:* and Kuno Fischer, commenting on this, renders *in se* and *per se* by *in sich* and *durch sich*. Spinoza's context (and the history of Philosophy) shows that it is the independence, apartness, self-sufficient isolation of substance that is signified: for in this respect it contrasts with attributes which are relative to substance, and with modes which are relative to something else. Casting out, then, any mystery that may attach to *per*, or *durch*, or *in*, whether Latin or German, Spinoza's "*in se est et per se concipitur*," may be Englished—'exists by itself and is conceived by means of itself, *i.e.*, apart from or independently of anything else. Why *per se* could not here be translated by *an sich* may presently appear.

Leaving the question of translation, we have next to consider what is mere good sense in the use of English: is there anything of that sort in the phrase 'thing-in-itself'? Here again the discussion turns upon the meaning of 'in'; and as that varies with different contexts, we had better have recourse to Dr. Johnson. He begins unpromisingly by deriving it from the Latin: if we

neglect that, his first meaning is 'the place where anything is present,' as 'in school'; but 'thing-in-itself' does not mean thing-inside-itself, nor occupying its own place, since it is generally supposed not to have any. Johnson's second meaning is 'the state present at any time,' as 'in very deed,' 'in friendship'; and this seems most nearly in point: I will return to it. His third meaning is 'to note the point of time'; but the 'thing-in-itself' again is not supposed to be in time. The fourth meaning relates to power, the fifth to cause; but though *per se* often has such references, they rarely attach to the phrase we are considering: and the Lexicographer's other meanings of 'in' are still less relevant.

In-itself-ness or *Ansichheit* seems usually to signify, if anything, the way in which something is considered: so that, returning to the second meaning of 'in' mentioned above, we may understand by 'thing-in-itself,' 'thing considered in its own nature'; though even then 'as or according to its own nature' would be easier to understand. But again, since 'in its own nature' is ambiguous, possibly meaning either phenomenally or noumenally, and as noumenally is of course intended, the full expansion of the phrase would be 'the thing considered in its own nature and not as it appears to us or forms part of consciousness'; an unwieldy expression certainly, but serving to bring out the meaning of 'thing-in-itself' as pointing to existence apart from consciousness; and, if so, 'thing-by-itself' will convey the meaning better. We now see why Spinoza's *per se* in the above extract should not be rendered by *an sich*. Spinoza conceives substance in its independence positively: but the manner of conception implied by *an sich* is negative; it is merely the negation of consciousness.

A transition so insensible from a question of good sense to one of good metaphysic could hardly have been expected, did not these regions lie nearer together than is commonly thought. *Ding-an-sich* is the symbol of a supposed existence whose reality modern idealism disputes: the nature of that supposed existence in relation to idealistic metaphysic is strongly marked by the translation 'thing-by-itself'; by 'thing-in-itself' not at all. It is often, I believe, a long time before a student learns to use 'thing-in-itself,' in the right sense, and meanwhile it seriously impedes his apprehension of the doctrines with which it is connected: for a good technicality is like a lamp in a dark thoroughfare; but a bad technicality emits a tenebrific radiance and deepens the obscurity. The natural and usual suggestion of 'thing-in-itself' is probably of a mystical character: no one idea is formed distinctly, but many irrelevant ones are stirred, and the conflict and mutual destruction of these inchoate representations leaves a sort of blur in consciousness, as the strife of hot, cold, moist and dry with their embryon atoms maintains the reign of chaos. Some readers may remember to have had such associations with the phrase, as I confess once to have had; but those who have

had no such experience will vainly try to construct it from the accounts of others. It baffles all articulate description: like Bottom's dream, it is past the wit of man to say what dream it was. We may fairly doubt if the first introducer of 'thing-in-itself' had clear notions about modern idealism; or he may have been one of those who prefer their metaphysic puddled, according to a wide-spread persuasion that a little philosophy dispels a mystery but the higher philosophy restores it. But those of a different persuasion may perhaps think that 'thing-by-itself' is good metaphysic: we have seen that it is good translation: and if it is not very good sense, it comes as near it as is permitted to the name of a nonentity. Or is it more consistent to retain 'thing-in-itself' as one absurdity to denote another?

CARVETH READ.

IS THERE SUCH A THING AS PURE MALEVOLENCE?

This question is one of a number of important and interesting topics which Professor Bain has discussed in MIND XXIX. He combats on this point the opinions of Professor Grote and Mr. Stephen, and maintains against them the existence of pure malevolence. And by this I understand him to mean that malevolence is not a derivative passion, but has been from the first, or at least is now, one of the original elements of our nature. The subject is one of very great importance. As Professor Bain has pointed out, the consequences of such a view reach very far. And when we consider the weight which in matters of psychology deservedly attaches to the writer's opinions, I cannot but think that on this ground also an answer is due. I could have wished that some person more qualified than myself had attempted a reply; but, in order that silence may not seem an admission, I feel called on to give a reason for the faith that is in me, and for my entire disbelief in Professor Bain's conclusion. It will be, I think, more convenient if I treat the general question and do not reply controversially on every head.

Let me say first what I take the issue to be. The question is *not*, Is there *real* malevolence? That exists and is a clear and palpable fact. It is impossible to deny that cruelty can give pleasure even when there is no ulterior object and aim. And this fact can certainly not be explained *away*; but then that is not the question. The question is whether it can be explained and derived from known laws and elements of human nature.

I must begin by confessing that my mind is biassed. Even if I did not see how to account for malevolence, I do not think I could conclude that it was original. The double presumption that weighs against it would force me, I think, to suspend my judgment.

The first ground for suspense would be my inability to give

this passion its place in human nature. It entirely declines to pair off with benevolence founded on sympathy. For we not only see that, as a matter of fact, the perceived pain of others is painful to ourselves, but we also see how and why this *must* be so. The fact follows from the first principles of psychical life. But pure malevolence would seem a thing quite by itself, a foreign germ dropped from outside into our system.

This consideration makes me biassed, and there follows another which carries great weight. If a human passion claims to be original, it should show itself present in the lower animals. But what animal is cruel for the sake of cruelty? The accusation has indeed been launched against the cat (Romanes, p. 413), but in this one point that guilty animal is innocent. There is not the smallest reason to credit it with a knowledge of the pain it inflicts, or with the idea of prolonging life to lengthen torture.[1] Add the desire for play to the appetite for slaughter, and all is explained. And if further the monkey is included in the charge, then I should see in the appearance of the passion so very late in development a proof that it was developed and hence presumably explicable.

But I do not feel obliged to fall back on these presumptions, since the passion can actually be analysed and explained.

I do not wish to reproduce in detail the excellent remarks made by Mr. Stephen and Professor Grote, but will briefly set down the chief materials that are offered for an explanation, and will then enlarge on one important point. We have in the first place the feeling of wrong, the identification of my comparative failure with another's happiness, and the consequent wish to remove the latter. And under this head we may set down envy and jealousy. We may add that if anything is a source of pain to me, that may generate hate and the desire to remove this source of pain by retaliation. Then we have the latent self-gratulation on our own security, which tends to make pleasant the view of others' disaster. And again we have another origin of pleasure in the excitement of the senses and the imagination which comes from violent sensations. Mr. Stephen has done well to lay great stress on this fact (*cf.*, Horwicz, *Psychologische Analysen*, II. ii., s. 322), and I do not see how it can be called in question, or itself in every case reduced to malevolence. When the vessel is among the breakers and the life-boat in the surf, who but hastens to look on, and yet who wishes ill? What malevolence underlies our fearful delight in the supernatural, our passion for adventure, and our love for the perilous contrasts of gambling? At least among human beings we find a genuine "hunger for

[1] A case was reported to me of a cat, otherwise effective, who was useless as a mouser because his habit was, having played with his mouse until weary of the pastime, then to let it go unhurt. Was this animal malevolent? And, if not, why any other?

change and emotion"; and, whatever in the end we may think is the truth of it, it seems as if, within limits, all heightening and expansion of our 'self-feeling' were pleasant. Nor is it any answer to reply that pain becomes predominant when those limits are overpassed, or when *other* conditions are added.

These known affections of our nature do clearly all contribute to make malevolence, and yet there is another point which I think is essential.

We shall all admit that there exists a love of power. And by this I do not mean the mere pleasure which comes from energy put forth, but the delight in self-assertion and the wish to increase the area of our control. I am not offering these phrases as a theory of the passion but as a description which may point to an evident fact. There is a desire in human nature to widen the sphere which it can regard as being the expression of its will. And this desire has no boundary. Now the mere existence of another man's will, which is independent of ours, is a limit to this desire, and in consequence we aim at the removal or diminution of that check to our sovereignty. How remove the limit? The limit is removed by the subjugation of the other. We must make him a material for our self-assertion, in other words, we must work our will on him. But how be sure that we do this? His submission is not enough, for his submission may be willing, and he still keep in reserve an independent choice. We work our will on him when he struggles ineffectually, and when we force him to that which he most dislikes. In this way we efface him as a boundary to our power. But why not kill him? Well, perhaps he is useful; and, apart from that, killing must make an end, and the end of him is the end of our mastery over him. We have our will of him most by keeping him in the state which he most longs to escape from. In this devilish extreme of wanton cruelty we have, I presume, got as far as malevolence. We do desire the other's pain, because only by his pain can we make an utter sport and plaything of his will. But even here we do not desire his pain simply and as such. Even here there is a positive ground for our cruelty, and our malevolence is never and could never be *pure*.

This explanation may be confirmed by the reflection that torture inflicted by a third person, who is not our agent, lacks a great element of pleasantness. No doubt we here may sympathise with the torturer, and so get pleasure; but a tyrant, speaking generally, would care little to see the cruelties of a neighbouring tyrant. The malevolence which would take delight in the quiet and passive starvation of the unoffending, would be an abnormal product.

Still even that disease could be readily explained. The misanthrope, to whom the sight of abject misery would bring joy, would be a man who for some reason hated his race, was aggrieved by it, and in its misfortunes felt his own depression

repaired and his self-assertion restored. Where I hate I desire the diminution of that welfare which pains me by expressing the source of my pain. And my hatred may lead me to the cruelty of desiring the constant recovery from a constant smart, and the luxurious alternations of a morbid appetite. But even here we have not got *pure* malevolence.

With the above principles in our hands we might confidently approach the pathology of the subject, but I prefer to call attention to an additional source of pleasure in evil. We are said to be gratified by our friend's misfortunes. That is true, but we should make an important distinction. The lingering disease of a friend would not be pleasant unless it called forth self-felicitation. What is pleasant is a sudden and exciting mischance. The excitement falls under a principle we have described, but the suddenness appeals to our sense of the ludicrous. Now even if we follow Professor Bain (as for myself I cannot) in reducing the comic everywhere to a perceived *degradation*, that is very far from establishing malevolence. For the degradation must imply a degrading *power*, and our pleasure would lie in thus feeling our own self-assertion increased. I think that Professor Bain would find it difficult to verify the presence of malevolence in *every* species of the ludicrous. When we laugh, for instance, at an absurd child's doll, do we do so from a latent *odium generis humani?* And, if malevolence is to be imported into the sense of the comic, are we to find it at the root of our joy in the sublime and of our pleasure in resignation?

I would add one word more on the delights of angry temper. Where this is not retaliatory and *therefore* remedial of our own wrong, it can easily be explained by our love of excitement, and explained again by our desire for making ourselves felt, and for swelling at the expense of those around us. In something of the same way we all cling to our wrongs, for they keep us for ever in mind of our rights, and we hug our hatreds since without them how little would be left to some of us. Our positive self-realisation, whether normal or morbid, is still the end of our being. The devil that but denies, the malevolence that is pure, is no mere ethical monster. It is monstrous too psychologically, and, despite Professor Bain's warnings, we must take heart to say that it is not possible.

The reader, I think, can now judge for himself how I should deal with the remainder of the instances adduced; and, while admitting the difficulty of some special applications, I venture to think that the origin of malevolence can be satisfactorily explained.

F. H. Bradley.

OUR RIGHT TO REGARD EVIL AS A MYSTERY.

It appears to me that Mr. Bradley's remarks on this subject in MIND XXX., p. 258 ("Is Self-sacrifice an Enigma?"), pass too lightly over one element of this question. He recognises the conviction that moral agents are bound to struggle against evil, to use all efforts to remove it; but he implies a denial, at least so I read him, that any conviction as to the possibility of success is implied in the state of mind which enables the struggle to be kept up. I am well aware how easy it is to misinterpret an elementary moral belief into a speculative proposition. If I hazard an interpretation and criticism of such a *de facto* persuasion it is in the hope that by comparison of views something reliable may be elicited.

It appears to me that the attitude of a human, *i.e.*, moral and intellectual, agent towards the world implies some ethical conviction regarding the nature and capabilities of the world. I mean more especially in reference to the capacity which the world has of being turned to good ends or freed from evil. Am I wrong in being influenced at this point by the analogy of knowledge? The ethical postulate which appears to me present in all moral action is very like, perhaps fundamentally one with, our ineradicable conviction that knowledge can be extended. I shrink from speaking of "the universe as a whole"; but I think that it was a little joke of Mr. Bradley's to require that we should do so or else be surprised at nothing. Ontology is in bad repute, and, I had always imagined, deservedly. But taking the universe to mean what is accessible to us, and assuming the constancy of our intellectual and moral nature, I do not see my way out of believing that we are bound to deal with the universe, and in so dealing to think of it, as knowable and as indefinitely capable of good.

Then it seems to me that common feeling, finding, as it fancies, this persuasion fulfilled on the whole in knowledge, and unfulfilled on the whole in practice, does well to be puzzled. If it interprets its *de facto* persuasion into the dogma that "the universe is a harmony" (which as I understand the proposition I see no great risk in doing), then it feels a sharp contradiction, unparalleled in other spheres of life, between this dogma and the course of things.

If it does not assume the dogma, but restricts itself to its *de facto* persuasion, then the non-assumption of the dogma is an admission of chaos into the universe as accessible to man, which *seems* in direct contradiction with the *de facto* persuasion. *Is* there such a contradiction? This depends on how we interpret the persuasion. It appears to me to say, or rather to postulate (for I am not relying on an innate idea, but on an interpretation of conscious activities), that while we act we must believe that some good can be effected. Virtue in despair is possible for the crew of a sinking ship, and, indeed, the trained consciousness

would, we hope, always maintain its character. But I do not think that action, as apart from the merest momentary endurance, can go on without the conviction I speak of. For it is upon it, in concrete and detailed shapes, that the guidance of action depends.

Is there then in common experience a contradiction to the belief that some good can be effected? I do not think so; but common feeling confuses (if I may say so) the effecting of good with the positive removal of what it is trained to call evil; and then finds that good, though not unprosperous in detail, seems even to be the seed of evil in the world as a whole. There can be little doubt that thus far civilisation has conferred a reproductive power on much that causes suffering and affords occasion for self-sacrifice. No one could venture on a proof that evil diminishes in quantity; and the break-down of many well-meaning short methods with evil leaves the impression of failure strongly on us just now.

If there was a contradiction or conflict *for us* in the existence of evil, should we be justified in reading it off into "the universe"? I must answer that I can see no hard and fast line between us and the universe. A contradiction which we cannot even begin to get over seems to me to be *ipso facto* a contradiction in the universe; *i.e.*, when we regard it to the very best of our power *ex analogia universi* it is there still. It seems to me simply idle to say that the best of our power does not amount to much. To ask why there should not be a contradiction which we can not get over seems to me to be asking why we should expect a truth to be true. I could only say that *ex vi termini* it is a truth, and that having used my best endeavours I could not get rid of it.

Do I agree with common feeling that undeserved suffering and self-sacrifice are a mystery? *Yes, unless we can see how they are not evil, i.e.,* not antagonistic to good life, which is all that my persuasion demands. I do believe that on this question much may be learnt by looking facts in the face, and by not assuming that our ethical postulate in its first crude form is to govern our whole ideal of life. The moral duty of trying to do away with suffering and with the occasions for self-sacrifice is undoubted, at least as things are now. The moral ideal, that we should expect and desire that everything of the kind should be removed, seems to me less clear. *I* only said our *de facto* persuasion was that some good could be done. Whether this good must be proportionate to the removal of what is called evil I do not know. But perhaps by wider and less biassed consideration something might be done in the way of seeing through the alleged contradiction, not merely carting it away. Can any one construct an ideal of life, destitute of suffering and self-sacrifice, which he does not shudder to contemplate? As a mere illustration, I will say that Mr. Bradley's instances of what we should all desire if we could have it seem to me *in the concrete* most unattractive. I

say in the concrete; of course, features could be taken out of them which if possible would be desirable. I am not saying that no one can imagine a better world than this; I am only saying that the extreme difficulty of doing so shows what unexpected elements seem essential, when we reflect, to make life worth having. I do not know whether it is below the dignity of philosophy to refer to Dickens's *Haunted Man* on this subject; I think it contains an idea that is worth attention. To take one case: must not all great art die if common feeling could realise its ideal of removing "evil"; and must not even the appreciation of the great art of the past die too, when the living experience of suffering is gone? "*Haec olim meminisse juvabit*" cannot point to a permanent frame of mind, and the frame it does point to is, I think, unhealthy. And granting that civilisation tends to elevate and refine suffering, to make it moral rather than physical, is there any tangible tendency to diminish its amount? *Amount*, indeed, has but little meaning; and yet the comparison thus suggested is wholesome to dwell upon, and can with care be brought to some results. Is not our *actual* ideal, if we look straight at the matter, rather to make everyone we can a moral agent, instead of a brute or a slave, than to make them either good or happy? I see no sign that progress will do the latter, in either term; but there is some little sign of its doing the former, and I believe we are all glad of it by itself. Admission to be actors in the moral drama seems to me to be what we practically expect for mankind from progress. The drama will no doubt become more complicated, we may hope, nobler. I see no reason to suppose that it can go on without suffering and self-sacrifice, nor, as I have said, can I honestly, with my present lights, desire that it should.

But Mr. Bradley may say: 'Well, then, you do accept the conflict, which we feel, as no more mysterious than any other fact'. I can only reply: I cannot deny that it seems to be a fact, but I maintain my right to be puzzled by it even more than if I could not make the sum of the angles of a triangle right in practice; to sympathise with common feeling in its perplexity; and to be sharply on the look-out for anything that may mitigate the contradiction by including more and more of the universe under the head of what is not evil, *i.e.*, of what is contributory or not antagonistic to good life.

B. Bosanquet.

KANT'S VIEW OF MATHEMATICAL PREMISSES AND REASONINGS.

I have read with much interest Mr. Monck's note on "Kant's Theory of Mathematics" in the last number of Mind; and so far as his observations are a reply to a portion of my "Criticism of the Critical Philosophy" in the January number, I shall be glad briefly to answer them. And since the only part of Mr. Adam-

son's strictures on my article which, in my opinion, calls for a reply is that which relates to the subject of Mr. Monck's note, it appears most convenient to make the same rejoinder serve for both my critics.

I must begin by guarding against a misapprehension into which they have both fallen; for which, however, I am quite willing to take the blame. They both suppose me to hold that $7+5=12$ is not a synthetical judgment: Mr. Monck even supposes me to affirm that "arithmetic does not contain synthetical judgments". I did not affirm either of these propositions; nor did I intend to imply or suggest either, or to raise any issue except that to which I expressly addressed myself—as to the consistency of Kant's statements on the subject. And I must adhere to this position; not because I have any reluctance to state my own view on the point in question; but because, first, my view bears no such relation to Kant's as would enable me to express in it his terminology without lengthy explanations; and because, secondly, I am anxious to keep the question, whether Kant's distinction of 'analytical' and 'synthetical' propositions is carefully thought out and consistently applied by him, quite distinct from the question whether I can produce a better classification. I am quite aware that criticism—"with a small *c*"—is easier than construction: but it is only this humbler task that I have proposed to myself on the present occasion.

Let us return, then, to the narrower question. Kant says that $7+5=12$ is a synthetical proposition, and that the distinction between synthetical and analytical propositions is fundamental: I contend that $7+5=12$ can be shown to be an inference from propositions which Kant cannot consistently deny to be analytical; since its converse may be deduced from the definitions of the numbers from 12 to 5 inclusive ($12=11+1$, &c.), by the aid of the general axiom, 'The whole = the sum of its parts taken in any order'. To this particular contention Mr. Monck, though he does not admit its validity, does not appear to offer any reply. I turn, therefore, to Mr. Adamson, who thinks it "sufficient to say that[1] . . . reversal of the series of numbers is only possible on ground of the previous series of syntheses by which they have been generated, and that an axiom which explicitly contains the mark of intuition—'taken in any order'—can hardly be declared analytical in Kant's sense of that term". Both these answers surprise me much; since I should have thought that the first of them could only be regarded as relevant by a writer ignorant of one of Kant's most important doctrines, while the other is inconsistent with his express statements on the subject of axioms. To take the former first—I say that I do not see how Kant can deny that $12=11+1$

[1] I have omitted one sentence which relates to my supposed view that $7+5$ is not a synthetical proposition—a view which, as before said, I have not expressed.

is an analytical proposition: Mr. Adamson answers that is only possible on ground of the previous synthesis by which 12 has been generated. But how can this affect the question, since, according to Kant, every analytical proposition is only possible on the ground of a previous synthesis, as "the understanding cannot analyse except where it has previously combined"? I find it difficult to suppose that Mr. Adamson has even temporarily forgotten this fundamental doctrine of the 'Transcendental Analytic': and yet on any other supposition his answer seems devoid of any appearance of relevancy. As to his second point, that "an axiom which explicitly contains the mark of intuition cannot be analytical in Kant's sense," it is sufficient to quote Kant's own account of axioms which he expressly states to be analytical: "Dass Gleiches zu Gleichem hinzugethan oder von diesem abgezogen ein Gleiches gebe sind analytische Sätze, indem ich mir der Identität der einen Grössenerzeugung mit der andern unmittelbar bewusst bin". Here what Mr. Adamson calls the "reference to intuition"—that is, the reference to the process of forming or combining quantities—is certainly no less explicit than it is in the numerical axiom stated by me.

I turn to the distinction between philosophical and mathematical cognition: and here again I must say that both my antagonists appear to have considered rather what Kant ought to have meant, than what, in the passages to which I referred, he has actually *said*. He says that mathematical cognition is distinguished by being cognition "aus der Construction der Begriffe," and that for the "Construction" of a "Begriff" we require a non-empirical "Anschauung," which accordingly as "Anschauung" is an "individual object" by which a concept is represented *in concreto*"; and again that mathematical cognition contemplates "the general in tne particular, nay, even in the individual". Reflecting on these statements, I ask myself what they can mean in relation to algebra: and reading on, I find that Kant says that in algebra the construction is not "ostensiv" but "symbolisch" or "charakteristisch," the relations of quantities, and the operations by which they are produced and modified, being represented "in der Anschauung" and placed "vor Augen" by means of symbols. The only meaning I can give to these statements taken together is that the "individual object" in the case of algebra is the symbol. I am not surprised that my Kantian critics should protest against this view, as it certainly reduces Kant's distinction to something like an absurdity: but I venture to think that they entirely fail to suggest any other tenable interpretation. Mr. Monck apprehends Kant's meaning to be that, "though the x's and y's are only symbolical representatives of quantity, their *relations* are exhibited in intuition". But surely the relations must be as general as the quantities related: neither the one nor the other can be the individual objects which intuition, in Kant's sense, involves. Mr. Adamson suggests that I am wrong in

regarding "the mathematical intuition as a single definite object and not as a schema"; which, however, he tells us is "concrete and individual". Here again I am at a loss to conjecture how Mr. Adamson professes to reconcile his view with the plain statements of his author. Mathematical cognition, as I have just quoted, requires an "Anschauung" which is an "einzelnes Object": whereas in the passage where Kant explains his "schematism" the schema is expressly said to be "keine einzelne Anschauung," and is thus contrasted with the "Bild" which is capable of being presented "*in concreto*". Again, Kant tells us that mathematical cognition proceeds by construction of concepts; and, according to him, "I construct a triangle by representing the object corresponding to that concept either by mere imagination in pure intuition, or afterwards on paper also in empirical intuition": whereas the schema of a triangle "can exist nowhere but in thought". And further, how could Kant possibly have made the presence of the schema a *differentia* of mathematical as contrasted with philosophical cognition, when half the chapter on the schematism of the pure understanding is concerned with philosophical as distinguished from mathematical conceptions? I am afraid that Mr. Adamson has forgotten that Kant includes under the term "philosophical cognition" the non-mathematical principles of Rational Physics.[1] And I am almost afraid that Mr. Monck has forgotten it also; since he asks, with the air of expecting a negative answer, "Have we [in Philosophy] any original synthetical premisses to start from?"

H. SIDGWICK.

The Editor having shown me the preceding Note by Mr. Sidgwick, I here, with his permission, append a few words, as it is best that a discussion of this kind should be brought at once to a close.

In reference to the question of the synthetical character of arithmetical propositions Mr. Sidgwick quotes an important doctrine of Kant's ("that the understanding cannot analyse except where it has previously combined") as decisive in favour of his criticism and only to be disregarded through ignorance. I cannot plead ignorance of this doctrine, for I have elsewhere called special attention to it, but even the knowledge that Mr. Sidgwick thinks it in point does not enable me to see its bearing on the precise question in dispute. Kant does not employ the expressions "presence of synthesis" and "synthetical character of a judgment as synonymous," and the inference implied by Mr. Sidgwick's use of the passage—that all judgments are at once synthetical and analytical, whatever be its truth, is hardly part of Kant's teaching.

On the statement that reference to intuition is the ultimate mark characterising synthetical judgments, Mr. Sidgwick quotes an expression of Kant's respecting the principle of equality—a principle which in de-

[1] See, among other passages, *Prolegomena*, § 15; where he speaks of the "bloss discursive Grundsätze (aus Begriffen) welche den philosophischen Theil der reinen Naturerkenntniss ausmachen".

fiance of his author (see *Kritik d. r. V.*, p. 157, Hart.) he calls an axiom. In view of Kant's precise declarations on this point, for which I refer generally to the discussion in *Kritik*, p. 480, and especially to the paragraph on p. 482 beginning "Wenn man von einem Begriffe synthetisch urtheilen soll, so muss man aus diesem Begriffe hinausgehen, und zwar zur Anschauung," and his teaching on the relation between such analytical principles as those of equality, whole and parts, and the synthetical propositions of mathematics (see *Kritik*, p. 44), no weight can be attached to the quotation, nor should the term "Grössenerzeugung" be understood as apparently is done by Mr. Sidgwick.

In regard to the character of the intuitive element in mathematical reasoning,—whether or not that, according to Kant, is the schema, Mr. Sidgwick advances a general argument and some special quotations. The general argument is, I think, based on a misunderstanding and is beside the mark. Though schemata are involved in mathematical reasoning, it would not follow that schematism was confined to mathematical thinking. Kant has expressly treated of the distinction between the use of schemata in mathematics and in philosophy, and I am not aware of having said anything which could warrant the application to me of Mr. Sidgwick's argument.

The quotations introduced here by Mr. Sidgwick seem to me misleading. The schema, according to Mr. Sidgwick, is expressly said to be "keine einzelne Anschauung". The phrase is, I suppose, from *Kritik* p. 142, but it is a mere fraction of a complete sentence which as a whole contains nothing to warrant the reading here taken. The "Bild," moreover, is far from being the only means of representation *in concreto* (see, among other passages, *Kritik*, p. 551). The next quotations, the first of which does not seem a very precise rendering, are likewise parts of sentences. Were the sentences (*Kritik*, p. 478 and p. 143) translated in full, the supposed contrast would be seen to have no existence, and the curious significance attached by Mr. Sidgwick to the words "in den Gedanken," occurring in the second of them, would be rectified. When Kant says of the schema that it exists only in thought, he means, as the subsequent words of the sentence fully show, that the schema is a product of pure imagination and not a fact of empirical apprehension (whether perception or imagination), and when he refers to the "Bild," whether as in imagination or as an actual figure drawn, he is careful to add that the empirical elements contained therein in no way enter into or are essential to the process of reasoning.

ROBERT ADAMSON.

VI.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Greek Philosophers. By Alfred William Benn. 2 vols. London: Kegan Paul & Trench, 1883. Pp. xxxii., 404; xii., 430.

Mr. Benn has given us in these two volumes a very interesting and clear account of the Greek Philosophers and the ideas which they represented. His work will never, it is true, take the place, with most students of philosophy, of Zeller's labours; it wants the suggestiveness and richness, the clearness of exposition combined with the accuracy of detail which make it difficult to conceive of Zeller's history as ever superseded. And Mr. Benn would be no doubt himself one of the first to acknowledge the extent to which he has been indebted to Zeller in the construction of his history. At the same time we are distinctly warned against supposing that the work before us is a mere popularisation of Prof. Zeller's history; rather, in fact, Mr. Benn's object is to controvert some of Zeller's favourite doctrines and especially the Hegelianism which misleads him in the study of Greek Philosophy. And certainly transcendentalism of any kind is totally excluded from Mr. Benn's pages; rather indeed one is met by a continued effort to reduce everything to the limits of the natural and commonplace.

This anti-transcendentalism, if I may so call it, strikes me as a somewhat perverting influence in Mr. Benn's treatment of Greek philosophy. We do undoubtedly injustice to Plato and Aristotle when we interpret them exclusively through the language and ideas of Kant and Hegel; but we do them, it must be remembered, no less injustice when we refuse to rise to the level of their high argument and reduce their speculative flights to the level of our own standards of philosophy. The words of Plotinus which Mr. Benn appropriately places in the forefront of his volumes remind us that in studying an ancient author we must try to appreciate his meaning and get the true *σύνεσις* of his doctrines; and this cannot be done either amid the antiquarian dust of the philologist or amid the associations of the modern empirically-minded critic. Now I cannot but think that Mr. Benn tends to live too much in the present to be able in all cases rightly to understand the past. It was inseparable perhaps from the original form of his work, as consisting largely of articles in the *Westminster Review*, that it should savour somewhat of the pamphleteer and controversialist; but it would have been in all probability a better book had it been subjected to considerable re-writing before its definite publication. It is only another side of this same tendency which leads Mr. Benn to accentuate unfairly (as I think) some aspects of the philo-

sophies he discusses: the result being that his work reads often rather like a number of side-lights upon their doctrines than a sound and systematic account of the doctrines themselves. It is in consequence often difficult to say at what point Mr. Benn will discuss some particular tenet of a philosopher; while the absence of an Index, which such a book ought certainly to have, makes it difficult to find the whereabouts of any passage.

The chief merit of the book is the extent to which it regards Greek Philosophy not as an isolated expression of the Greek mind, but as co-ordinate with the different developments of the Hellenic genius in literature and art. "My object," says the writer, "has been to exhibit the principal ideas of Greek philosophy in the closest possible connexion with the character of their authors, with each other, with their development in modern speculation, with the parallel tendencies of literature and art, with the history of religion, of physical science and of civilisation as a whole." And if this "object" is perhaps too ambitious to be realised in any genuine sense within the limits of 800 pages, it must be allowed on the other hand, that Mr. Benn has brought out the connexion between Greek philosophy and Greek life, between Greek metaphysics and Greek poetry, in a way that one not unfrequently desiderates in accounts of philosophical speculation.

The Pre-Socratic thinkers from Thales to Anaxagoras occupy of course the first section of the book. About them Mr. Benn does not apparently have anything new to tell us: anything new in fact could only be obtained by a closely critical study of their fragments such as would be out of place in a popularly written history. Yet I cannot but think that Mr. Benn occasionally gives a one-sided rendering to the fragmentary sayings of these early thinkers. Parmenides, for instance, we are informed, "tells us plainly that man's thoughts result from the conformation of his body, and are determined by the preponderating element in his composition". Theophrastus, it is true, gives his support to this interpretation of the passage, but it probably means hardly so much as Mr. Benn asserts and in any case it should be noted that the words belong not to the higher but to the lower, *i.e.* the phenomenal, doctrine of Parmenides. And when we read that Plato and Aristotle censured Anaxagoras for "not anticipating the *Bridgewater Treatises* and proving that the world is constructed on a plan of perfect wisdom and goodness," we must be allowed to protest against the prejudice given to the question by the parallel. Nor will anyone who remembers the degree to which Aristotle was evidently indebted to Anaxagoras for the very phrases in which he described the reason readily believe that Anaxagoras was not speaking of "an immaterial unextended consciousness," or understand the logic which holds that Anaxagoras, thinking of his own intelligence as a discriminating identifying faculty, conceived its objective counter-

part under the form of a differentiating and integrating power, and so identified it with a "mere mode of matter".

"The Greek Humanists" is a somewhat fanciful heading for a chapter on the Sophists and their times; but it will probably mislead none who remember what the real work of the period was. And yet the name anticipates the tendency to one-sided exaggeration which I cannot but view as a blot in Mr. Benn's exposition. His contention is that "the Stoic Epicurean and Sceptical Schools may be traced back through Antisthenes and Aristippus to Hippias and Protagoras much more directly than to Socrates". The assertion, like so many others in these volumes, contains such a blending of truth and error that it is difficult to extricate what is true from what is misleading. The Sceptics, no doubt, carried further the destructive work which Protagoras had begun, and the Epicureans supported themselves upon a sensualistic theory of knowledge. But if one is to find the earliest originators of later doctrines, then the true lineal ancestors of the Post-Aristotelian schools is Democritus with his distinction between two kinds of knowledge and his doctrine of *εὐθυμία* and absence of *δεισιδαιμονία*. And whether Mr. Benn be right or wrong, the evil of thus having "contentions" is that the reader is sacrificed to the writer's eagerness to promulgate his views and in the case in question might easily fail to understand that the Sophists were not only moralists but also analysts of language and incipient logicians—paving the way for Aristotle's *Organon*. Yet if the sophists themselves come badly off, the poets are well characterised, and I may be allowed to quote, by way of illustration, a passage in which Æschylus and Sophocles are thus contrasted:—

"Æschylus has an open sense for the external world: his imagination ranges far and wide from land to land: his pages are filled with the fire and light, the music and movement of Nature in a southern country. He leads before us in splendid procession the starry-kirtled night: the bright rulers that bring round winter and summer: the dazzling sunshine: the forked flashes of lightning: the roaring thunder: the white-winged snowflakes: the rain descending on thirsty flowers: the sea now rippling with infinite laughter, now moaning on the shingle, growing hoary with rough blasts, with its eastern waves dashing against the new-risen sun or again lulled to waveless windless noonday sleep: the volcano with its volleys of fire-breathing spray and fierce jaws of devouring lava: . . . the meadow dews: the flowers of spring and fruits of summer: the ever-green olive and trees that give leafy shelter from dogstar heat. For all this world of wonder and beauty Sophocles offers only a few meagre allusions to the phenomena presented by sunshine and storm. No poet has ever so entirely concentrated his attention on human deeds and human passions."

The iconoclastic character of Mr. Benn's pages becomes more obvious as we proceed. Readers of Grote's books hear much in connexion with the life and views of Socrates about his consciousness of a religious mission and his refutation of human ignorance. Neither the one thing nor the other, Mr. Benn

assures us, has any place in Xenophon's conception of his master. And Zeller, it appears, is still more wrong in making Socrates seek what true science ought to be. And there is no doubt that modern exponents of Socrates have tended over and over again to go far beyond the simple unsophisticated picture which Xenophon gives us of a thinker who gravely argued that Anaxagoras was mistaken in supposing that the sun was fire because the sun makes people black whereas the fire produces no such effect. But it is one thing to allow this, another thing to maintain that Socrates first brought out "the idea not of knowledge but of mind in its full significance". No doubt, as Xenophon tells us, it was *ἀνθρώπινα*—human matters—that chiefly excited the interest of Socrates: but in dealing with these his great object was to find out what each was, and the passage, to which Mr. Benn himself twice calls attention, in which Aristotle regards *καθόλου ὁρίζεσθαι* and *ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι* as constituting Socrates's contribution to the history of philosophy would seem to make it evident that Socrates was quite as much occupied in finding out what true science (*i.e.*, knowledge) ought to be as in bringing out the idea of mind.

Socrates is in most histories of philosophy succeeded by a chapter on the semi-Socratic schools of Antisthenes, Aristippus and Euclid. There is no such chapter in Mr. Benn's work: nothing but some incidental references to their tenets. And the absence of such a chapter shews its effects in the chapter on Plato—one, I am inclined to think, of the least satisfactory in the work. The reason is, no doubt, partly to be found in the fact that we are never led to see how Plato's Philosophy was an answer—and a very earnest one—to the logical and ethical individualism of his age—an individualism which showed itself now in the nominalism of the Cynics, now in the hedonism of the Cyrenaics. The ideal theory itself is reserved for a few lines at the close of the chapter; and Mr. Benn congratulates himself on the fact that he has been able to expound Plato without bringing in his Ideal Theory, as showing that the doctrine of Ideas is a "much less important part of his philosophy than is commonly imagined". It may be unimportant to a modern critic: but a thorough student of Platonism can hardly fail to recognise the fact that it constitutes the most important part of his philosophy to Plato. It lies at the very root of his theory of knowledge: it was just in fact, as Aristotle shows, the necessity of explaining the *fact* of knowledge which led Plato to postulate the existence of ultra-sensible realities: it determines his repugnance to art: it underlies his theory of virtue, and the idea of good is Plato's "greatest lesson" (*μέγιστον μάθημα*) for the world. And a writer who proposes to explain the work which Plato did for his times without taking account of his Ideas must not be surprised if he find that he is thought by most students of the Platonic *Dialogues* to have left out the very soul of the Platonic creed. It may be

that "Plato was pre-eminently a practical, Aristotle pre-eminently a speculative genius," but the real value of Plato's philosophy lies in the degree to which he shows that a metaphysical basis is required for practical enterprise.

The account which Mr. Benn gives of Aristotle throws no inconsiderable light upon some parts of the Aristotelian system. It is, for instance, refreshing to find him saying that Aristotle's categories are "not a classification of things, but of the information which it is possible to receive about a single thing": had Stuart Mill taken such a view of their meaning he would not have found it necessary to challenge their exhaustiveness by asking under which category we should class sensations. Apart, however, from side-lights of this kind, it is difficult to get much real information about Aristotle from the pages which Mr. Benn devotes to his philosophy. The *Ethics* is disposed of in some three pages: in fact a careless reader, remembering that "Aristotle is not a practical genius" might be excused for supposing that Aristotle had never written on morality at all. The most careless reader, however, would very soon come to know that Aristotle gives us for explanation a mere description of the facts to be explained, and that he "made the indication of his own ignorance and confusion do duty for depth and distance". "To say that a thing is developed out of its possibility merely means that it is developed out of something the nature of which we do not know." Such a sneer would be justifiable enough if the Aristotelian antithesis in question had remained nothing but an abstract formula. But anyone who remembers the application of the theory to Ethics, Politics, and Psychology will hesitate to speak of Aristotle as simply "constructing the world not of our ideas but out of our absolute want of ideas". Even the logical analysis of Aristotle is not free from Mr. Benn's criticism. Syllogism, it appears, is "not a process of discovery but of proof," and more particularly it is based on the relations of concepts instead of on the relations of judgments. It is difficult to understand altogether the significance of this objection. But, when we remember that scientific knowledge to Aristotle just consists in finding out the middle term which shall be also the causal explanation of phenomena, when we remember what he says about ἀγχίνοια or scientific readiness, it is difficult to think of Aristotle's syllogism as merely a scheme for proving something already ascertained.

The Logic of the Stoics gives Mr. Benn another opportunity for noticing the weakness of the Aristotelian analysis. The Stoic method marks, he holds, a real advance on Aristotle's. And the main ground for this assertion is, it seems, that the first principles of reasoning are with the Stoics "not to be postulated as unconditionally certain: they are to be assumed as hypothetically true and gradually tested by the consequences deducible from them". It was inseparable, of course, from the development

of thought that the Stoics should in some parts of scientific analysis go further than the earliest analyst of scientific method. But it is unfair to Aristotle to forget the way in which he insists on the need of experience for testing theories (*e.g.*, *Eth. Nic.*, x. 8, 8) and to say in addition that the "hypothetical syllogism was first recognised as such by the Stoics" is misleading when nothing definite is said about Aristotle's *συλλογισμὸς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*. However, I am not disposed to quarrel much with Mr. Benn about his treatment of the Stoics, which is for the rest a sympathetic and clear statement of their leading propositions. Nor do I think it necessary to enter upon the chapters on the Epicureans and Sceptics; and of the chapter entitled the "Religious Revival" it must be enough to say that it gives an interesting sketch of those developments of religious belief and superstitious observances which Friedländer had so successfully delineated in his *Sittengeschichte*.

Greater attention, however, is due to the chapter on the "Spiritualism of Plotinus," one, I am inclined to think, of the best which the book contains. And the reason, perhaps, of Mr. Benn's success in this direction is that the controversial view is kept more in the background, and that he is more occupied in giving an historical account of an ancient author than in criticising the accounts which others may have given. It is, as he points out, by his refutation of materialism that Plotinus stands out in Greek philosophy: and this refutation, he thinks, Plotinus argues "more powerfully than it had ever been argued before, and with nearly as much effect as it has ever been argued since". Of these antimaterialistic arguments of Plotinus Mr. Benn has given an extremely clear and readable account: I am unacquainted with any English book which gives so good an expression of their import. And I should simply suggest that if Mr. Benn has occasion (as I hope he may have) to re-edit his work, he will add a reference to the striking passage (*Enn.* iv., Kirchhoff i., p. 20) in which Plotinus shows how a transmission of impressions (*διάδοσις*) is quite unable to explain the unity of conscious perception.

"The Relation of Greek Philosophy to Modern Thought" is the subject of Mr. Benn's last chapter, and as it is the portion of his work which originally appeared in this Journal, it is perhaps the part of his labours on which I may be excused from saying much. It is, to begin with, a great thing to find a modern critic recognising, as Mr. Benn does, the close interdependence between ancient and modern thought. And it is also a good thing for many Englishmen to be reminded of the worthlessness of Bacon's contributions to either ancient or modern philosophy, and to learn that "Bacon exemplified in his own intellectual character every one of the fundamental fallacies which he has so picturesquely described". And all Hellenists, at all events, will welcome the admirable words in which Mr. Benn has expressed his estimate

of the earlier Greek philosophers—words which may serve as the conclusion of this paper:

"On every subject of speculation that can be started, we continue to ask, like Plotinus himself, what the 'blessed ancients' had to say about it: not, of course, because they lived long ago, but because they came first, because they said what they had to say with the unique charm of original discovery, because they were in more direct contact than we are, not, indeed, with the facts, but with the phenomena of nature and life and thought."

EDWIN WALLACE.

Hegel. By EDWARD CAIRD, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Glasgow. ("Philosophical Classics for English Readers.") Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1883. Pp. viii., 224.

The difficult task undertaken by Professor Caird has been discharged with a remarkable measure of success. It is no easy matter to write upon Hegel at length so as to bring his position within reach of even the philosophic student in this country; and one might well despair of an attempt to give within the narrow limits of the Philosophical Series a view which should be moderately intelligible to the general cultivated reader. Yet in this attempt we think Professor Caird has been fortunate. His little volume not only presents the preliminaries of the Hegelian system in such a fashion as to overcome the initial difficulty for the English student—that of understanding the drift of the whole—but it is throughout animated by so wide and genial a philosophic spirit, and expresses so evidently a full and thoughtful mind, that it is in itself an excellent contribution to general speculative thinking. Much good will undoubtedly be achieved by it for Hegelianism in this country, but, what is of infinitely greater importance, the reader can hardly fail to carry away something of permanent benefit from the weighty and maturely pondered reflections which give the volume its special value. The author himself would be one of the first to maintain that the Hegelian system, pure and simple, cannot be transplanted into foreign conditions; nor, indeed, has the world of thought stood still since Hegel's days. The rapid development of thought and culture renders it for ever impossible for this age to remain satisfied with the method of organising its spiritual interests that rested upon an earlier platform of ideas. But the great principles which underlie the Hegelian philosophy and which it was the task of Hegel's life to reduce to their abstract essence and to unfold into their concrete applications, these are of perennial value, and no generation can afford to do without a *metaphysic*, without a *rationale* of what secretly animates its own life and gives to its varied productions in all spheres of activity their peculiar colouring. For the construction of such a metaphysic, no more thorough preparation

is to be had than the Hegelian system. Truly, as Mr. Caird puts it, the *Logic* of Hegel is the one work which modern times have to place alongside of Aristotle's *Metaphysic*, the one laborious and manful attempt to decipher in its entirety the chain of thoughts that binds our spiritual life into a unity. Probably the comparative neglect which seems to have overtaken Hegel's work is a symptom that is not altogether without an encouraging significance. The abstract treatment of thoughts which can only by hard effort be disentangled from their concrete exemplifications is valueless unless the disentanglement has been to some extent effected. The full importance, therefore, of the Hegelian contribution to the comprehension of modern thoughts, can only disclose itself after such criticism of principles as lays bare their real essence. The several notions that come forward in the *Logic* represent *in abstracto* distinctions, oppositions or differences that give life to actual thinking. The import of the treatment they receive can be appreciated only through reflection on the problems which arise in connexion with such distinctions. Perhaps, too, our age is over-cautious. We have a secret or avowed distrust of systematic philosophising, and spend our efforts rather on preliminary criticism than on constructive work. Each distinction that presents itself in our spiritual life comes forward with so much clustering round it that the task of clearing the way seems sufficiently great to preclude the hope of systematically viewing all such distinctions in their organic nexus. We have to digest in order to assimilate, and doubtless our age has much to do before it has digested even what underlies the Hegelian work.

Professor Caird's volume falls naturally into two parts: the one tracing the life of Hegel, both as regards external fortune and in its inner development; the other, devoted to an account, such as the space allows, of the main features of the Hegelian philosophy. I do not propose to offer remarks on any matters of detail regarding the several chapters devoted to these two purposes. The student as well as the general reader will find much to interest him in both divisions, and probably, at various points, would have desired more than the author has been able to extend to him. One might have wished a fuller statement respecting some of those *junctures* in the system which cause greatest stumbling to the modern reader, *e.g.*, respecting the precise significance of the *Naturphilosophie* and on the conception of spirit in its relation to *Natur* specifically and to the individual subject. But such matters belong doubtless more appropriately to an extended exposition, and it would be ungrateful to grumble at not receiving more when so much that is good has been afforded. What is given, specially on pp. 195-202, is amply sufficient to obviate the grosser misconceptions that have arisen in respect to Hegel's treatment of natural science, and that have been fostered by the unsparing but one-sided criticism of scientific experts.

The view of the life of Hegel, presented in some detail in the

first five chapters of Prof. Caird's little volume, appears to me a most happy illustration of the genuine method of handling the history of philosophy. As a rule, histories of philosophy convey to the student an extremely false conception of the nature of speculative thinking and of the mode in which advance or development of philosophical doctrine takes place. Each philosophy is regarded as though it were the treatment of some isolated problems or the attempt to convey an explanation of some special order of facts. The analogy of the natural sciences, where abstraction from all interests other than those specially involved is not only admissible but necessary, where each branch of knowledge seems to have its peculiar sphere of phenomena within which it moves, tends almost insensibly to induce a similar view respecting the functions and problem of philosophy. And in the sequence of philosophic systems each is put in a definite relation to its predecessor as though it were simply an improved method of dealing with the same special facts, improved by reason of the light afforded in the preceding attempts. There is thought to be a direct filiation of philosophical systems, as though each carried out with the aid of the preceding the investigation peculiar to philosophy as such. Now this conception is perhaps not so much false in itself as incomplete and therefore misleading. Philosophy in the amplest sense of that word has no special order of facts to consider, no province which is one among many others. It is not to be placed alongside of other branches of investigation as though classified on the same principle by which they have been divided. In essence, a philosophy is the abstract expression, the statement in ultimate terms, of the thoughts, opinions, modes of looking at things which make up what is so frequently described as the spirit of an age. Each stage of culture has its peculiar colouring, for at each stage there are present and operative in thought and action principles of a character more or less general, more or less defined. It is the business of philosophy at any period to *think* through these principles, to carry them back to their ultimate source, and by subjecting them to the criticism which can only be offered when they are treated *in abstracto*, to determine their value and place in the spiritual life. A philosophy is great, just in proportion as it takes up into itself comprehensively the body of ideas that informs the intellectual atmosphere of the time, and as it succeeds in viewing them in their connexion with the ultimate fact in nature, the life of self-conscious intelligence. Philosophies will differ from one another, will be historically distinct, by reason of the continuous alteration which takes place in this intellectual medium, an alteration in part due to philosophy itself, and through the varieties in the method by which the testing or comprehension of the whole body of ideas may be attempted. Thus the history of philosophy is a record of the final conceptions which at suc-

cessive periods are formed by reflection on the facts of existence as viewed at each age, and must be unintelligible or, at least, but partially understood, if not taken in the closest connexion with the spirit of each age. If I may illustrate by a reference to a single set of considerations, I would point out that the speculative thinking of the seventeenth century—the Cartesian systems being the typical representatives—is but poorly appreciated if we do not take at its full value the prevailingly geometrical conception of things which was the dominant scientific idea of the time. The speculative thinking of the eighteenth century in like manner—our English philosophy being its typical representative—expresses in an ultimate fashion the mechanical conception then prevailing. And the influence of ideas not generally considered philosophical is by no means limited to those employed in natural science. Every part of human life is viewed at different times in different lights, and the ruling ideas or principles of judgment are all important factors for philosophical reflection. Thus at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the most significant conceptions were those which affected more particularly the ethical or social life of humanity. As in ethics generally, these conceptions were complex and secondary, implying, though in the use of them the implications might remain most obscure, ultimate views regarding the function and quality of human life. The principle of individual liberty, especially, was one of application most wide and of implication most obscure, but a philosophy contemporaneous with the practical acceptance of such a principle in human life was of necessity bound to reflect deeply upon the meaning of individuality, and thus to attempt a truly philosophical criticism of the principle itself. Such criticism may seem to have led far from the facts from which it started; in the Kantian system, *e.g.*, it led to a profound inquiry into the nature of intelligence and its relations to the sum total of things. But it is the very secret of philosophy that it is a circle. Enter it where we may, from this notion or from that, we are led on in an inevitable round, ever striving to complete our view and to see the notion with which we started in its true relations to all that makes up our intellectual cosmos.

As it is with the history of philosophy, so it is on a less scale with the life of a great philosopher. Could we trace that in its entirety we should be able to see how the dominant ideas of the time entered into his spiritual life, affected it and were in turn affected by it, how out of the chaos there was gradually formed the ultimate view in which the disjunct members are harmoniously placed, in which the apparent oppositions are reconciled by being placed in their true relations to one another and to the whole. Perhaps no life presents greater interest when regarded in this fashion than that of Hegel. For the period during which his view of things was being formed by conscious or unconscious process of assimilation was one unusually rich in those ultimate

thoughts that express deep-seated tendencies of thought and action. Operative on him were the principles of the two greatest events in modern history, the French revolution and the critical philosophies. On him, too, were brought practically to bear the potent influences of the fresh study of Greek life and art and of the critical investigations in the domain of Christian religion, that were characteristic features of German culture in the early part of the nineteenth century. These great conceptions, ramifying in the most varied directions, giving rise to more or less spasmodic efforts of thought and expression in German life, and manifesting, where each was pushed to extremes, oppositions of an unusually violent character, had to be taken up and worked into one harmonious, concatenated system. The vast importance of the Hegelian doctrine can be duly appreciated only when we take into account how comprehensive and significant were the principles there reduced into one multiform idea, and how enormous was the effort of thought required to reduce them to their clear essence and to exhibit them in their place and function as elements in the life of a self-conscious intelligence. For the reader, the difficulty of the Hegelian work is not its abstractness, nor even any peculiarity of its method; but, on the contrary, it is the very concreteness of each notion, the manner in which each is regarded in the light of the whole, the mode of placing the several parts so that the twofold nature of each, in itself and for the others, shall never be forgotten, that make of the dialectic an " almost unsupportable burden ".

Prof. Caird's treatment of Hegel's life, as was said, is singularly able and interesting. He has given a real contribution to the writing of the history of philosophy, and undoubtedly the sketch of the development of Hegel's mind will do much to clear up the real significance of the Hegelian system.

The concluding chapters of the work present in brief and pregnant fashion an outline of the problem of philosophy in Hegel, an explanation of what is so often a stumbling-block to the beginner—Hegel's teaching in regard to the Principle of Contradiction, a general description of the *Logic* and a statement of the way in which the Hegelian doctrine is related to the important spiritual interest of Christianity. More could not, perhaps, have been achieved in the limited space at command, and Prof. Caird has done well to abjure details and content himself with indicating the central thought from relation to which only could the details become intelligible. One regrets that room could not have been found for some indication of the way in which the Hegelian idea permits us to view the facts of practical life, of individual morality and ethical custom, for here in particular one must recognise the value of the Hegelian work as opposed on the one hand to the abstract, psychological ethics of the best known writers in English, and on the other hand to the ' naturalistic ' ethics which has recently come forward as furnish-

ing an answer to problems left unsolved by the earlier methods. But on points such as these, it is not possible to enter here. A word, however, may be permitted on the *Logic*.

At the present time logical studies are in a very remarkable condition. Nothing can surpass the chaos of views with respect to their exact character, limits, value, and relation to philosophy generally. There is undoubtedly in this condition of things an element of reaction. Just as in Political Economy recent writers are almost instinctively driven to take an attitude of opposition to the older doctrines which presented themselves as forming a complete, harmonious system, so in Logic, the neatly worked-out Formal Logic of the school of Kant and the more complex Logic of Empiricism have shown themselves inadequate to solve the questions inevitably suggested even within their own lines. Writers on Logic, then, are at present endeavouring to obtain some new point of view from which it may be possible to survey the whole ground. Towards such an end nothing could be more helpful than appreciation of the Hegelian Logic. As a rule, our logical treatises are prevailingly psychological, even though at the very outset an opposition between logic and psychology may be indicated. Notions, judgments, and inferences are regarded as so many facts, to be grouped under the common head of Thought and having special characteristics. For example, the notion is viewed as one peculiar product of mind, distinct in certain respects from the percept, and divisible into kinds, *abstract* and tne like; and one section of logical doctrine is devoted to the treatment of these features. So to regard the notion is quite in accordance with psychological method, which rests upon and implies the assumptions that fall to be examined in a theory of knowledge, but it leaves us with all the deeper questions untouched and with a wholly unworkable idea of what constitutes knowledge. The student who approaches the Hegelian Logic after a training of the ordinary kind is apt to be absolutely bewildered by finding the old names used for facts which seem to have nothing in common with the 'products of thought' to which he has been accustomed. If he attempts to read into the Hegelian section on the notion his view of notions as special subjective phenomena, he will undoubtedly find himself in outer darkness. The Logic of Hegel is no psychology of thought, but the systematic treatment of those ultimate elements in our view of things which constitute their intelligibility for us. However interesting may be the history of the steps by which in the subjective experience of the individual this view is realised, such a history is not Logic but Psychology. The 'forms of thought,' the categories of intelligence, as Prof. Caird well puts it, "are not a collection of isolated ideas, which we find in our minds and of which we apply now one, now another, as we might try one after another of a bunch of keys upon a number of isolated locks; . . . the cate-

gories are not instruments which the mind *uses*, but elements in a whole, or the stages in a complex process, which in its unity the mind *is*". To make clear to ourselves the implications of the current logical doctrines is to take a long step on the way towards a truer and more profound analysis of thought; and nothing can contribute so powerfully towards this end as an accurate apprehension of what the problem was which Hegel set himself to prove in the *Logic*.

R. ADAMSON.

The Origin of Ideas. By ANTONIO ROSMINI SERBATI. Translated from the Fifth Italian Edition of the *Nuovo Saggio sull' Origine delle Idee.* Vol. I. London: Kegan Paul & Trench, 1883. Pp. lii., 382.

The *Nuovo Saggio*, the work in which Rosmini first fairly broke ground in 1830, and which he subjected to continuous revision up to the end of his career, forms, perhaps, the best introduction to his voluminous and encyclopædic system of philosophy, of which a *conspectus* was presented to English students last year in Mr. Davidson's translation of the philosopher's short account of his own views, reviewed in MIND XXVII. This second contribution to our knowledge and understanding of Rosmini comes in excellent form, admirably rendered by friendly and competent translators, and preceded by a sympathetic introduction of 50 pages, containing extracts from his other works which throw light on this. The present instalment of the *Essay* consists of a historical introduction to his own Theory of Knowledge in the form of a critical review of previous theories, some of them, like Locke's, erring by defect as assigning an inadequate cause, and others, like Plato's and Kant's, erring by excess of explanation; but, in these animadversions, he of necessity reveals his own principles and position, and does so with some definition and detail, so as to provide material for a first statement and appreciation of his theory, awaiting reconsideration on the issue of the completing volumes. His first finding, upon reflective introspection and analysis, may be stated thus;—that, not merely to feel but to *perceive* our feeling or sensation, to get "an idea or cognition" of it, to cast it off from us and set it over against our perceiving as a perceived "*object*," we must affirm that it "is," by a kind of "judgment" that predicates of it "Being"; and that this "Being," like the predicate of every judgment, is a "universal," or general term, but, inasmuch as no process of abstraction and generalisation can have as yet obtained, this must be an innate one; and, *à fortiori*, that all other more complex percepts, concepts, or ideas, require such judgment, and predication of this universal for their formation. Here is the *pons asinorum* of ideology and philosophy according to Rosmini, and a very difficult and narrow, if not impossible, passage it will prove for the followers of Locke,

Hume, and Mill, who have been accustomed to find in sensation and reflection upon sensation a sufficient account of experience, and, as Rosmini says of Locke, may not be able to bring themselves even within sight of this crucial passage to the problem of knowledge. "The mind must be accustomed to gaze on the ideas themselves, stripped of all the trappings of words, schemata, and methods," that would behold the innate "idea of being in general," and have and hold it, not merely, as everybody can do, as the last and emptiest of abstractions by the handle of a word, but as that veritable *à priori* "*intuition* of indeterminate or possible being," on which Rosmini founds his whole system, and affirms to be the very "Light of Reason," and that which even creates the intellect. But the English school are devoid of this Platonic second sight, and do not miss it, thinking that knowledge is not built up of judgments or affirmations of this formal and propositional sort, that requires us to have a concept before we can begin to conceive, and a percept or intuition before we can begin to perceive; that on the contrary, sensations given, the process of reflection they know of, can discriminate and grasp them and hold them in bundles at arm's length as objects—the distinction in reflection between the many felt and perceived or conceived objects and the one subject of feeling and knowledge being nothing for us but the distinction between the many particular feelings and feeling in general, that which is the one common feature of them all. So Rosmini judges that these thinkers have not even seen the *pons*, much less crossed it.

A heavy but lesser condemnation awaits those, like Kant Leibniz and Plato, who, having crossed, have gone too far with innate ideas, not seeing that the first they met with, the concept of Being in general, keeper of the threshold of the house of knowledge, was enough, and itself the source of all other ideas or categories. Here, Rosmini attempts to reduce all the other Kantian categories to the modal one of "possibility," which he identifies with his own Pure Being or idea of Being in general, the only fundamental and strict form from which the others are inferred, or differenced by admixture of the various matters of sense. But, it is doubtful whether a Kantian *pur sang* would admit that his master's categories were fully fledged and complete concepts like Rosmini's aboriginal and perfect "Ideal Being," and, for the rest, it remains to be seen in the sequel, whether "quantity," "quality," "substance," "causality," and so on, can be got out of the concept of mere blank Being. Perhaps the author comes nearer the truth about Kant, when he seems to say that Kant's Categories are simply the several functions of unifying thought, and merely an elaboration and rigorous specification of Reid's "Common Sense," and that, again, only a vigorous and hearty affirmation of Hume's more modest "Instinct"; and, in this regard, Rosmini's "Ideal Being," taken as "Possibility," would be only a statical image or symbol of the constant forward

strain of reflecting mind, and, taken as "Pure Objectivity" or the idea of objectivity in general, it would only be a figurate cross-section of the perpetual process or act of objectification which comprises and reveals the essence of "the original synthetical unity of apperception"—"ὁ νοῦς," as Aristotle says, "τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνεργείᾳ". But Rosmini does not allow this construction. His form is not a mere "subjective" form, as he calls Kant's categories. It is *in* us from the first psychologically, but not *of* us either so, or transcendentally—not our immanent act, but an alien thing coming from abroad. It is not merely the idea of objects in general, but the idea of things-in-themselves in general, and apparently its business is to make known to us that what we feel is, just as it acts on or in us and we feel it, a thing "existing in itself, independently of us, of our passion, and of all other beings whatsoever". "Being has two modes, the one *subjective*, and the other objective." "The subjective existence is supplied to our cognition by the senses." Objective Being is the idea of being in general or of possibility. It is the intelligibility of the thing felt, and in no way alters it. "It simply illumines it." Since in both modes "we have the self-same being, it follows that the cognition is valid and true". At first sight, this looks like no more than an extremely ontological way of stating the spontaneous convictions of the ordinary unreflecting man. But the proof of this bold assertion of absolute certainty and science has to follow, and until it is published, it would be premature and unfair to essay an arbitration between Rosmini and eitner Phenomenalism or Absolute Idealism.

J. Burns-Gibson.

Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Zum hundertjährigen Jubiläum derselben, herausgegeben von Dr. H. Vaihinger. Erster Band (Zwei Theile). Stuttgart: Spemann, 1881-2. Pp. xvi., 506.

Among the many works about Kant, which owed the occasion of their publication to the centennial commemoration of the first edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Dr. Vaihinger's *Commentary* on that work is entitled to a foremost place. When completed, this commentary is meant to fill four goodly octavo volumes. Of these only the first has yet appeared:—and in two parts, separated from each other by the interval of nearly a year. This volume, which for printing and paper deserves every commendation, deals only with the 'Preface' to the first edition, and with the 'Introduction' both in its earlier and later forms. Even within these limits several questions of history and exegesis have been reserved for discussion in special supplements. Excursus, dealing with the disputes on the *a priori* or empirical character

of mathematical truths and of the causal law, both previous and subsequent to the time of Kant; with the anticipations of the distinction between analytic and synthetical judgments to be found in earlier writers; with the specific relations in which Kant stands to the influence of Hume; and even with the meaning of terms, like "Rein," or "Transcendental";—these, which form battle-fields of Kantian philologists, and cannot be dismissed in a sentence, are all postponed to a future volume.

Unquestionably the work which Dr. Vaihinger is undertaking is complex and laborious. The due proportion between the parts and their subordination to the whole cannot be preserved without an almost prophetic forethought. It becomes the more incumbent upon the commentator to cut away every luxuriant detail, to have no mercy on irrelevant references, however interesting, and above all to reduce to a minimum the space allowed for discussion of the arguments or phraseology of individual expositors, in all cases where the interest of such controversy is personal rather than material. When one thinks of the burning questions which arise at almost every step in the 'Transcendental Deduction' of the forms of thought, of the problems which especially beset the treatment of the 'Analogies of Experience,' and of the deeps calling unto deeps in the metaphysical discussions of the 'Dialectic,' the space of four volumes seems but a scanty measure to hold the overflowing stream of exegesis.

Of the utility of Dr. Vaihinger's enterprise few students of Kant will be inclined to doubt, were it only as a storehouse of materials, an arsenal of weapons for the Kantian controversy. The explanatory evolution of the Kantian doctrine has been carried on at so many points, by so many hands, and in so many directions, that the time seems to have come for 'taking stock' of what has actually been brought together during the last 100 years by the labours alike of friend and foe. These expositions fall into two periods: an earlier, coeval with the close of last century, and a later, separated from the former by the domination of the great idealist schools from Fichte to Hegel and Schelling. Though it is among the merits of the present commentator to recal the points raised by the earlier critics, he naturally deals most effectively with the modern awakening of Kantian studies during the last twenty years. This movement, sometimes loosely described as Neo-Kantism, has several phases. In its more distinctively Neo-Kantian aspect, it is an attempt to find in Kant a resting-place for the storm-tossed pilgrims of philosophy, alike for those who would establish some *modus vivendi* between speculation and the special sciences, and for those who believe that Kant's metaphysical ethics can save them from the spectre of materialism. But besides these disciples who are bent on developing into more systematic completeness what they take to be a sound foundation, there are other students

who approach Kant in a more purely critical and historical spirit. In this historical movement the post of coryphaeus may be given to Kuno Fischer, whose account of Kant in the 3rd and 4th volumes of his *History of Modern Philosophy* paved the way for the historical study of Kant's intellectual development. Less bulky but most suggestive contributions were made in the same general direction by Bona Meyer, Noack, Liebmann, and a host of others. Gradually Kant entered upon the rank of a classic; and the study of Kantism assumed the shape of a branch of philology. The philosophical interest became for the time second to the archæological. Long-concealed manuscripts from he Kantian archives were brought to light, and made to supplement the gaps in our record. Greater effort was made to secure the textual accuracy of the published works, which had hitherto been treated in but step-motherly fashion by the editors. Ambitious critics even hoped to emulate the glory of Aristotelian scholarship, by discovering evidence of double redaction and awkward junctures in the *textus receptus*. And the result was to discredit the 'Kant-philologists' as a too curiously-inquisitive class of men, who brought into the precincts of philosophy methods which should be confined to the walks of erudite scholarship in Greek and Latin. Kuno Fischer in his new edition addresses words of rebuke to the philologists who, as he thinks, have unduly magnified their office.

Yet, whatever may be said of single points, it would be a mistake to depreciate the value of an accurate and minute criticism and exegesis of the relevant documents of a philosophy. In the case of Kant, especially, the spectacle of contradictory theories based, as was alleged, on the same utterance, seems emphatically to call for a close and critical comparison of the *ipsissima verba* of the writer, such as *e.g.*, Bonitz has exemplified in dealing with Plato and Aristotle. For if the history of philosophy is to be studied, and the words of a philosopher made the text of exposition and generalising criticism, the foundation must be laid in verbal analysis. The student, it may be admitted, who reads Kant to seek help and suggestion for his own mental development, will not perhaps find any charm or merit in searching comparisons, wire-drawn distinctions, and elaborate discussions which try to run to earth the rambling and twisting thoughts. This erudite quibbling will seem to him the vain play of ingenious philology: external criticism, which throws away the spirit to clutch at the letter. Yet even he may be glad to borrow a light from this *Commentary* to elucidate a puzzle; and still more will the expositor who professes to deliver to the present age his adaptation of Kantian philosophy, and claims for it the authority of his master, be perforce drawn to consult, even if he do not adopt, the clue offered by Dr. Vaihinger. For, as that scholar remarks, "the Critical Philosophy is a series of expositions, which as they come after each other by way of

complement and continuation, tend to go back again upon what was said before, and, of course, often to contradict it: expositions, contained partly in the several parts and editions of the *K.d.r.V.* itself, partly in the other Critical writings. Out of the flux and variety in these contradictory and self-correcting statements, to extract and put together the average normal picture of the Critical Philosophy is for that reason a possible and a necessary problem for the historian of philosophy who seeks to render a true representation of this mighty mass of thoughts. But possible it can be, only by means of the microscopical, though not micrological, labour of the philologist."

The "Commentary" proper is preceded by a disquisition on the historical position of Kant between two periods of different speculative aim and method, and by a fuller examination of the *media via* which the Critical Philosophy claims to follow as the only salvation from the dangers of dogmatism and scepticism. Dr. Vaihinger attempts to hold the balance true (and he returns in his "Methodological Analysis" pp. 388-450, to the same theme), between the two *momenta* of rationalism with its *a priori* elements, and empiricism with its sense-experience: to keep perpetually in view the Janus-face of Kantism, which commentators, who lay exclusive stress on one or other aspect, are constrained to miss. He shows with much acumen the many signal features of the *Kritik* which depend upon this fundamental characteristic. Sometimes indeed his distinctions seem to lose themselves in a hard and dry formula: a mere shell of learning is left instead of the living power of the philosophic word. But such a consequence is pernaps inevitable in any attempt to classify a unique historical phenomenon: and Dr. Vaihinger has amply compensated for any want of intimacy in his apprehension of his author, by the brilliant pages of analytic criticism in which he discusses the several aspects of Kant's problem. As against Paulsen and Riehl, who hold that in the first edition of the *Kritik* the inquiry assumes the psychological fact of synthetic judgments and asks whether and on what conditions they are valid, while in the second edition and the *Prolegomena* the validity of the judgments is assumed and only their origin remains to be examined, and partly as against Fischer who holds that Kant in all cases started from the validity of the judgments, Dr. Vaihinger adopts a view which he thus sums up (p. 411):—

"Fischer is right, in so far as he puts in the foreground the problem of *explaining* the validity of mathematics, &c. But as it is incorrect to exhibit this fact of validity as absolutely beyond the reach of doubt,—which the attacks of the Sceptics show that it is not,—it follows that it is unjustifiable to exclude from the problem the proof of this validity. And so, while from the former point of view the synthetic *a priori* judgments in mathematics are in Kant's eyes valid members in the system of science, they are from the latter point of view no better than psychological facts. Thus Fischer's opponents are entitled to claim this complement to his exposition: but they are wrong when they treat this problem of the proof

of validity as the main topic, and when they assume that by presupposing the validity the critical theory has ended before it had begun. On the contrary the original problem consists in the *explanation* of this validity: it still remains such, though this validity may no longer be a universally accepted presupposition, but may require to be demonstrated: the explanation carries the proof with it. When the first view is thus corroborated, and yet the second not excluded, but shown to be complementary,—when the *result* is thus really a *resultant*, it appears that both parties are in the wrong, because with both questions they mix up, to an extreme height of confusion, and even unduly under-estimate, a third problem,—the disclosure of a new method for the discovery of true knowledge."

But it may be added that Dr. Vaihinger in arriving at this result was not exactly formulating a novelty: he was only bringing out with a clearness previously unexampled the conclusions which others had seen to be involved, and carrying to their rigorous issue criticisms which other and more purely expository writers may not have deemed it necessary to pursue to the bitter end. He admits himself (p. 423) that the "fluctuation" in Prof. Watson's statements at which Mr. Balfour "wonders" is after all the inevitable consequence of the "antithetical" and "hypothetical" problem (for the meaning of these logical terms see pp. 393, 399) which Kant had before him, and that another English "transcendentalist" had seen that the explanation of the fact involved its justification. As to his fancy that Fischer's account of Kant has founded the English study of the subject, it is a mere fancy.

And yet Dr. Vaihinger is right in working out his thesis of the inherent inconsistencies of the Kantian work to extremer issues than the English Kantians have carried their exposition. He shows that, however valuable the materials, the suggestion, the methods, contained in the *Kritik* may be, the Critical Philosophy as it stands cannot be the foundation of modern philosophy. If Hegel cannot remain a safe basis, no more can Kant. As Ferrier said: "No man for at least two thousand years has seen the true flesh-and-blood countenance of a single philosophical problem. Every question in philosophy is but the mask of another question, and all these masking and masked questions required to be removed and laid aside, until the ultimate but *truly first* question has been reached." We must go deeper than the historical Kant if we wish to build on the rock: we must set aside the individual limitation, the personal *Vorurtheil*, with which even he begins his work. Kant has as yet been read too exclusively as a foil to set off Hegel, or Schopenhauer, or English psychologists. We want a larger and freer study of Kantism in its intrinsic merits: not merely in the points which the sympathy or antipathy of another type of thinker fastens upon as characteristic; but on every hand, as a system of free thought, essaying to construct by reason the foundations of a faith. And as a contribution to that end, this *Commentary*, even though it sometimes recals a remark which a former pupil brings me as

from the author ('I first read everything about Kant, and then sit down to confute it'), deserves a warm welcome. Particularly, perhaps, as Dr. Vaihinger does not by any means pass over unnoticed, after the manner of his countryman Kuno Fischer, the labours of the English Kantians.

The complication and the frequent immanent want of clearness of the *Kritik* are, as Dr. Vaihinger remarks, partly to be explained from the gradual growth of Kant's own ideas, and require for that end a psychological history of his development. Dr. Vaihinger endeavours, though with some straining of facts, to show that twice in his lifetime, about 1762 and in 1772, Kant passed from under the influence of Leibniz and Wolff, through the torpedo-like shock of Hume, into what may be called a 'Critical' standpoint. But it is very hard in such a matter to keep within due limits: analogies mislead; the traces Kant has himself left are slight and open to interpretation. Dr. Vaihinger errs, and Prof. Benno Erdmann is perhaps a greater offender, in giving too free play to the very natural desire to construct an intellectual biography of Kant, to lay bare as it were the process of stratification in his mind. Not indeed that their aim is other than useful: only that they seem to be inclined to underestimate the uncertainties of the problem and to be too hasty in summing up their conclusions.

It would be impossible in short limits to enter into the various questions suggested by this ingenious and erudite criticism of a 'Criticism'. Readers will find among the notes on the 'Vorrede' a rich collation of the passages in which Kant compares the plan and disposition of his enterprise to a court of justice where the opposing types of philosophic method and doctrine contend in arguments meant to win the verdict of reason in favour of their claims. They will probably be surprised at the variety of conception or misconception, to which the genitive (objective or subjective) in the title (Criticism *of* Pure Reason) leaves the way open. They will again and again be reminded of the twofold character of the problem: the problem of experience, and that of the *a priori* elements. They will see some account of the steps by which the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments grew up in Kant, and of its true bearings, which a formal treatment of the distinction sometimes ignores. They will no longer be allowed to be guiltless in confounding the two senses in which Kant speaks both of Natural Science and of Metaphysics. They will find an attempt to present a clearer statement than is commonly given of the precise relation in which Kant's problem stands to that of Hume, both as Hume really dealt with it, and as Kant understood him to conceive it. Occasionally they may be annoyed at the tabular and numerical formality of certain arrangements and distinctions. But, after all, it will be impossible to refuse the admission that Dr. Vaihinger is engaged in a very necessary piece of work: that he

is taking every means to secure an adequate fulfilment of his self-imposed labour: and that no Kantian student should be without such an assistance towards the understanding of a book, which is not merely marked by obscurities of style, but pervaded by contrasts of doctrine. And perhaps such a reader may join with me in wishing Dr. Vaihinger health and strength to continue his arduous labour to a successful end.

W. WALLACE.

Anti-Kant, oder Elemente der Logik, der Physik und der Ethik. Von Dr. ADOLF BOLLIGER, Privatdocenten der Philosophie an der Universität zu Basel. Erster Band. Basel: Schneider, 1882. Pp. 407.

The contents of this book are described very well by the double title. It is a criticism of Kant accompanied by an exposition of the philosophical system of the author. In the present volume (which is to be followed by another) Dr. Bolliger criticises in detail the 'Introduction' to the *Kritik* (in Part I., pp. 11-148) and the 'Transcendental Æsthetic' (in Part II., pp. 151-407). The result to which his criticism leads him, as stated in an introductory chapter ("Ansicht und Absicht," pp. 1-8), is that "we must learn to forget Kant".

The first criticism that Dr. Bolliger makes is that Kant does not define knowledge, but begins with a division of it into "pure" and "empirical" knowledge. He ought to have asked himself first of all whether the problem of knowledge is "to reproduce in (adequate) representations an objective world or to analyse in judgments the world of representations". Dr. Bolliger takes the latter view—that all knowledge is analysis of representations. He holds that the whole of Kant's system implies the former view. In the first edition of the *Kritik* Kant may have come a little nearer to idealism in some respects, but the differences between the first and second editions are unessential. Dr. Bolliger always cites the second edition because it seems to him the fairest course to criticise a doctrine in the form that was finally given to it by its author.

Experience as much as knowledge requires definition. There are several ambiguities in Kant's use of the term "experience" (Erfahrung). One is that he sometimes distinguishes it (as "empirical knowledge") from "*a priori* knowledge," and sometimes regards it as having itself an *a priori* factor. Dr. Bolliger's position is that all knowledge is with respect to its object empirical, with respect to its function noetic or intellectual. If then we translate the Kantian *a posteriori* by "empirical" and *a priori* by "noetic" all knowledge is *a posteriori* and *a priori* at once. Kant therefore makes a cross-division when he divides knowledge into knowledge *a priori* and knowledge *a posteriori*. Truth is not attainable by a compromise such as that which is

attempted by Kant. The philosophical doctrine that will conquer is a developed Empiricism.

Dr. Bolliger's position with respect to judgment is that all right judgments are necessary because they are analytical. There is no need for the assumption of an *a priori* element in knowledge in order to explain the necessity of any class of judgments. Kant's doctrine is a superfluous means of defence against the scepticism of Hume,—a scepticism which had its origin in a mistaken view of the relation of cause and effect. Synthetic judgments, both *a priori* and *a posteriori*, in the Kantian sense, are impossible. Kant supposes conceptions (of body, for example, as having extension, figure and impenetrability) to which something is added in a synthetic judgment (weight, for example, to the conception of body). But in reality additions to our representations are made by experience only. After we have obtained new experience we analyse in judgments our complex of representations. This is true whether we add to our representations by means of the senses or by the substitute of imagination. Man as *knowing* can produce nothing. Kant confuses the problem of the theory of knowledge with a problem of psychology. If the world of experience is really produced by formal principles (the categories) out of an unknown matter, the problem still remains of analysing this world, of making it intelligible.

Near the end of the first part Dr. Bolliger discusses a question of terminology to which he attaches some importance. He has undertaken to show that no part of mathematics, of natural science, or of metaphysics is constructed out of synthetic judgments *a priori*. "Metaphysic is," he says, "the analytical science κατ' ἐξοχήν." But this term ought not to have been used; there was no need for any term but "Physic" in order to describe what is usually called Metaphysic. Under the conception of Physic come Logic and Ethic together with the theory of knowledge and the theory of good (Hedonic); for all this belongs to empirical science, and since the totality of empirical facts is called nature, to "Physic".

The discussion of the 'Transcendental Æsthetic' begins with a historical account of "the Interpretations of Representation to the time of Kant". Dr. Bolliger holds that ancient philosophy necessarily ended in scepticism because it assumed that knowledge consists in the reproduction by the mind of an object supposed to exist outside it. The ancient sceptics doubted everything except that which they ought to have doubted first, that is, whether it is quite certain that the end of thought is this impossible task of reproducing a world of things-in-themselves. Descartes resembles the ancient sceptics in this, that with all his scepticism he forgot to ask whether representations, in order to give us knowledge, must really reproduce objects. Unlike the ancient sceptics, he thought it possible to find a test of the truth of our ideas. The doctrines of Descartes, the Occasionalists, and Leib-

niz are only substitutes for the doctrine of the congruence (sometimes called identity) of our representations with something outside us, which was held in different forms by Plato and Aristotle. The true "doctrine of identity" is that the representation and the extended world are one and the same. Spinoza therefore did not arrive at this doctrine any more than the thinkers who have just been mentioned, for although he denies the duality of substance he asserts the duality of its attributes. Berkeley, instead of asking whether we really do see things *outside* ourselves, made a theory to explain this supposed fact. A second error of Berkeley's was that he did not see that each individual must actively create his own world and cannot be merely a passive recipient of ideas. Hume occupied himself chiefly with the problem of causation: he thought that causes must be sought in phenomena, and therefore concluded that no judgment about matters of fact is necessary. These two illusions are the beginning of the Critical Philosophy. In order to surmount scepticism Kant (1) brings back the ancient dualism of matter and form, (2) claims for the principle of form more importance than for that of matter, (3) seeks to place the principle of form within the mind. The development of Kant's doctrines by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel shows us "the ideal Kant". Kant's confusion of the cosmological (psychological) with the epistemological question not only remains throughout this development but becomes greater. The most important of the philosophers since Kant is Lotze with his phenomenalism on the one side and his view of causation on the other. Both these sides of his philosophy are indeed imperfectly developed, but he has done enough to give him a very high place among philosophers.

After this historical view Dr. Bolliger sets forth his "Positive view of the nature of Representations," under which term he includes all phenomena. He argues that representations ("Vorstellungen") imply a subject of representations ("ein Vorstellendes"), which is not itself a representation. This is "the soul," the absolute unity of which, as well as its existence, is proved by analysis of phenomena. The relation of the soul to its manifold representations is that of cause to effect. It must have in itself the power of producing them; this power is that by which we distinguish it from pure nothingness; the best name for a being in which this power is inherent is "cause". There is no causation in the phenomenal world. Souls are the only real causes. But the individual soul is not the *only* cause of its own representations. It produces its phenomenal world under the action of other beings. A "soul-monad" absolutely alone might produce a phenomenal world, but no change, no time could exist in this world. Such a soul would have produced in one phenomenal world the full effect due to it as a cause; to produce another world it must become another soul. But if we suppose that the soul is acted upon by other real beings we can explain the fact of

change, which consists in the disappearance of one phenomenal world to make room for another. Representation—that is, the production of these phenomenal worlds—is an expression of the momentary state of each soul under the action of other beings, or, more strictly, as Dr. Bolliger argues afterwards, under the action of one being that is in relation to all other beings. The soul is not limited to the body or to a part of it. The doctrine that it is thus limited leads to the absurd assumption of action at a distance, to the dogma that the soul is where it is not. If we must speak of place at all in relation to the soul, then the soul is the place of phenomena. The body and the material world and infinite space are in the soul. The soul is active not merely in the body but wherever there is a phenomenon. If it is asked what is the meaning ("der Sinn") of the world of representations, it may be replied that a thing has a meaning when it is adapted to an end. Now the only absolute end is happiness, and this end is attained or not attained equally whether the phenomenal world is called into existence by the soul or is a reproduction of a world of objects.

This "Analysis of Representations" is followed by an "Analysis of Concepts". It is maintained that Kant starts from a false view of concepts, and that this, like his false view of representations, prevails throughout the *Kritik*. Not only in the Kantian cosmology but also in the Kantian logic concepts rule; for according to Kant we judge by means of concepts. The true view of the concept is that it is merely a sum of many particulars ("ein Inbegriff vieler Einzelwesen"). It cannot, therefore, have the functions that Kant assigns to it. Concepts have their origin in judgments, not judgments in concepts.

Kant's distinction of Form and Matter is next discussed. Dr. Bolliger brings against the Kantian position the objections (1) that the antithesis of matter and form is "a metaphysical fiction," (2) that the compromise of Kant proceeds from a false opposition of "empirical" (identified with "received") and "*a priori*" (identified with "not received"). Both "form" (whatever may be meant by this term) and "matter" belong to experience, and are therefore empirical; both are produced by the soul, and are therefore *a priori*.

Dr. Bolliger continues the development of his own system in opposition to that of Kant in an "Analysis of Space" (pp. 268-375). Modern philosophers and the philosophers of classical antiquity have almost without exception taken a wrong view of space. The true view existed among the ancient civilised peoples of the East. From the East light came to the Greeks, but they were too immature to receive it in its fulness. The Greek philosophers regarded space as a μὴ ὄν. The true view is that it has a higher degree of reality than matter. It would be better to say that space is the *only* material of feeling—that everything else is mere form—than to say with Kant that space is a mere form. But this too would

be an error. "The antithesis of form and matter is with Plato as false as with Kant". Space is a monad; "single bounded spaces originate for us through a limitation and division of space in its state as a monad". Can we, in accordance with the view of causation that has been already explained, ascribe the production of space to the activity of the individual soul alone? This is impossible, for the idea of space is not changeless; there are intervals during which the consciousness of space ceases. The possibility is suggested that this cessation of the consciousness of space is brought about by the activity of innumerable other real beings, that there is no one being to whose action the consciousness of space is due. But it is maintained that a proof of the existence of one real being corresponding to the phenomenon of space may be found by developing as far as possible "naïve objectivism" and then interpreting the results, which must be regarded as symbols, in terms of phenomenalism. Dr. Bolliger proceeds, therefore, to construct "the Ideal of Materialism". His reason for seeking truth in a development of materialism is that this doctrine—the doctrine that everything can be explained by means of atoms and space—has gained more conquests over nature than any other philosophical doctrine.

Since gravitation varies with the distance, space must take part as a cause (the term being understood in the "naïvely objective" sense) in the production of motion. A difficulty of ordinary materialism is that the action of atoms on one another is inexplicable because they constitute a mere plurality. But space is a unity. It supplies, then, the bond of union that is wanting to the materialistic doctrine. Atoms must not be regarded as each filling a definite portion of space. Every atom "is where it acts". Since it acts on all other atoms it is everywhere. But although atoms are ubiquitous they are not, like space, equally active everywhere. Every atom is an infinite being that has its highest intensity at one point. By means of this theory of atoms all phenomena may be explained as results of one force—attraction. When this position has been reached it may be shown that even the attraction of atoms by one another is an unnecessary assumption. Since space acts directly on atoms they need not act at all on one another in order to produce the effects we observe. Atoms must not be regarded as lifeless. Life cannot belong to a group of atoms, but only to a single being, an atom. The brain is "a system of atoms under the constraint of which *one* atom actually lives, thinks, feels". All atoms are potentially alive. As living beings they come into relation with space only, just as we saw that they do as gravitating beings. Since atoms derive their activity from space this must be the one principle of the world, for a plurality of principles is inconceivable. Finally, a principle from which living beings emanate must be itself a living being.

Space and matter are phenomena and cannot therefore be real

causes. But from what has been proved on the ground of "naïve objectivism," as to the phenomenal world, we may infer the nature of the intelligible world. The real being that corresponds to the phenomenon of space is God. Thus the consequences of materialism lead to a theistic view of the universe.

Dr. Bolliger does not give a complete analysis of Time in this volume, but he states his view in general terms and offers some arguments in favour of it. He maintains in opposition to Kant that time is nothing apart from the succession of events. It is merely that which is common to all changes. The changeless elements of the intelligible world are the cause of change.

Whatever may be thought of the substance of these speculations, it must be admitted that Dr. Bolliger explains very clearly their deduction from the principles laid down. This character of his method makes it possible to state with brevity certain objections to his philosophic system.

The doctrine of "the intelligible world" depends on the positions that "the soul is a unity" and that it is "the cause" of phenomena. But if, with Dr. Bolliger, we include under "phenomena" all states of consciousness whatever, and at the same time deny the validity of the distinction of form and matter, "the soul," being neither a phenomenon nor a form of phenomena, is merely a cause of which we know nothing except that it *is* a cause. Dr. Bolliger refuses to apply the word "cause" to anything in the phenomenal world; it is therefore with him the name of one of the terms of an unknown relation, for he regards phenomena as coextensive with experience. His intelligible world, then, is a world of unknown beings each of which stands in an unknown relation to a phenomenal world of its own. It may, perhaps, be said that we must still assume that this intelligible world exists, because "die Vorstellungen" imply "ein Vorstellendes". This is an argument of a kind that is frequently used; but arguments of this kind tend to deprive philosophical language of its value. They contain the assumption that all words that are related etymologically to any philosophical term must have a real meaning in philosophy analogous to their meaning in daily life.

Dr. Bolliger's exposition of idealism or "phenomenalism" and of the doctrine that all knowledge consists in analysis of experience is perhaps the most valuable part of his book. One part of this exposition seems, however, to have led to some errors. In several passages it is denied that there was any need for the explanations given by Berkeley and by Lotze of the belief in an external world. A consequence of this view seems to be that extension in its unanalysed form is treated as if it had equal value as a datum of philosophy with the results of psychological analysis.

The criticisms of Kant are always interesting, though sometimes in the historical sections it seems as if Dr. Bolliger had

resolved to find good in all philosophers except Kant. This exaggeration is probably a reaction against the views of those who regard Kant as the greatest of all philosophers. Dr. Bolliger almost admits this when he says that it is the fault of the Kantians if his attack is more vehement than "the historical Kant" would deserve. But there are many empiricists who will not be disposed to accept the view that the distinction of form and matter as developed by Kant and his successors is worthless. One of the most important effects of the theory of evolution on philosophy has been that attempts have been made to find an expression of this distinction that shall be consistent with empiricism.

T. WHITTAKER.

VII.—NEW BOOKS.

[*These Notes do not exclude Critical Notices later on.*]

Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development. By FRANCIS GALTON, F.R.S., &c. London: Macmillan, 1883. Pp. xii., 380.

The various important psychical researches by Mr. Galton, which have from time to time been noticed (or have appeared) in MIND—as to the formation of 'generic images' illustrated by composite portraiture, automatic representation, the statistical appreciation of differences of visualising power, &c.—are here incorporated with a multitude of other more or less cognate inquiries; all of them, though conducted through many years in apparent separation, having in his own mind been directed to the determination of the great practical question, whether it may not be possible to further and modify the process of natural evolution for the production of a more perfect humanity. It is impossible to give a notion of the variety and interest of the topics strung together by Mr. Galton as arguments towards his final conclusion that men not only may, but have it as a religious duty to, work intelligently towards shaping the course of the race's future. Among the sections of more directly psychological import, besides those mentioned above, attention may be drawn to that on "Sensitivity," followed by the one entitled "Sequence of Test Weights". Here Mr. Galton sets out a method of measurement which suggests the hope that he may apply his ingenuity in like manner to the senses generally. The sections on "Number-Forms," "Colour-Associations," and "Visionaries," bring together a great number of novel and surprising facts, made the more impressive by the engraved and coloured illustrations added at the end of the volume. In face of such mental peculiarities of individuals as he has been able to establish, Mr. Galton may well exclaim: "It will be seen in the end how greatly metaphysicians and psychologists may err who assume their own mental operations, instincts and axioms to be identical with those of the rest of mankind instead of being special to themselves." Whereas a psychologist hitherto, on noting a fact in his own mental experience, has assumed that it must hold good for all men alike, he is now by Mr. Galton's inquiries warned to expect that with other men the fact should rather be different. That does not make a science of psychology impossible, but enormously increases the need of circumspection in making general statements about the mind's action.

Prolegomena to Ethics. By the late THOMAS HILL GREEN, M.A., LL.D., Fellow of Balliol College and Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Edited by A. C. BRADLEY, M.A., Fellow of Balliol College and Professor of Modern Literature and History at University College, Liverpool. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883. Pp. xxxv., 427.

The three articles contributed by the lamented author to MIND XXV.-VII., under the title "Can there be a Natural Science of Man," fill (with four introductory pages) the first 103 pp. of this work in its final shape as now published. It is disposed by the editor in four Books: "Metaphysics of Knowledge" (pp. 10-89); "The Will" (pp. 90-159); "The Moral Ideal and Moral Progress" (pp. 160-314); "The Application of Moral Philosophy to the Guidance of Conduct" (pp. 315-427). The book is unfinished but not abruptly broken off. The editor has provided (with help from Prof. Caird) a very full and elaborate analytical Table of Contents (pp. ix.-xxxv.). He mentions that it is hoped that before long Green's published writings will be collected and edited, together with a short biography and selections from his unpublished MSS.

The Principles of Logic. By F. H. BRADLEY. London: Kegan Paul, Trench. Pp. xvi., 534.

The author sends the following:—

"The above work may be described as an attempt to answer two questions, What is Judgment, and What is Reasoning, and is a treatment of some of the topics which those questions involve. The distinction between the Categorical and the Hypothetical Judgments, and the failure to justify that distinction rationally, led the writer to discuss the whole question of Judgment and to consider its main species. He has added under Modality an account of the principles of the doctrine of Chances. The second question, What is Reasoning, was suggested by the failure alike of the Syllogism and of all the substitutes offered. Mill's Deductive Methods and Professor Jevons's Equational Logic are criticised in detail, and an attempt is made to show that the *ordinary* doctrine of the Association of Ideas is no basis for Logic, being itself an error. Inference is then found to be any ideal experiment which gives us a new truth, and an effort is made to exhibit the main varieties of these experiments and to penetrate to their inner nature. The formal and the real validity of reasoning are the subjects which then bring the volume to a close."

Ethic demonstrated in Geometrical Order, &c. By BENEDICT DE SPINOZA. Translated from the Latin by WILLIAM HALE WHITE. ("English and Foreign Philosophical Library," XXI.) London: Trübner, 1883. Pp. xxxviii., 297.

The translator states that he completed his work more than twenty years ago, but withheld it because of the little interest then taken in Spinoza. It has not now been published without

being subjected to thorough revision and considerable modification by Miss Stirling, the daughter of Dr. J. Hutchison Stirling. The result, as far as we have been able to examine, is a very careful and exact rendering, giving evidence throughout of patient and sympathetic insight. It is a great advance upon the earlier translation of the *Ethica* by R. Willis, published by the same house, and now, we may suppose, intentionally superseded by this new volume of the "English and Foreign Philosophical Library". The rendering of the Latin 'Affectus' by the obsolete English word 'Affect' (used by Shakespeare) is somewhat repellent at first sight but justifies itself upon consideration, the word 'Affection' being required for Spinoza's 'Affectio' and 'Passion' for 'Passio': the choice indeed gives proof of the intelligence that has been brought to bear upon the work. The translator's Preface brings out some of the salient features of Spinoza's thought in a striking and original way. A useful Index is appended.

Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle. Compiled by EDWIN WALLACE, M.A., LL.D., Fellow and Tutor of Worcester College, Oxford. Third Edition, enlarged. ("Pitt Press Series"). Cambridge: University Press; London: Cambridge University Press Warehouse, 1883. Pp. 130.

The author thus describes the new matter in this Edition, enlarged to almost double the size of the previous one:—

"I have added an introductory chapter [pp. 1-16] on the way in which Aristotle sought to meet the difficulties of preceding thinkers and on the general drift of his own philosophy. I have considerably expanded the chapter on Aristotle's Logic; and, throughout, I have supplemented the Greek extracts when it seemed to me that by adding a few additional words Aristotle's meaning was made more obvious. But I have also, I hope, facilitated the study of the Greek by interpolating occasionally short explanatory notes."

The Science of Man: A Manual of Anthropology based on Modern Research. By CHARLES BRAY, Author of *The Philosophy of Necessity*, &c. Second Edition. London: Longmans, Green [1883]. Pp. xv., 323.

The author has made some additions to his work as it first appeared; the argument and discursive treatment remaining what they were. It is, as originally described, an "application of the Conservation, Transmutation, and Dissipation of Energy to Mind, Morals and Religion"; an endeavour "to show the conditions under which physical force or *automatic mind* again resumes its consciousness; how the Persistence of Force and Philosophical Necessity or Law in Mind are the same, and how therefore our ethical systems may and must be brought into harmony with this now known fact"; also "to show the Unity of Force, and that all Power is Will Power, conscious or automatic".

The Pedigree of Man: and other Essays. By ERNST HÄCKEL. Translated, with the Author's permission, from the German. By EDWARD B. AVELING, D.Sc., Fellow of University College, London. With 80 Woodcuts. ("International Library of Science and Freethought," VI.) London: Freethought Publishing Company, 1883. Pp. xv., 352.

An excellent translation of the two series of Popular Lectures collected by the author in 1878-9, having been delivered within the fifteen previous years. Two in particular, "On Cell-Souls and Soul-Cells," and "On the Development of Life Particles and the Perigenesis of the Plastidule" have an interest for philosophical readers. The concluding lecture "On the Origin and the development of the Sense-Organs" becomes unsatisfactory when it touches on the most interesting question of all—the development of the eye.

Sir William Hamilton: The Man and his Philosophy. By JOHN VEITCH, LL.D., Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1883. Pp. 68.

Two Lectures recently delivered before the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution, in which the author gives one more sketch of Hamilton's life, and in expounding his philosophy finds time also for thrusts at Mill on the one hand and Hegel on the other.

The Creed of a Modern Agnostic. By RICHARD BITHELL, B.Sc., Ph.D. London: Routledge, 1883. Pp. 153.

An attempt to explain the theoretical basis and set forth the practical outcome of "Agnosticism". The book is written with intelligence and in a serious spirit.

Studies in Logic. By MEMBERS OF THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY. Boston: Little & Brown, 1883. Pp. 203.

A collection of six papers by students under Prof. C. S. Peirce at Baltimore, with an essay on "Probable Inference" (pp. 126-86) by himself. The others are concerned with Symbolic Logic, after the first which gives an acccount of the Logic of the Epicureans (by A. Marquand). We hope to return to this volume.

Philosophy of Landscape Painting. By WILLIAM M. BRYANT. St. Louis, Mo.: St. Louis News Co., 1882. Pp. 282.

The author seeks to show that there could be no true landscape-art till the modern scientific view of nature, with its necessary complement the scientific view of man, had been developed. He then considers the elements, conditions, limits and divisions

of this kind of art; and concludes with a sketch of the historical development of landscape painting. He acknowledges obligations to Hegel in particular, and to Vischer and other writers in general.

Les Maladies de la Volonté. Par TH. RIBOT. Paris: Germer Baillière, 1883. Pp. 180.

M. Ribot has in this volume followed up his new and interesting line of psychological inquiry, mental pathology. The present volume answers closely in form and mode of treatment to the previous *Les Maladies de la Mémoire*, noticed in MIND. Review will follow.

La Physique Moderne: Études historiques et philosophiques. Par ERNEST NAVILLE, Correspondant de l'Institut de France. Paris: Germer Baillière, 1883. Pp. 278.

The author, whose *Logique de l'Hypothèse* was noticed in MIND XVIII., 294, finds in these studies a confirmation of his views on scientific method. They deal successively with (1) the Characters of Modern Physics (scientific, logical, æsthetic); (2) its Origins (chiefly in the work of Descartes); (3) the Philosophy of its Founders (where the author traces the influence of religious beliefs on the governing principles of physics in the minds of some of the chief physical inquirers from Copernicus to Faraday and Mayer, and also draws out the consequences of scientific atheism). In a fourth study he considers Physics in relation to Morality, and denying the universality of the Conservation of Energy reconciles this physical principle with human liberty. The concluding study deals with the Philosophical Consequences —as to matter and mind and the idea of Creation (which is found to be confirmed by the whole course of physical inquiry, when rightly understood).

Revision der Hauptpunkte der Psychophysik. Von GUSTAV THEODOR FECHNER. Leipzig: Breitkopf u. Härtel, 1882. Pp. 427.

Instead of undertaking, at his advanced age, the revision of the famous *Elemente der Psychophysik*, so long out of print, with a view to a second edition, the venerable author has here produced an independent work, in which he practically traverses the whole ground of his original research but does so in express relation to the various critics who, especially of late years, have sifted every part of the psychophysical theory. In particular he has been stirred up to the task by the critical work of Prof. G. E. Müller of Göttingen, *Zur Grundlegung der Psychophysik*, which appeared in 1877 just after the smaller book, *In Sachen der Psychophysik*, in which the author last delivered himself on the subject so closely identified with his name. He does not find

himself driven even by Müller, still less by other opponents, to alter anything in his fundamental conceptions, but, in meeting their hostile criticism and reviewing the large amount of independent psychophysical investigation carried out since the appearance of the *Elemente*, he has many new considerations opened up for him. The book is divided into eight parts, the titles of which will give a preliminary view of its scope:—(1) On the Import of Psychophysic; (2) Principles and Methods of psychophysical Measurement; (3) Psychophysical Laws; (4) Psychophysical Ground-formulæ (with consideration of the negative values entering into them); (5) Conflict between the *psychophysical* and *physiological* views (with remarks on Wundt's *psychological* interpretation of Weber's Law and the part played by Attention in the case); (6) Some subjects of Internal Psychophysic (Attention, Waking, Sleep and Dreams, Memory); (7) Special Replies to Critics; (8) Review of various series of Psychophysical Researches.

Grundzüge der Logik u. Encyclopädie der Philosophie. Dictate aus den Vorlesungen von HERMANN LOTZE. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1883. Pp. 120.

The sixth of the series of Lotze's paragraphs for dictation in lecture; those on Metaphysic and Æsthetic now alone remaining to be published. In the present issue, Logic fills 83 pp., the main division of the subject being in the usual terms, Pure and Applied. *Encyclopädie* is disposed under four heads: (1) Meaning and Problems of Philosophy, (2) Theoretic Philosophy, (3) Investigations of Values *(die Werthe)*, (4) Philosophy of Religion.

Geschichte der neuern Philosophie. Von KUNO FISCHER. III. u. IV. Bände. Dritte neu bearbeitete Auflage. München: Bassermann, 1882. Pp. xx., 576; xviii., 516.

Since issuing in 1880 the third edition of Vol. I. 2 ("Spinoza") of his well-known *Geschichte*, Prof. K. Fischer has been busily employed in revising his Vols. III. and IV., containing the full exposition of Kant. Vol. II. "Leibniz and his School," remains on sale in the second edition, and as Vol. V., "Fichte and his Predecessors" is out of print, it is probably this rather than the earlier volume that the author will next take in hand. The revision, in the case of Vols. III. and IV., has been even more thoroughgoing than in the two parts of Vol. I., as might have been expected from the extraordinary quantity of recent Kantian literature of which account had to be taken. The chief obvious additions in Vol. III. are a detailed exposition of Kant's works in physical science and an important concluding chapter (pp. 545-76), "The various Expositions of the *Vernunftkritik*," in which he not only discusses at length the question of the two Editions, but also reckons with the movement of "Kant-philology" and in

particular repels B. Erdmann's theory of the heterogeneous composition of the *Prolegomena*. Room is found for these additions and for the introduction of a multitude of new observations throughout the exposition, by the sacrifice of all the controversial notes (against Trendelenburg) which bulked so largely in the previous issue of the volume. In Vol. IV., there is also considerable change, the doctrine of the *Critique of Judgment* having now due prominence given to it in a separate Book 3, instead of being tacked on as a second section to the "Philosophy of Religion" as first section of Book 2. Book 2 in the present edition bears the new title of "The Kantian Doctrine of Religion and the Conflict between Established Order *(Satzung)* and Criticism". For the rest, the author maintains his original exposition, according to which *The Critique of Pure Reason* forms the sole basis of a "System of Reason" into which, after "Metaphysic of Nature," the other two *Critiques* are taken up as not of the same fundamental importance. This dislocates the relation in which the three *Critiques* are naturally thought of as standing towards each other; but on the other hand it cannot be maintained that Kant worked out the three as, in the same sense, bases of a philosophical construction. Such as it is, the author's exposition may now more than ever rank as the best and completest presentation of the Critical doctrine. It should, however, be added that he might with advantage have extended his view of recent Kantian literature beyond what has appeared in Germany only.

Untersuchungen über die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und der Politischen Oekonomie insbesondere. Von CARL MENGER, o. ö., Professor der Staatswissenschaften an der Wiener Universität. Leipzig: Duncker u. Humboldt, 1883. Pp. xxxii., 291.

This is not an attempt to formulate the methods of the social sciences and political economy in particular, for which, according to the author, the time is not ripe. It is an attempt to fix the true conception of political economy and define its province within and without, in face of the different conceptions that have gained currency in Germany since the older orthodox system of the Adam Smith school ceased to prevail; the critical consideration being directed mainly to the methodological aspects of each.

Grundzüge der Moral. Gekrönte Preisschrift. Von Dr. GEORG VON GIZYCKI, Privadocent an der Universität zu Berlin. Leipzig: Friedrich, 1883. Pp. 140.

This essay had awarded to it, over sixty-five others, the prize offered by the Berlin Freethinkers' Society "Lessing" for a popular exposition of morality "based exclusively on unquestionable facts of natural knowledge": the judges were Professors H.

Grimm and Scherer, and Deputy Dr. E. Lasker. The author, who has distinguished himself by his attention to English Ethical Philosophy, adopts "the greatest possible happiness of all" as his principle, and having worked up to this in the first part of his essay applies it in the second part. Inquiring finally into the motives determining to right action, he concludes:—"In a word, the foundation of morality is not merely 'conscience,' or 'self-interest,' or 'benevolence,' or 'social impulse,' or 'sympathy,' or 'reason,' or any single power in man: it is the whole—feeling, willing, thinking—man."

La Legge del Tempo nei Fenomeni del Pensiero. Saggio di Psicologia Sperimentale di GABRIELE BUCCOLA, Docente di Psichiatria nella Regia Università di Torino. Con Incisioni e Tavole litografiche. ("Biblioteca Scientifica Internazionale," XXXVII.) Milano: Dumolard, 1883. Pp. xv., 432.

For some time past, there has been no European country displaying more psychological activity than Italy, and the present work (part of which we have noted as appearing from time to time in the *Rivista di Filosofia Scientifica*) is a proof with what fruitful result. It is a very exhaustive investigation of the Time taken by the different psychical processes, embodying the results of much original experiment as well as reproducing those of earlier inquiry. After dealing with the recognised general conditions of the investigation, the author deals successively with (1) the circumstances that modify the time of reaction, (2) the duration of the elementary psychical process in the insane, (3) reaction-time and the sense of tactile space, (4) the time of discrimination and of volitional determination, with the variations of each, (5) the duration of complex perceptions and association of ideas, (6) duration of reproduction (of perceptions of movement in visual and in tactile space), (7) the sense of time, (8) the phenomena of organic memory. It will be seen that the treatise covers ground that has been little worked over in this country; and it is much to be desired that this might be one of the works in the "International Scientific Series" to be translated into English. But the task would need a competent hand and head.

Le Teorie nativistische e genetiche della Localizzazione spaziale. Saggio critico di GIOVANNI CESCA, Dottore in Filosofia e Lettere. Verona, Padova: Drucker e Tedeschi, 1883. Pp. 160.

The author, who is one of the most active workers of the Italian scientific school, has here reviewed the later psychological discussions of the Space-question with the following result: —

"(1) The problem of the notion of space has not been solved by any of the theories: the one future theory that will be valid and will solve the problem will be a psychogenetic theory of the representation of something outside the Ego, whose parts are outside one another.

(2) The problem of the determination of spatial position has been definitively solved by the theory of the genetic associative school.

(3) The problem of the distinction of simultaneous sensations of the same kind has been definitively solved by Lotze's theory of local signs.

(4) The problem of determining the position of a sensation has been definitively resolved by the genetic theories of Lotze and of Wundt; which have, however, to be corrected in the secondary point of having muscular sensations substituted for sensations of innervation, whose existence is not made good."

Body and Will: Being an Essay concerning Will in its Metaphysical, Physiological and Pathological Aspects. By HENRY MAUDSLEY, M.D. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 1883. Pp. viii., 342.

The following extract is from the Preface of this *presently forthcoming* work:—

"This Essay has had its beginnings in lectures and addresses which I have given on different occasions during the last ten years; the themes of which were Conscience and Organisation, the Physical Basis of Will, Lessons of Materialism, and the like. The design, entertained vaguely for some time, of collecting them into a book was abandoned, because it was evident that the treatment of the subject in that loose way would not be sufficiently concise and methodical, or indeed adequate. Thereupon this essay on Will in its metaphysical, physiological, and pathological relations was undertaken, in order to have unity of subject and to treat it systematically and with more pretence to completeness. The freedom of a spiritual will being the stronghold of a metaphysical psychology, there can be no accusation of evading difficulties when that is selected as test-subject of the value of the doctrines arrived at by the positive method of observation and induction. If the method fails there, its fundamental incompetence must be frankly admitted."

VIII.—MISCELLANEOUS.

The Rev. John Owen, author of *Evenings with the Skeptics*, noticed in the last No. of MIND, sends the following:—

While I feel very grateful to Dr. Burns-Gibson for his kindly notice of my *Evenings with the Skeptics*, I should be glad to be allowed to explain one or two misconceptions which he seems to have formed as to the aim of the work, and also to assign a few reasons for crediting William of Occam with a larger share of mysticism than Dr. Burns-Gibson seems inclined to allow him.

As to the first point: The primary object of the book is to consider the relation of pre-critical thought at different epochs to the prevailing dogmatic structures, philosophical or theological, of the same periods. Such an attempt necessitates a division of the great thinkers of history into Analytical and Constructive and a stress, especial if not exclusive, on the former. Now while I am prepared to acknowledge that a complete demarcation of the analytical from the synthetical thinker is a matter of some difficulty, a sufficiently approximate criterion may be found by inquiring as to any particular philosopher, What was the *chief* effect produced by his teaching upon the current beliefs of his time? Judged by this rule it seems evident that while, *e.g.*, Sokrates and Plato exercised a disintegrating effect on Greek thought, the chief influence of Aristotle was of a different kind. His work consisted mainly in arranging and systematising what he regarded as the most reliable products of Greek speculation, and its effect was therefore constructive and dogmatic. As to Duns Scotus my reason for not including him among the disruptive agents of mediæval theology was partly want of space, partly that his most salient qualities are manifested in the work by the more influential thinkers Erigena and Abelard. I may add that want of space compelled me to omit a more important contribution to mediæval free thought than that supplied by Duns Scotus, *viz.*, the fascinating episode of free inquiry represented by Arab thinkers, especially Averroes and Al Ghazzali. This omission I regard as serious and hope to supply at some future time.

Giordano Bruno, whose presence among my "Skeptics" Dr. Burns-Gibson seems to think strange, claims a place as representing in a very striking manner a mode of thought which made havoc of mediæval theology. I should be the last to deny the large proportion of constructive thought in his philosophical system, but his synthesis is based upon the new Copernican astronomy. In respect of the general thought of his time, his influence seems to me to have been altogether destructive.

As regards more modern thinkers adduced by Dr. Burns-Gibson, I quite agree with him that Hume, Kant, and Mill ought to find a place in every complete catalogue of analytical and free thinkers, and they are included in my own conspectus. Hamilton I do not think deserves to be placed among them. Both his aims and influence were constructive.

Dr. Burns-Gibson finds fault with my treatment of Occam. He thinks I have underrated his scepticism and taken too seriously his mysticism. If I had confined my attention to the *Quodlibeta* and *Centilogium*, I should, no doubt, have made him not only an inquiring and suspensive, but a denying sceptic. But the works just named form but a small portion of his writings, and in his remaining works, especially his great work on the *Sentences* and his *Dialogues*, his mysticism assumes a clear and distinct form, and is urged with so much force and evident *bona fides* that it seems

to me impossible not to take it seriously. Besides, mysticism formed one of the leading characteristics of the Spiritual Franciscans—Occam's comrades in the struggle against Rome, and it is easy to see the advantage their polemic derived from the adoption of such a standpoint. I need hardly remind Dr. Burns-Gibson that a scepticism more or less avowed in external dogma and mere traditional belief is not only compatible with mysticism, but is oftentimes its cause and starting point.

Dr. G. M. Beard of New York, whose writings on Trance and related subjects have repeatedly been noticed in MIND, died in January last at the age of 43.

Mr. Herbert Spencer, who was lately elected Corresponding Member of the *Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, has declined the honour on grounds of principle.

Messrs. Trübner & Co. will publish in October Vol. I. of the translation of Schopenhauer's *Welt als Wille u. Vorstellung*, by Messrs. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp. This volume, embracing the first four books of the original, will contain a complete exposition of Schopenhauer's own system. Vols. II. and III. of the translation, to follow, will contain the criticism of Kant's Philosophy and the "Ergänzungen". The same publishers announce for December the long-promised translation of v. Hartmann's *Philosophie des Unbewussten*, by Mr. W. C. Coupland.

THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.—Vol. XVI. No. 4. W. H. Kimball—Fate and Freedom. Hegel—On the Absolute Religion (trans.). J. Ward—A General Analysis of Mind. J. Burns-Gibson—On Some Idols or Factitious Unities. Kant—Anthropology (trans.). Trentowski—On the Sources and Faculties of Cognition. Notes and Discussions.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.—VIIIme Année, No. 4. A. Fouillée—Les arguments psychologiques en faveur du libre arbitre. Ch. Secrétan—La métaphysique de l'eudémonisme, du pessimisme et de l'impératif catégorique. A. Binet—Du raisonnement dans les perceptions. Note (M. Guyau—Sur les modifications artificielles du caractère dans le somnambulisme provoqué). Analyses et Comptes-rendus. Rev. des Périod. No. 5. Ch. Bénard—La vie esthétique. F. Paulhan—L'obligation morale au point de vue intellectuel. Fonsegrive—Sur les prétendues contradictions de Descartes. Note (M. L. Dauriac—Les origines logiques de la doctrine de Parménide). Analyses, &c. (E. Wallace—*Aristotle's Psychology*, &c.). Notices bibliographiques. Rev. des Périod. No. 6. A. Fouillée—Le libre arbitre et la contingence des futurs. Beaunis—Sur la comparaison du temps de réaction pour les différentes sensations. P. Tannery—Études de philosophie ancienne : Anaximène et l'unité de substance. Fonsegrive—Sur les prétendues contradictions de Descartes (fin). Revue Générale (G. Tarde—Quelques criminalistes italiens de la nouvelle école). Analyses, &c. Rev. des Périod.

LA CRITIQUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.—XIIme Année, Nos. 1—20. C. Renouvier—Réponse à différentes objections contre le principe juridique de la morale (1) ; Une espèce du pessimisme à propos de l'étude de M. Scherer sur Amiel (12) ; Politique et socialisme : xiv. La philosophie de Fourier (14, 16). Georges Noel—Le nombre et l'espace (3). Sh. H. Hodgson—Philosophie de la réflexion (trad., 3, 5, 7, 8, 9). A. Penjon—Cours de philosophie (6). F. Grindelle—Les petits traités d'éducation morale et

civique (8, 11, 13). F. Pillon—À propos de la notion de nombre (9, 11, 12, 15); Quatre anciens manuels ou catéchismes d'instruction morale et civique (17, 18, 19, 20). A. Naville—La science et l'art (13). L. Dauriac—De la psychologie independante: Evolutionnisme et criticisme (16); L'origine des métaphysiques (17).

La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane.—Vol. XXVI. Disp. 2. G. Barzellotti—L'idealismo di A. Schopenhauer e la sua dottrina della percezione. T. Davidson—Rosmini falsamente accusato dinanzi a Leone XIII. T. Mamiani—Osservazione sull' articolo che antecede. P. Ragnisco—Il principio di contraddizione in Aristotele. C. Cantoni—Lettera a T. Mamiani. T. M.—Filosofia giuridica. A. Chiappelli—Panezio di Rhodi e il suo giudizio sulla autenticità del *Fedono*. T. M.—Ancora del primo fatto e del primo vero. Disp. 3. T. Ronconi—Del nome comune. G. S. Tempia—Il valore educativo degli studi sociali e la cultura femminile. A. Paoli—La logica di Gugl. Wundt. F. Tocco—F. Masci, *Le idee morali in Grecia prima di Aristotele*. B. Bertinaria—Fondamenti filosofici della scienza politica. T. Mamiani—Di nuovo del primo fatto e del primo vero. Notizie, &c.

Rivista di Filosofia Scientifica.—An. II. No. 2. R. Ardigò—Empirismo e scienza. G. Trezza—Il Darwinismo e le formazioni storiche . . . Riv. Sint. (G. Sergi—L'antropologia moderna). Riv. Anal. (G. J. Romanes, *Animal Intelligence*), &c. No. 3. . . . L. Paolucci—Studi di psicologia comparata. Il linguaggio degli uccelli: i. Sulla struttura fonetica delle voci usate dagli uccelli. . . . &c.

Zeitschrift für Philosophie, &c.—Bd. LXXXII. Heft 2. W. Schuppe—Was sind Ideen? (ii.) R. Eucken—Fortlage als Religionsphilosoph. M. Sartorius—Die Entwicklung der Astronomie bei den Griechen bis Anaxagoras u. Empedokles, in besonderem Anschluss an Theophrast (i.). G. Neudecker—Denknothwendigkeit u. Selbstgewissheit in ihrem Erkenntnisstheoretischen Verhältniss (mit erläuternden u. berichtigenden Anmerkungen von H. Ulrici). C. B. Braig—Der Pessimismus in seinen psychologischen u. logischen Grundlagen. Recensionen. Bibliographie.

Philosophische Monatshefte.—Bd. XIX. Heft 3, 4. B. Erdmann—Eine unbeachtet gebliebene Quelle zur Entwicklungsgeschichte Kant's. J. H. Witte—Die angebliche "Blattversetzung in Kant's *Prolegomena*". Recensionen u. Anzeigen. Litteraturbericht. Bibliographie, &c. Heft 5. E. Feuerlein—Die Selbstpflicht im System der Moral. Recensionen u. Anzeigen. Bibliographie, &c.

Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie u. Sprachwissenschaft.—Bd. XIV. Heft 3. J. Duboc—Kant u. der Eudämonismus (mit Bemerkung dazu von H. Steinthal). F. Misteli—Die theorie der Abschleifung im Indogermanischen u. Ugrischen. A. Bastian—Masken u. Maskereien.

Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie.—Bd. VII. Heft 2. J. Jacobson—Philosophische Untersuchungen zur Metageometrie (i.). F. Tönnies—Studie zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Spinoza (i.). B. Erdmann—Logische Studien (ii.). Anzeigen. Selbstanzeigen, &c.

Other Books, &c., received: J. W. Reynolds, *The Supernatural in Nature*, 3rd Ed., pp. 509, and *The Mystery of Miracles*, 3rd Ed. London (Kegan Paul, Trench). K. Pearson, *The Ethic of Freethought*, London (E. W. Allen), pp. 16. A. Wysard, The Intellectual and Moral Problem of Goethe's *Faust*, London (Trübner), pp. 80. J. Griesland, *Genie de l'Homme: Libre Philosophie*, Paris (Germer Baillière), pp. 374. P. Piper, *Schriften Notker's u. seiner Schule*, II. 1, Freiburg i. B., u. Tübingen (Mohr), pp. 224.